Preventing the
further proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
The importance of
on-site inspection in Iraq
Lecture by Dr. Hans
Blix, Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC
at the Third Training
Course of UNMOVIC
Vienna, 19 February
2001
The Gulf War was fought ten years ago to liberate
Kuwait. The objective was attained in a
short period of time. However, the
world is still grappling with the question whether Iraq retains some weapons of
mass destruction and long-range missiles or dedicated capacity to produce these
deadly items. And Iraq, which was one
of the most advanced States in the Middle East - with excellent schools,
universities and health care - has been tragically set decades back by the
combined effect of the long war with Iran, the Gulf War and sanctions.
I propose to discuss the measures taken by the United
Nations Security Council regarding Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction in the
context of the broader international efforts to prevent the spread of such
weapons and their means of delivery globally.
Iraq used chemical weapons in the war against Iran and
against its own citizens. It used
long-range missiles both in the Gulf War and against Iran. So its capacity in these two respects was
known to the world, when the cease-fire was concluded in 1991. Iraq’s achievements in the spheres of
nuclear and biological weapons was not known at the time, but the cease-fire
conditions of Security Council resolution 687 (1991) stipulated broadly that
Iraq must be rid of all biological, chemical and nuclear weapons and long-range
missiles and facilities to produce them.
These provisions of the resolution must be seen as
expressions of the Council’s determination to eliminate the danger which Iraq’s
possession of weapons of mass destruction would present to its neighbours, but
also as a part of the Council’s global efforts to prevent the further spread of
weapons of mass destruction.
In paragraph 14 of the resolution, the disarmament
requirements for Iraq were described as “steps towards the goal of establishing
in the Middle East a zone free from weapons of mass destruction and all
missiles for their delivery”… Thus,
although the Council has not linked the disarmament of Iraq with the
establishment of a zone, it showed a disarmament vision that went beyond Iraq
and that envisaged future mutually reinforcing commitments from States in the
region.
The regional approach to non-proliferation is, indeed, one
that commends itself especially in areas where there could be risks of arms
races between neighbouring States.
While agreement on a zone free of all weapons of mass destruction and
long-range missiles cannot be negotiated in the current political climate in
the Middle East, zones free of nuclear weapons have been established in a
number of other regions of the world.
Indeed, the regional nuclear-weapon-free zones cover the whole of the
Southern hemisphere. While Cuba has yet
to ratify the Tlatelolco Treaty covering South and Central America and the
Caribbean, The Rarotonga and Bangkok treaties cover South Asia and the South
Pacific, and South Africa’s walk back from a nuclear weapon capacity allowed
the African nuclear-weapon-free zone treaty to be concluded.
The reference in Security Council resolutions 687 (1991) and
1284 (1999) to a Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction was thus
to a concept that was well established for nuclear weapons.
The years since the end of the Cold War have seen a growing
international engagement - including a summit meeting on the subject in the Security
Council - against proliferation. In
several respects this engagement has been successful. In a few cases it has failed.
It is sobering to realize that if it had not been for the Gulf War and
the revelations and disarmament measures that it brought, Iraq would have been
equipped with arsenals of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and missiles
to deliver them. Iraq would have
constituted a case of flagrant and dangerous failure.
NON-PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
Let me for a moment discuss the international
non-proliferation efforts apart from NWFZ - regarding the different types of
weapons of mass destruction and for long-range missiles.
The effort to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons beyond
the five Permanent Members of the Security Council has been more successful
than many had thought possible and, yet, not as successful as all had
wished. The efforts have focused on
making the Non-Proliferation Treaty universal but it has also aimed at
promoting nuclear-weapon-free zones and comprised ad hoc approaches, as
in the cases of Iraq and the DPRK. The
efforts have also been paralleled and helped by quantitative reductions by
Russia and the United States, which have very substantially reduced their
nuclear weapons arsenals. The UK and
France have also undertaken some scaling-back.
All this has contributed to a welcome global reduction in the number of
nuclear weapons and a limitation in the number of nuclear weapon States. Today, not only NGOs but also many
governments demand plans for a complete elimination of nuclear weapons, a goal
that may be somewhat distant but is now acknowledged and accepted by all. While all this is encouraging, other
developments in the nuclear sphere are not.
Three States - beyond the five - are generally deemed to
possess nuclear weapons: Israel, India and Pakistan. While none of these States had adhered to the Non-Proliferation
Treaty, their possession of nuclear weapons nevertheless obviously constitutes
proliferation beyond that which is represented by the five Permanent Members of
the Security Council.
The DPRK has agreed to suspend its indigenous nuclear
programme in return for assistance in the building of two nuclear power plants
to be placed under international inspection.
