The Secretary-General has the
honour to transmit to the Security Council a report submitted by the Executive
Chairman of the Special Commission established by the Secretary-General
pursuant to paragraph 9 (b) (i) of Security Council resolution 687 (1991).
95-18315 (E) 200695 /...
*9518315*
Annex
Ninth report of the Executive
Chairman of the Special Commission
established by the
Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph
9 (b) (i) of Security Council
resolution 687 (1991), on the
activities of the
Special Commission
I. INTRODUCTION
1. The present report is the
ninth on the activities of the Special Commission established by the
Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 9 (b) (i) of Security Council
resolution 687 (1991), submitted to the Council by the Executive Chairman of
the Special Commission. It is the
eighth such report provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Security Council
resolution 699 (1991). It covers the
period from 10 December 1994 to 16 June 1995, and is further to reports
contained in documents S/23165, S/23268, S/24108 and Corr.1, S/24984, S/25977,
S/26910, S/1994/750 and S/1994/1422 and Add.1.
2. The work of the Special
Commission in the reporting period has covered the whole range of activities
envisaged by section C of Security Council resolution 687 (1991). However, the focus has been to ensure that
the Commission is henceforth in a position to monitor Iraq's compliance with
its obligations not to use, retain, possess, develop, construct or otherwise
acquire those weapon capabilities banned to it under resolution 687
(1991). For the Commission's monitoring
to proceed from a comprehensive and accurate base requires that the Commission
be able to account, as far as possible, for the disposal or current location of
Iraq's capabilities, both past and present, which could be used for banned
weapons purposes. Consequently, a large
part of the developments to be covered in the present report has already been
addressed in the report submitted on 10 April 1995 under Security Council
resolution 715 (1991) (S/1995/284).
II. DEVELOPMENTS
A. General
3. The Commission has continued
to be extremely active in the period under review. Investigations to elucidate fully all aspects of Iraq's past
programmes have continued apace with analytical work being conducted at the
Commission's headquarters in New York, inspection and investigation teams being
dispatched to Iraq, inquiries on specific matters being addressed to supporting
Governments and the responses to those inquiries being fed back into the
analytical and investigative work.
Seminars with international experts on relevant issues have been
convened in New York under the auspices of the Special Commission in order to
assist in the analytical process.
Further work has been undertaken on the proposal for an export/import
monitoring mechanism called for by the Security Council in paragraph 7 of its
resolution 715 (1991). This proposal is
currently with the Sanctions Committee established under Security Council
resolution 661 (1990) for its approval, prior to onward transmission to
the Council for adoption. A more
detailed assessment of the status of the Commission's work in each area is
given below.
4. During the period from 14 to
17 May 1995, the Deputy Executive Chairman of the Special Commission visited
Baghdad with a group of chemical weapon experts. The primary purpose of that visit was to address issues arising
from the analysis, by the Commission, of Iraq's amended full, final and
complete disclosure of its past chemical weapons programmes, submitted on
25 March 1995. Its secondary
purpose was to press Iraq to respond to the Commission's concerns relating to
Iraq's past biological warfare programme.
The mission obtained agreement by Iraq that significant questions did
exist and that Iraq would address the chemical issues in written form during
the Executive Chairman's next visit to Iraq.
On biological matters, Iraq indicated that it could resolve the
Commission's concerns, but only after the Commission had agreed that all other
areas were closed.
5. Over the period from 29 May to
1 June 1995, the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission visited Baghdad
for high-level talks with Iraq. During
that time, the Executive Chairman had separate discussions with Iraq's Deputy
Prime Minister, Mr. Tariq Aziz, and with the Director of Iraq's Military
Industrialization Corporation, General Amer Mohammad Rasheed al Ubeidi. The aim of the visit was threefold: to continue the high-level dialogue
initiated in July 1993; to seek to push forward the process of clarifying
outstanding issues, particularly in the biological weapons area; and to
prepare, through the discussions, for the writing of the present report. Technical talks were also held on chemical
weapons, during which some significant progress was made, and on ballistic
missiles. However, Iraq refused to
engage in efforts to resolve, with the specialists accompanying the Executive
Chairman for that purpose, the biological weapon issues referred to in the
Commission's last report of April 1995 to the Council.
