The Secretary-General has the
honour to transmit to the Security Council a report submitted by the Executive
Chairman of the Special Commission established by the Secretary-General
pursuant to paragraph 9 (b) (i) of Security Council resolution 687 (1991).
95-10422 (E) 120495 /...
*9510422*
Annex
Report of the Secretary-General on the
status of the implementation
of the Special Commission's plan for
the ongoing monitoring and
verification of Iraq's compliance with
relevant parts of section C
of Security Council
resolution 687 (1991)
CONTENTS
Paragraphs Page
I. INTRODUCTION
..........................................
1 - 2 3
II. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS
................................. 3 -
4 3
III. ACTIONS
TO IMPLEMENT THE PLAN ......................... 5 - 127 6
A. Ongoing monitoring and verification operations
.... 5 - 96 6
1. Missile activities
............................ 5 - 23 6
2. Chemical activities
........................... 24 - 58 10
3. Biological activities
......................... 59 - 87 16
4. Nuclear activities
............................ 88 - 92 22
5. Aerial surveillance
........................... 93 - 96 23
B. Export/import mechanism
........................... 97 - 113 23
1. Actions to establish the mechanism
............ 99 - 107 24
2. Actions to implement the mechanism
............ 108 - 113 25
C. National implementation measures ..................
114 - 116 26
D. Organization
...................................... 117 - 127 27
1. Executive Office, New York
.................... 117 - 122 27
2. Baghdad Monitoring and Verification Centre
.... 123 - 127 28
IV. FUTURE OPERATIONS
..................................... 128 - 132 29
A. Financial status of the Special Commission
........ 128 - 130 29
B. Operations and organization
....................... 131 - 132 30
V. CONCLUSIONS ...........................................
133 - 136 30
Appendix.
Inspection schedule ......................................... 32
I. INTRODUCTION
1. The
present report is the seventh submitted pursuant to paragraph 8 of Security
Council resolution 715 (1991) of 11 October 1991, by which the Council
requested the Secretary-General to submit a report to the Security Council
every six months on the implementation of the Special Commission's Plan for
ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance with relevant parts of
section C of Security Council resolution 687 (1991). It updates the information contained in the
first six reports (S/23801, S/24661, S/25620, S/26684, S/1994/489 and
S/1994/1138 and Corr.1).
2. Further
information concerning developments relating to the implementation of the plan
is contained in the report to the Security Council of
15 December 1994 (S/1994/1422 and Add.1), the seventh report provided
in accordance with paragraph 3 of resolution 699 (1991), the addendum to which
covers in detail the array of ongoing monitoring and verification activities
undertaken by the Commission in the period from June to December 1994.
II. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS
3. The
basic elements of the ongoing monitoring and verification system are regular
inspections of relevant facilities, inventories of dual-purpose items 1/ and
accounting for all inventoried items until they are consumed, disposed of or no
longer operable. The inspections and
the establishment and maintenance of accurate inventories will be underpinned
by a full array of interlocking activities:
aerial surveillance with a variety of sensors, remote sensors, tags and seals,
a variety of detection technologies, information obtained from other sources
and, when sanctions on the dual-purpose items are lifted, notifications under
the export/import control mechanism. No
one of these elements on its own would suffice to provide confidence in the
system, but together they should constitute the most comprehensive
international monitoring system ever established in the sphere of arms
control. Confidence in its
effectiveness will rely, inter alia, on the following:
(a) Possession by the Commission of a full picture
of Iraq's past programmes and a full accounting of the facilities, equipment,
items and materials associated with those past programmes, in conjunction with
full knowledge of the disposition of dual-purpose items currently available to
Iraq, the technologies acquired by Iraq in pursuing the past programmes, and
the supplier networks it established to acquire those elements of the
programmes that it could not acquire indigenously. This information provides the baseline data from which ongoing
monitoring and verification proceeds;
Knowledge
of the level of technology attained by Iraq, of the production and acquisition
methods it used and of the materials and equipment it had available are all key
to designing a system of monitoring that addresses issues of concern and
focuses monitoring effort where it would be most effective and efficient. For example, within Iraq, the system should
focus more of its efforts on those technologies and production methods that
Iraq is known to have mastered than on technologies and methods that Iraq is
known not to have mastered, whereas, for the export/import monitoring regime,
the converse would be true, with effort focusing on those items that Iraq would
have to import in order to reactivate a proscribed weapons programme. Clearly, knowing where to focus effort
requires knowledge of what Iraq achieved in its past programmes;
Similarly,
knowledge of the procurement methods and routes used by Iraq for its past
programmes is key to the design of an effective and efficient export/import
monitoring regime. This system should
be designed to be effective against the procurement routes and methods that
Iraq is known to have used in the past.