In the Middle East, lastly, Iraq was found to have violated its
obligation under the NPT, to have mastered the technique of enriching uranium
and to have been close to developing a nuclear weapon. The ability of the Security Council to hold
Iraq to the nuclear-weapon-free status to which it had committed itself by
adhering to the NPT is evidently important not only for the credibility of that
treaty, and for future efforts to achieve a zone free from WMDs in the Middle
East, but also for the global outlook. A revival of the nuclear weapons programme in Iraq would be a
grave and colossal failure. The IAEA is
charged by the Security Council to map and to eradicate Iraq’s nuclear weapons
programme. While few question marks
were deemed to remain in the nuclear dossier at the end of 1998, the IAEA is
now obliged to examine whether the situation remains unchanged. UNMOVIC is requested to assist the IAEA –
not least at the practical logistical level.
We are happy to do so and pleased with the very close cooperation that
exists. Indeed, I am glad to
acknowledge that we at UNMOVIC are learning a great deal from our friends at
the IAEA.
In the field of chemical weapons, the efforts to prevent a
proliferation - indeed to eliminate existing arsenals - are focused on the
Chemical Weapons Convention of 1993, which bans not only the use but also the
possession and production of these weapons.
It was especially important that the Convention covered all States
equally – that the great powers were to eliminate their stocks just as all
others. It was also highly significant
that a comprehensive system for inspection, including on-site inspection, was
set up. While the adherence to the
convention is as yet by no means universal - and this is a concern - we can
register with satisfaction how huge quantities of chemical weapons are being
destroyed under international inspection in Russia, the United States as
elsewhere. Iraq has not yet ratified
the convention. However, its use of
chemical weapons was in violation of the 1925 Geneva Protocol and international
customary law.
The Biological Weapons Convention of 1972 prohibits the
development, production, and
stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and
requires their destruction. Like the
CWC this convention treats all States, including great powers, equally. While not all States have yet adhered to the
convention and while there is so far no international protocol on verification,
States - including Russia and the United States - have taken steps to implement
the Convention. Iraq was moving in the
opposite direction.
Long-range missiles are a category of weapons system which
constitutes a pressing problem. The
world community has only had limited success in regulating it through the
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).
The Iraqi use of missiles against neighbouring States and the testing by
the DPRK of a three-stage rocket have contributed to the current discussion of
missile shields of various kinds. Such
shields, it is argued, would constitute a response to the proliferation of
long-range missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction. Another approach discussed would be a common
effort to focus on the States perceived as actual or potential dangers and seek
to defuse these dangers. It is
UNMOVIC’s task to seek to ensure that Iraq is rid of missiles of a range over
150 km and does not produce or acquire any more.
THE DEMAND FOR ON-SITE VERIFICATION
Whether we look at bans on the possession of nuclear,
chemical or biological weapons or restrictions on long-range missiles, we find
that invariably international on-site verification is demanded. For States to be able to rely on commitments
given and to feel confident that the risk of being cheated is small, they need
effective, credible verification. This
is true whether we talk about multilateral regimes, such as the NPT and the
CWC, or commitments such as Iraq’s under the cease-fire agreement and
resolution 687 (1991), and that of the DPRK under the so-called agreed framework. International inspection is a growth
business.
We have to note that States are not enthusiastic about
receiving foreign inspectors on their territory and in their industrial and
military installations - whether nuclear, chemical or other. If sufficiently reliable means of
verification were to exist through satellite imagery or seismic surveillance or
other non-intrusive means, it would be preferred. However, currently existing non-intrusive means of verification
are not deemed sufficient. States come
to accept on-site inspection first because it is important for themselves to
create confidence that they are abiding by their commitments and, secondly,
because they want other States to accept the same kind of inspection.
On-site inspection regimes may be
(a) mutual-bilateral,
as in the case of many of the bilateral US-Russian agreements in the
disarmament field;
(b) regional, as
in the case of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)
or in various nuclear-weapon-free zones; or
(c) international,
as in the cases of the NPT, CWC and CTBT (Complete
Test Ban Treaty).
There may also be hybrids between the different types. The right for individual parties to a
multilateral regime to request so-called challenge inspections introduce a
bilateral element. A regional regime
could be supplementary to an international one, as in the case of the
nuclear-weapon-free zones, which in the main uses on-site inspection through
the IAEA international safeguards system but may add some kind of regional
inspections for various situations.
An international regime may appear less disturbing to
national sensitivities than bilateral arrangements, as the inspected State is
likely, itself, to be a party to the regime, which may inspect a large number
of States. On the other hand, reaching
agreement about the sharing of costs is often a problem in international
arrangements and providing intelligence to international inspectors is more
problematic than giving it to one’s own.