6. During the meeting with the
Deputy Prime Minister, he stated that Iraq's sole reason for cooperating with
the Special Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was
that it sought reintegration into the international community through the
lifting of the sanctions and embargo, that is, through the fulfilment of the
terms and implementation of paragraphs 21 and 22 of Security Council
resolution 687 (1991), leading to the normalization of relations with Member
States. If there were no prospect of
such reintegration, it would be difficult for Iraq to justify the expense and
the effort involved in such cooperation.
However, because Iraq wanted full reintegration into the international
community, it was prepared to make the necessary sacrifices as long as there
was a prospect that such sacrifices would bear fruit.
7. Mr. Aziz stated that, for
Iraq, prospects for the desired reintegration would only look good if the
Special Commission and IAEA reported clearly to the Security Council that the
essential provisions of Council resolutions 687 (1991) and
715 (1991), that is, those required for the implementation of paragraph 22
of the former resolution, had been implemented. He described those essential provisions as being the elimination
of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles with a range
greater than 150 kilometres and the operation of an effective ongoing
monitoring and verification system to ensure Iraq's compliance with its
obligations not to reacquire such weapons.
At the present stage, Iraq required statements, on the one hand from the
Special Commission that the chemical weapons and missile files were closed and
the ongoing monitoring and verification system was operational, and on the
other from IAEA that the nuclear file was closed. If Iraq thus deemed the prospects of reintegration to be
positive, it would be ready in late June 1995 to address to the Special
Commission's satisfaction the sole outstanding issue of significance, the
biological issue. If the prospects were
not good, it would have to assess the situation again.
8. In response to this, the
Executive Chairman stated that much had been achieved in the implementation of
paragraphs 8 to 10 of Security Council resolution 687 (1991) - indeed, the bulk
of what was required. However, those
provisions were not confined to the elimination of the named weapons, but also
of associated major parts, subsystems and components of such weapons and of
facilities for their research, development and production. The latter had, because of Iraq's incomplete
and late declarations, taken longer to identify and eliminate than had the
weapons. Nevertheless, while there
remained a major issue in the biological area concerning the extent of Iraq's
past programmes and hence the comprehensiveness of monitoring in the biological
area, most of the work was now done. A
system of ongoing monitoring and verification was operational in all
areas. The export/import monitoring
mechanism was available for early adoption and implementation.
9. The Chairman stated that, in
the missile and chemical areas, while technical issues remained outstanding,
they related more to the level of technical expertise achieved by Iraq or to
accounting for components or materials than to weapons themselves or to an
operational weapons production capability.
Uncertainties arising from such issues (as mentioned in the report to
the Security Council contained in document S/1995/284) had been reduced by Iraq
during discussions with the Commission.
They were no longer significant, in his view, for the evaluation of the
fulfilment of the terms of paragraphs 8 to 10 of Security Council
resolution 687 (1991), namely the assessment of whether Iraq's proscribed
ballistic missile and chemical weapon capabilities had been eliminated and that
current dual-purpose capabilities were being adequately monitored. However, he insisted that those issues still
needed to be resolved and the Commission would continue to use its rights to do
so under the relevant resolutions, the plan for ongoing monitoring and
verification and the agreement contained in the Exchange of Letters of 7 and 14
May 1991 between the Secretary-General and the Foreign Minister of Iraq,
regardless of what action the Security Council took on the implementation of
paragraph 22 of resolution 687 (1991).
10. In that regard, the Executive
Chairman welcomed the Deputy Prime Minister's pledge, made in October 1993 and
reaffirmed during the meeting, to cooperate with such efforts and with future
inspection teams investigating matters relating to past programmes, even after
any decision by the Security Council to ease or lift the sanctions and the
embargo.