Testing whether it is, is predicated on knowing those routes and
methods;
Full
accounting for the materials, items and equipment associated with the past
programmes is directly related to what assets should be monitored under the
system. Dual-purpose materials, items
and equipment from the past programmes must be monitored, along with other
dual-purpose capabilities available to Iraq. Uncertainties relating to the
accuracy or completeness of this accounting will consequently lead to
uncertainties as to whether the ongoing monitoring and verification system is
indeed monitoring all the materials, items and equipment which should be
monitored;
Under
Security Council resolutions 687, 707 and 715 (199l), Iraq is obliged to
provide the above information, which the Commission then verifies through its
inspection and analysis activities.
Iraq is required to update its declarations on its dual-purpose
activities and capabilities every six months;
(b) Completion of comprehensive monitoring and
verification protocols for each site at which monitoring will be conducted as a
consequence of the dual-purpose items present or activities undertaken
there. These protocols are the product
of the baseline inspection process, i.e., inspections for the purposes of
identifying all dual-purpose capabilities requiring monitoring, tagging and
inventorying, sensor installation and protocol-building as necessary. They collate all the information required
for future ongoing monitoring and verification of, and contain recommendations
as to the conduct of such monitoring at, the specified site;
(c) Successful testing of the system of ongoing
monitoring and verification in order to:
- Establish a clear understanding and practice
of how the elements of the system, including the actions required of Iraq,
should operate;
- Evaluate the effectiveness of its elements,
both individually and as a whole;
(d) Continuing reassessment of the operation of
the system of ongoing monitoring and verification in order to make adjustments
necessary in the light of Iraq's industrial development and of any further
information which becomes available on Iraq's past programmes. Because of the scale of those past
programmes, the damage caused during the Gulf war and Iraq's own actions in
allegedly destroying material evidence, in particular documentation, elements
could remain unclear for a long time.
While these elements, except where otherwise indicated in the present
report, are not such as to call into question the effectiveness and
comprehensive nature of the monitoring system, the Commission will continue to
seek out the information to clear them up.
The entire process of verification of Iraq's declarations has been
rendered both difficult and prolonged as a result of Iraq's refusal or
inability to produce the documentation relating to its past programmes and
Iraq's providing the Commission with frequently changing accounts of certain
elements of its programmes. This has
required the Commission to undertake more intensive investigations than would
otherwise have been necessary. It has
also had to seek information from other Governments of former suppliers to
Iraq's programmes. This has consumed
considerable periods of time. This
procedure is still ongoing and will be vigorously pursued by the Commission. The full responsibility for the delays lies
with Iraq. In addition to unclear
elements of the nature referred to above, new information may become available
to the Commission requiring investigation in the future. Iraq clearly understands this to be the case
and the Deputy Prime Minister has on several occasions provided explicit
assurances that Iraq will in no way hinder or interfere with such
investigations.
While the system is premised on the provision
by Iraq of accurate and complete declarations of its dual-purpose activities
and capabilities and cannot be operated at its most effective and least
intrusive without such full declarations, it has also been designed to be
robust. Experience has shown that, even
when initially presented with inadequate declarations, the Commission has been
able, through the deployment of its various resources and the exercise of its
inspection rights, to elicit the information required for the system to be
established. The Commission recognizes
that it has received full cooperation from Iraq in setting up and now in
operating the monitoring system. It has
also received assurances from Iraq, at the highest levels, that this
cooperation will continue as the Security Council takes decisions in respect of
easing or lifting sanctions and the oil embargo. However, should Iraq seek systematically at any time in the
future to block the work of the Commission by, for example, preventing access
to sites, the Commission would not be able to provide the Security Council with
the assurances it seeks concerning Iraq's compliance with the terms of
paragraph 10 of resolution 687 (1991).