B. Missiles
11. As reported in April 1995
(S/1995/284), the Commission has essentially completed the accounting of
proscribed ballistic missile capabilities, that is, ballistic missiles with a
range greater than 150 kilometres and related major parts, and repair and
production facilities associated with Iraq's past programmes in that area. Furthermore, as also noted in the report,
missile monitoring was now operational.
Further progress has since been made in the Commission's investigations,
in the disposal of certain missile-related items and in clarifying the direction
of Iraq's missile research and development efforts. Additional responses to the Commission's requests for information
from some former suppliers would be of great assistance in the early completion
of the verification process in this area.
Investigations will continue until the Commission is satisfied that it
has obtained as detailed a picture as possible of all aspects of Iraq's past
programmes and current capabilities.
However, the Commission considers that final elucidation of these
outstanding matters should not materially affect its current assessment, as
contained in the conclusions of the present report, of the overall extent of
Iraq's past missile programmes.
C. Chemical weapons
12. As stated in its reports of
June 1994 and April 1995 (S/1994/750 and S/1995/284), the Commission has
completed the destruction of Iraq's identified chemical weapon facilities,
stockpiles and production equipment and the Commission's chemical monitoring
system in Iraq is now operational.
Destruction activities were extensive, lasting two years and resulting
in the destruction of over 480,000 litres of chemical warfare agents, over
28,000 chemical munitions and nearly 1,800,000 litres, over 1,040,000 kilograms
and 648 barrels, of some 45 different precursor chemicals for the production of
chemical warfare agents. Ongoing
monitoring and verification, together with an effective export/import
monitoring mechanism, is designed to preclude Iraq from resuming prohibited
chemical activities.
13. The Commission has actively
pursued its investigations to clarify those issues raised in the April
report: completing the material balance
for imported precursors and agent production; accounting for production
equipment and munitions; and fully elucidating the extent of Iraq's
achievements in research, development and production of the nerve agent
VX. In that regard, it has held a
seminar in New York of international experts on chemical weapons and, in the
absence of documentary evidence from Iraq, has had further contacts with
several supporting Governments to obtain verification of the quantities and
types of chemical weapon-related items supplied by companies operating in their
territories. This has resulted in the
receipt of a large number of documents, which the Commission is continuing to
analyse. The discussions held at
Baghdad in May 1995 with Iraqi experts and inspection activities since the
April report have provided more information and led to some important
clarifications.
14. Iraq, at the Commission's
request, has provided additional information on its procurement and disposition
of precursor chemicals acquired for VX production and the reason for the
cancellation of the project. This
included original documentary evidence to support Iraq's declarations concerning
its procurement of certain precursor chemicals. It also included details of the location of the sites at which
Iraq disposed of one of the three key VX precursor chemicals, which enabled the
Commission's resident chemical monitoring group to verify the Iraqi
account. By taking samples at the sites
concerned, the group verified that quantities of the pure chemical were indeed
present and that the size of the pits in which the chemical was buried was
consistent, in general terms, with the quantities of the chemical Iraq declared
to be buried there. Iraq also gave the
Commission information, pertaining to the second VX precursor, that the
chemical monitoring group will verify in the coming weeks in order to confirm
the disposition of the major portion of Iraq's declared imports of the
precursor. On other issues related to
the VX project, Iraq has promised that it will continue its efforts to obtain
facts that will enable the Commission to verify Iraq's account. It has followed up on this undertaking and
is continuing to send more information to the Commission.
15. During the discussions in May
1995, the Commission received additional information on quantities of various
munitions acquired by Iraq and the purpose for their acquisition, particularly
as it related to the chemical weapon programme. Iraq reaffirmed in writing that all of the munition types
investigated by the Commission in relation to the chemical weapon programme
were indeed acquired solely for chemical-fill purposes. While accounting fully for such munitions
remains an important task, in the light of the Commission's current knowledge
of the disposition of Iraq's stocks of chemical agents and their precursors,
the significance of the issue of empty munitions in terms of chemical warfare
capabilities is much diminished. Iraq
further stated that it would address, in the framework of future biological
discussions, the Commission's concern that these munitions might be or might
have been used for the weaponization of biological warfare agents.
16. The Commission is now
confident that it has a good overall picture of the extent of Iraq's past
chemical weapons capabilities and that the essential elements of it have been
destroyed. Remaining issues, which
centre by and large on verification of Iraq's revised declarations, can be
resolved satisfactorily given continued cooperation on the part of Iraq and
assistance from supporting Governments on supplies to Iraq. These issues will be pursued until the
Commission considers that all avenues for investigation have been exhausted.
D. Biological weapons
17. The situation in the
biological area remains blocked by Iraq's refusal to address the Commission's
concerns. The evidence available to the
Commission establishes that Iraq obtained or sought to obtain all the items and
materials required to produce biological warfare agents in Iraq. With Iraq's failure to account for all those
items and material for legitimate purposes, the only conclusion that can be
drawn is that there is a high risk that Iraq purchased them and used them at
least in part for proscribed purposes - the production of agents for biological
weapons. Indeed, since the Commission's
last report to the Security Council, it has received additional documentary
evidence from supporting Governments that lends further weight to that
conclusion. While all the elements of
the system for biological monitoring are in place and monitoring is proceeding,
the Commission cannot be certain that monitoring is comprehensive in coverage
because it has been unable to obtain a credible account of Iraq's past military
biological activities.
18. Since April 1995, Iraq has
responded to the Commission's concerns in that regard only by assuring the
Commission that Iraq could be prepared to address the matter in late June
1995. In the meantime, Iraq has stated
that it is not responding to the Commission's questions concerning the scope of
Iraq's military biological activities or any other issue relating to Iraq's
proscribed biological programme. This
has had the additional detrimental effect of delaying the completion of
investigations and assessments of certain missile and chemical issues. Iraq's failure to account for its military
biological programme leaves one of its essential obligations unfulfilled.
E. National implementation measures
19. There have been no new
developments since the Commission's report in April 1995 regarding the
national implementation measures Iraq is required to take under the plans for
ongoing monitoring and verification.
Iraq's anticipated enactment of those measures in the course of April
has not materialized. The Commission
will continue to pursue the matter and to press for the adoption of the
necessary legislation so that this positive development can be reported to the
Council.
F. Aerial inspections
20. The Commission's aerial
inspection assets, the high-altitude surveillance aircraft (U2) and the
Baghdad-based Aerial Inspection Team, continue to make an important
contribution to the overall effort to ensure that all relevant activities and
facilities within Iraq are encompassed by the monitoring regime.
21. Both assets continue to
conduct aerial surveillance of sites under monitoring in Iraq and designated
sites, at the direction of the Commission.
Experts from the resident monitoring teams accompany the team in order
to assist it in focusing on particular areas of relevance at sites. The results obtained from aerial missions
are an important part of the overall inspection process in Iraq.
22. As at the end of May 1995, 250
missions have been undertaken by the U2 and 580 missions by the Aerial
Inspection Team.
G. Baghdad Monitoring and Verification Centre
23. A full description of the
status of the Centre is contained in paragraphs 123 to 127 of the April
report. In addition, on 30 May 1995,
the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission inaugurated the biological
room in the Centre and, in May and June, the security camera system was
upgraded. All of the Centre's planned
facilities are now operational.
H. Export/import mechanism
24. As stated in the April report,
a proposal for a mechanism, required under paragraph 7 of Security Council
resolution 715 (1991), to monitor the sales to Iraq by other countries of
dual-purpose items has been prepared and submitted jointly by the Special
Commission and IAEA to the Sanctions Committee established pursuant to Security
Council resolution 661 (1990) for the latter's consideration. The Committee has twice considered the
proposal since it was resubmitted in February 1995, but, while it appears that
there is no objection to the text and that all delegations have expressed support
for the principles contained in it, formal agreement to submit it to the
Security Council, in the name of all three bodies as required by resolution 715
(1991), has yet to be reached.