If such a case were to arise, the Commission would immediately inform
the Council.
4. Once
the sanctions imposed on Iraq under resolution 661 (1990) are eased or lifted,
in accordance with paragraph 21 of resolution 687 (1991), to the extent that
the export to Iraq of dual-purpose items is again permitted, a further
essential element of the overall monitoring of Iraq's dual-purpose capabilities
will be the export/import mechanism envisaged under paragraph 7 of resolution
715 (1991).
III. ACTIONS TO IMPLEMENT THE PLAN
A. Ongoing monitoring and verification
operations
1. Missile activities
Summary
5. The
Commission has essentially completed the accounting of facilities, equipment
and materials used in the past proscribed missile programmes of Iraq. The Commission must complete its
verification of certain elements of Iraq's account to ensure that all items
subject to ongoing monitoring and verification are indeed included in the
monitoring programme. The Commission is
still waiting for responses to requests for information from a number of
countries from which Iraq acquired or sought to acquire items for proscribed
purposes about those transactions. In
most cases, the remaining outstanding issues do not involve the receipt by Iraq
of prohibited items, but deal with the technological level attained during, and
the intended direction of, Iraq's past missile activities. Consequently, their resolution is required
to ensure the right focus of ongoing monitoring and verification efforts.
6. The
Commission completed the baseline survey of Iraq's permitted missile and
related dual-purpose capabilities in May 1994.
Installation of sensors and tags for monitored missiles and production
equipment and related dual-purpose items was completed in July 1994 and the
resident missile monitoring team began its monitoring activities in August
1994. Since then, the Commission has
established a viable mechanism for monitoring Iraq's design, testing and
production of permitted missile systems and related dual-purpose items. Iraq has provided support to ensure the
proper operation of the monitoring system. The missile monitoring is now
operational.
Past programmes
7. The
lack of precision in the initial information provided by Iraq on its past
ballistic missile programmes and the alleged destruction of documents by Iraq
in late 1991 have made obtaining a complete understanding of Iraq's past
ballistic missile programmes extremely difficult. The Commission has exerted considerable efforts to verify the
information provided in Iraq's "Full, final and comprehensive report on
ballistic missile activity", received in 1992. However, parts of the information provided have proved confusing,
misleading or inaccurate. The
Commission, therefore, embarked on an effort to seek corroborating information
from a variety of sources to provide the verification required by the Security
Council. Many of the details of those
programmes have been elucidated.
However, several issues remain to be resolved. These issues do not, in general, involve the delivery to or
possession by Iraq of prohibited items, but bear directly on the technology
level attained by Iraq. The
Commission's understanding of this is important for the design and operation of
the monitoring system.
8. Iraq's
ballistic missile programme was initially centred around the single- stage,
liquid-engine 8K14 (SCUD B) missile, for which it first received missiles and
mobile launchers, together with associated support equipment, starting in 1974. Iraq has stated that in 1987 it started a
programme to extend the range of these missiles and to reverse-engineer the
system. In total, Iraq imported 819
such missiles and 11 mobile launchers for them. In addition, it produced indigenously 8 mobile launchers and
constructed or was in the process of constructing 60 fixed launch sites for
these missiles. The Commission has
supervised or verified the destruction, and accounted for the expenditure, of
the above assets.
9. The
Commission has received numerous reports of the importation by Iraq of SCUD
systems from countries other than the supplier of the 819 missiles described
above. No evidence has been found of
such imports. The Commission assesses
that no additional missiles of this type or support equipment were indeed
supplied to Iraq.
10. In
its efforts to extend the range of the imported SCUD B missiles, Iraq used
simple techniques which did not add significantly to its missile technology
base. However, its reverse-engineering
efforts included the acquisition of sophisticated production machinery and
technology as well as the acquisition from various suppliers of components for
missile systems. In particular, Iraq
gained expertise in missile propulsion systems and their propellants, guidance
and control and airframe production technologies, and acquired the hardware for
high-precision machining. The above
notwithstanding, Iraq was not successful in its efforts to acquire an indigenous
capability to produce indigenously entire missile systems through its
reverse-engineering efforts.