25. In the meantime, the Special
Commission has continued its efforts to prepare for the implementation of the
mechanism after its adoption by the Council:
dedicated software for a transaction-based database is being developed
for installation on the Commission's computer network; supporting documents and
notification forms have been further refined; a preparatory inspection of
Iraq's principal points of entry for traded goods has been undertaken to ensure
that the Commission has full knowledge of Iraq's import procedures and
facilities; and Iraq's legislation relevant to import and export has been
obtained for study. Through such
preparations, the Commission aims to be in a position to implement its
obligations under the mechanism immediately upon the Security Council taking
appropriate action to adopt the mechanism and to bring it into effect.
III. CONCLUSIONS
26. The Government of Iraq has
stated that, for it to see value in cooperating with the Special Commission and
IAEA, it needed to be convinced that there was a prospect of paragraphs 21 and
22 of Security Council resolution 687 (1991) being implemented. It, therefore, demanded that the Special
Commission and IAEA report to the Council that it had met the terms laid down
in paragraph 22.
27. The Commission has repeatedly
assured Iraq that its endeavours have been directed to bringing about, as soon as
possible, a situation where paragraph 22 can be implemented. This, however, requires that the Commission
be able to report to the Council that, based on its technical assessment, Iraq
has met the requirements of paragraphs 8 to 10 of resolution 687 (1991). The Commission must be satisfied that the
proscribed items have been disposed of, that it has as complete a picture as
possible of Iraq's past programmes and that a comprehensive system of
monitoring is operational.
28. Paragraph 22 states that:
"The Security
Council,
"...
"Decides
... that ... upon Council agreement that Iraq has completed all actions
contemplated in paragraphs 8 to 13 above, the prohibitions against the import
of commodities and products originating in Iraq and the prohibitions against
financial transactions related thereto ... shall have no further force or
effect".
The Special Commission is responsible for reporting on the
implementation of paragraphs 8 to 10 and the Director-General of IAEA on the
implementation of paragraphs 11 to 13.
The actions contemplated of Iraq in paragraphs 8 to 10 are as
follows:
"8. ... Iraq shall unconditionally accept the
destruction, removal, or rendering harmless, under international supervision,
of:
(a) All chemical and biological weapons and all
stocks of agents and all related subsystems and components and all research,
development, support and manufacturing facilities related thereto;
(b) All ballistic missiles with a range greater
than one hundred fifty kilometres, and related major parts and repair and
production facilities;
"9. ... (a) Iraq shall submit to the Secretary-General ...
a declaration on the locations, amounts and types of all items specified in
paragraph 8 and agree to urgent, on-site inspection ...;
"9. ... (b)
(ii) The yielding by Iraq of possession
to the Special Commission for destruction, removal or rendering harmless ... of
all items specified under paragraph 8 (a), including items at
the additional locations designated by the Special Commission ... and the
destruction by Iraq, under the supervision of the Special Commission, of all
its missile capabilities, including launchers, as specified in
paragraph 8 (b);
"...
"10. Decides further that Iraq shall
unconditionally undertake not to use, develop, construct or acquire any of the
items specified in paragraphs 8 and 9, and requests the Secretary-General, in
consultation with the Special Commission, to develop a plan for the future
ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance with the present paragraph
...".
Paragraph 5 of Security Council resolution 715
(1991), itself an elaboration of paragraph 10 of resolution 687 (1991),
adds:
"The
Security Council,
"...
"5. Demands that Iraq meet unconditionally
all its obligations under the plans [for the future ongoing monitoring and
verification of Iraq's compliance with paragraph 10 of resolution 687 (1991)]
approved by the present resolution and cooperate fully with the Special
Commission ... in carrying out the plans".