11. Beginning
in 1985, Iraq started a cooperative effort with other countries to develop a
high-technology, two-stage missile system designed for a range of around 1,000
km, called the BADR 2000 in Iraq. In
this effort, Iraq constructed sophisticated production facilities and imported
high-technology production equipment for the fabrication of the first
solid-propellant stage of this system.
The Commission assesses, however, that no complete BADR 2000 missiles
were produced by Iraq. The Commission
has supervised and verified the destruction of all known items, production
equipment and infrastructure directly associated with that programme. The Commission currently believes that Iraq
did not acquire any technology or equipment for the production of any other
aspects or components of that system, e.g., guidance and control and launchers.
12. The
Commission believes that it has a broad understanding of the achievements of
Iraq's past missile programmes and of the level of technological development of
Iraq in this area. It further believes
that it has accounted for the majority of the materials, items and equipment
associated with these past programmes.
Investigations into the disposition of some remaining items,
particularly related to the former missile reverse-engineering project, are
continuing. The Commission believes it
has been able to design a reasonable monitoring system based on this level of
technology and that all the physical assets that should be monitored are indeed
being monitored.
13. However,
there are still aspects of Iraq's past programmes, regarding the direction of
its research and development efforts, that require further clarification. The Commission has, over the past six
months, requested and received information on Iraq's past activities from many
supporting nations. The information
provided, in most cases, corroborates information provided by Iraq in its
subsequent declarations. A few cases
require continued investigation by the Commission to eliminate any possibility
that they present potential loopholes in the ongoing monitoring and
verification mechanism. The following
cases exemplify such issues.
14. Supersonic
parachute recovery system. In 1988,
Iraq initiated the development of a supersonic parachute recovery system for
the Al Hussein missile warhead. The
programme continued through 1990. Iraq
approached at least three different companies for the development, production
and supply of the system. However, no
systems were provided to Iraq. The
Commission is currently investigating and verifying the programme's purpose and
scope. Information available to the
Commission from the potential suppliers does not corroborate Iraq's current
declarations about the programme.
15. Unsymmetrical
dimethyl hydrazine (UDMH). UDMH is
a liquid fuel which can improve the performance of liquid-propellant rocket
engines. In 1987, Iraq began inquiring
about and procuring facilities, equipment, training and materials concerning
every aspect of the use and production of UDMH and related systems in
missiles. The programme continued until
January 1991. Iraq declared that it had
unilaterally destroyed 10.5 tons of UDMH in May 1991. The Commission has been unable to verify this. Further, Iraq declared that no experiments
were performed using UDMH. The
Commission has information which contradicts this statement. If Iraq mastered the technologies required
for UDMH rocket engine design, the Commission would need to modify the ongoing
monitoring and verification regime in the missile area to take account of
Iraq's access to these technologies.
The Commission is continuing to investigate this issue to ensure that it
has an accurate account of Iraq's past activities in this regard.
Baseline data
16. The
monitoring system in the missile area has been designed by assessing the
critical aspects of each stage of the production of permitted missile systems
to ensure that no components are produced or diverted for use in proscribed
missile systems. Consequently, monitoring
focuses on Iraq's non-proscribed missile research, development, testing and
production activities, facilities and equipment. In addition, the system also monitors other facilities with
related dual-purpose technologies and items and high-precision engineering
manufacturing capabilities which could be used to support a clandestine effort
to produce proscribed missiles.
17. The
Commission completed the baseline survey of all of Iraq's declared missile and
related research, development, test and production facilities in
May 1994. Thirty-two baseline
inspections were conducted during UNSCOM 71/BM 22. The baseline process included identifying the critical
technologies and equipment, recommending the appropriate level of monitoring for
the same and creating the detailed protocols necessary for conducting
inspections at each site.
18. The
Commission completed the installation of 41 monitoring cameras at 15 sites
related to missiles or associated dual-use technology in July 1994. These cameras were tested during August 1994
and the system became operational in September 1994. The Commission completed the tagging and inventorying of 182
items of missile-related equipment in July 1994. The Commission completed a technical baseline survey of missile
systems to be subject to monitoring in June 1994, and the tagging of all
relevant operational missiles in Iraq in July 1994. The resident missile monitoring team initiated
its inspection activities in August 1994.