29. Clearly, Iraq has not met all
these terms, given the absence of credible accounting for its military
biological activities. In the ballistic
missile and chemical weapon areas, the Commission is now confident that it has
a good overall picture of the extent of Iraq's past programmes and that the
essential elements of its proscribed capabilities have been disposed of. While there are still some issues to be
resolved in those two areas, the uncertainties arising from them do not present
a pattern consistent with efforts to conceal a programme to retain acquired
proscribed weapons. These remaining
issues are not of a magnitude that would affect the assessment as to whether
Iraq has completed the substantive actions required of it under paragraphs 8
to 10 of Security Council resolution 687 (1991) to eliminate its proscribed
ballistic missile and chemical weapon and related facilities and to permit
effective monitoring of its compliance in those areas.
30. The Commission has pursued,
and is continuing to pursue, all means available to it to identify and verify
every aspect of Iraq's past programmes.
It realizes, however, that conditions have been such, particularly where
the acquisition and disposal of items is concerned, that a verified accounting
of each and every element of the past programmes is beyond the realm of
possibility, given the various hostilities in which Iraq has been engaged and
the unilateral actions by Iraq to destroy weapons, equipment, supplies and
documentation. The Commission is,
however, satisfied that, in the missile and chemical fields, it has achieved
such a level of knowledge and understanding of Iraq's past programmes that it
can have confidence that Iraq does not now have any significant proscribed
capability. It is also confident that
the comprehensiveness of its ongoing monitoring and verification activities,
while those activities continue, is such that the Commission would detect any attempt
to reconstitute a proscribed capability in those areas. Verification of the latest information
obtained by the Commission in the missile and chemical fields can be carried
out satisfactorily during the Commission's ongoing monitoring and verification
operations, using the rights and privileges available to it under the relevant
resolutions, the Exchange of Letters and the plan for ongoing monitoring and
verification. As noted in paragraph 10
above, the Commission welcomes Iraq's pledge to cooperate with these efforts,
even after any decision by the Security Council to ease or lift the sanctions
and the embargo.
31. As regards paragraph 10 of
resolution 687 (1991), it will be recalled that, by identical letters of 6
April 1991 to the Secretary-General and to the President of the Security Council
(S/22456), Iraq indicated its acceptance of that resolution, and by further
identical letters of 11 June 1991 to the same addressees (S/22689), Iraq
confirmed that it had unconditionally undertaken not to use, develop, construct
or acquire any of the items specified in the resolution. By a letter dated 26 November 1993 from the
Minister for Foreign Affairs to the President of the Council (S/26811), the
Government of Iraq stated that it had decided to accept the obligations set
forth in resolution 715 (1991) and to comply with the provisions of the
plans for monitoring and verification as contained therein.
32. On 7 October and again on 15
December 1994 (see S/1994/1138 and Corr.1 and S/1994/1422), the Commission
reported to the Council that the ongoing monitoring and verification system was
provisionally operational and that testing of the system had begun. In its report to the Council of 10 April
1995 (S/1995/284), it reported that the elements of ongoing monitoring and
verification were now in place and the system was operational and that it had
received full cooperation from Iraq in setting up and operation of the
monitoring system. To ensure the
comprehensiveness of the system as far as Iraq's obligations are concerned,
Iraq needs to respond satisfactorily to the Commission's concerns regarding its
past biological weapons programme.
Furthermore, as the plan for ongoing monitoring and verification notes
(S/22871/Rev.1, para. 10), the efficacy of the provisions of the plan will
be enhanced when they are complemented by an export/import monitoring mechanism
that combines transparency with timely information on future sales or supplies
to Iraq of relevant dual-use items.
Presently, the Commission is satisfied that Iraq's cooperation in
carrying out the monitoring plan has been of a degree that satisfies the
provisions of paragraph 5 of Security Council resolution 715 (1991).