Ongoing monitoring and verification apparatus
19. The
plan for ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance with relevant
parts of section C of Security Council resolution 687 (1991), approved by the
Security Council in its resolution 715 (1991), states that facilities,
equipment, other items and technologies which could be used for the
development, construction, modification or acquisition of ballistic missiles
with a range greater than 150 kilometres should be subject to monitoring and
verification. The Commission has
undertaken to fulfil this requirement of the Security Council by designing a
multi-level, comprehensive monitoring system covering Iraq's missile research,
development, testing and production facilities as well as facilities with
related dual-use capabilities. The
monitoring system provides for: the
periodic no-notice inspection of facilities by the Baghdad resident missile
monitoring group; camera surveillance of critical areas and key production
machines; inventory control, by tagging and regular inspection, of items and
machinery located at key, related and dual-use facilities; special inspection
teams to address specific issues (e.g., research and development activities);
inspections to verify Iraq's compliance with existing resolutions; and aerial
inspections and surveillance.
20. In
order to accomplish the above tasks, the Commission has undertaken inspections
of research, development, testing, production and modification activities and
facilities. Inspection of research and
development facilities establishes the technological capabilities of Iraq and
helps identify any modifications necessary for the current monitoring
regime. Inspection of testing
facilities, including the witnessing of testing activity, provides assurance
that current missile systems and those under development do not exceed the
constraints established by the resolutions.
Inspection of production and modification facilities guarantees that all
missiles produced are accounted for and that no proscribed missile systems are
produced. This is backed up by
inspections of sites not currently under monitoring to ensure that no
activities requiring monitoring are conducted at the site in question, thereby
ensuring, through a programme of such inspections, the comprehensiveness of the
monitoring system (i.e., that all that should be is monitored). Finally, the verification inspections of the
operational missile ensures that no modification to extend the maximum range of
these missile systems will go undetected.
21. The
resident missile monitoring teams have conducted 178 inspections since the last
report. These inspections have
established the effectiveness of the monitoring regime in verifying the current
status of Iraq's non-proscribed missile programmes and related technology. The resident team is entrusted with the
inspection of Iraq's missile and related facilities to ensure that there is no
research or development into or production of missile systems exceeding the
specifications of the resolutions, that all declared equipment is accounted for
and that records agree with information on research, development and production
available from other sources. Further,
regular collection and review of video coverage of missile-related activities
in critical areas and key equipment is conducted to guarantee that the
Commission accounts for and tags all produced missiles subject to monitoring
and that no production of proscribed missile systems occurs.
22. Since
the last report the Commission has conducted three inspections of the tagged
operational missiles to ensure that Iraq has not modified any missile to extend
its range beyond that allowed by the resolutions. These inspections are conducted on a random sample of
10 per cent of the operational missile force three times per annum. No modifications of missiles under
monitoring were detected.
23. The
Commission has conducted, on a regular basis, research and development update
inspections to confirm that current missile designs will not exceed the limits
established by the resolutions. Such
inspections are designed to review the technical details of the design,
development and testing of missile systems and missile-related technological
developments twice per annum. These
inspections are designed to identify any requirement to modify the monitoring
regime to assure its continued effectiveness.
The Commission conducted its latest research and development update
inspection in March 1995.
2. Chemical activities
Summary
24. During
the high-level talks held at Baghdad in February 1995, Iraq promised to present
a new full, final and complete declaration of its past chemical warfare
activities in order to comply with the requirements of resolution
707 (1991). This it did on 25
March 1995, during the most recent visit of the Executive Chairman to
Baghdad. The new information provided
is now being verified, in particular the claim that significantly reduced
quantities of chemical warfare agents were produced.
25. The
chemical monitoring system in Iraq is now operational, with the installation of
its monitoring equipment almost complete.
The additions and modifications to the system which are in the course of
being made are not such as to undermine the effectiveness of the overall
regime. Together with an efficient
export/import monitoring regime, this system is expected to preclude Iraq from
resuming prohibited chemical activities.
Past programmes
26. In
order to resolve outstanding issues relating to its past chemical weapons
programmes, Iraq provided on 25 March 1995 a new "full, final and
complete" declaration of all aspects of its past chemical weapons
programmes. This declaration contains
new information on: the history and organizational
structure of the past programmes; the weaponization of chemical weapons agents;
the procurement of chemical weapons-re