MEANS OF VERIFICATION
The rapid expansion of the need for international inspection
and the development of technology have led to the employment of powerful new
means of verification:
·
Satellite imagery provides important overview and is obtained without
any intrusion into the territory or airspace of States. But satellites do not see through roofs and
camouflage or decoys may fool them.
While imagery from them used to be available only to or through a few
States, it is now becoming available commercially - at a price.
·
On-site videos and sensors may provide continuous surveillance and may
even transmit images automatically reducing the need for inspector presence.
·
Environmental sampling of air, soil or water and subsequent analysis for
relevant chemical, biological or nuclear substances is becoming ever more
powerful means of inquiry.
These and other techniques have been used increasingly and
much experience of them has been accumulated in the IAEA, OPCW and UNSCOM. They may be useful not only in providing
data for analysis but also in providing a disincentive to violations. However, they supplement but do not replace
more traditional means of verification.
·
Declarations by the inspected State provide the normal starting point
for verification, monitoring and inspection.
In banking and business, careful and consistent accounts provide some
confidence of correct operations and the same is true of States’ accounts
relevant to weaponry. Inconsistencies
require explanations.
·
The inspectors on the ground can hardly be replaced. Their professional expertise and experience
may lead them to ask pertinent questions and to observations unavailable
through other means.
·
Information about a State’s imports – through declarations by the State
itself or suppliers – may give important clues.
·
Open sources, like newspapers, professional journals, radio and
television reports may provide valuable information. They are easily available though not so easily scanned.
THE USE OF INTELLIGENCE
A special source of information for international
verification is intelligence. It can
readily be used where States are mutually inspecting each other. It is by no means given, however, that
national intelligence agencies will supply relevant information to
international inspection organizations.
Indeed, it appears that before the revelations of Iraq’s programmes of
weapons of mass destruction, no international inspection regime did receive any
national intelligence - not even satellite imagery.
International verification regimes are invariably present
and active in inspected countries with the consent of these countries. They gather information only by methods that
are authorized and must use the information only for purposes authorized. They do not have the means of checking
international electronic communications.
It is clear, on the other hand, that national intelligence
organizations may obtain much information that could be directly useful in the
inspection and verification work of international organizations, notably to
raise pertinent questions and to identify objects and installations for
inspection. It is also obvious that if
such information is not made available to the organizations, it loses some of
its potential value. Moreover, an
international organization could hardly be criticized for not following up a
lead, which had never been given to it.
This is not to say that there could not be good reasons why such
information was not made available. The
need to protect sources could be one. A
fear that the international organization could not handle the information in a
secure or meaningful way could be another.
This being said, it seems highly desirable that
international inspection regimes be assisted by national intelligence under
conditions acceptable to both sides.
Defectors do not normally come to international organizations but to
States, which can give them asylum. Where
inspected countries do not provide full or reliable information, defectors and
others may give very important data.
Information about attempted procurement may provide significant clues
and is usually not directly available to international regimes.
At the same time it is obvious that an international regime
must guard itself against misinformation.
It must critically analyse all information that may be given to it and
preferably have information from several sources. It must not engage in any information trading. It is in everybody’s interest that UNMOVIC
is in nobody’s pocket.
COOPERATION BY THE INSPECTED STATE
There is no doubt that cooperation by the inspected State is
crucial to achieve inspection results that are credible. Where the inspected
State is anxious to obtain the trust of neighbours and the world, such
cooperation should come naturally. An
interesting example is South Africa, which invited the IAEA to verify that the
nuclear weapons it had possessed had been irrevocably eliminated. From the outset, South Africa offered access
to whatever documentation and whatever sites the Agency wanted to check. While such attitudes do not by themselves
amount to evidence, they create a degree of credibility that may make it easier
for States to disregard the residues of uncertainty, which will almost
invariably exist. It is significant
that resolution 1284 (1999) makes “cooperation in all respects” by Iraq with
UNMOVIC the condition for the suspension of sanctions.
LESSONS FROM IRAQ
In the case of Iraq, nearly ten years of inspection has seen
cooperation and very significant results but also much obstruction. Many lessons have been learnt:
·
One is that even when they have the most far-reaching rights of access,
inspectors remain basically ‘observers’ in a country where full executive power
is in the hands of the Government. The
host country is always able, if it so chooses, to deny inspectors access, even
though they are legally entitled to it.
However, it can only do so at a price, namely, that the denial of access
may suggest to the inspectors and to the world that prohibited items might be
concealed.
·
Another lesson is that it is not practically feasible to search for
every possibly relevant item or data in large weapons programmes lasting over
many years. Matters deemed of marginal
importance may have to be left aside unless and until some new data invest them
with importance. Even so, there will
inevitably be a ‘residue of uncertainty’ and it will be for the Security
Council to decide what impact it will have.
There is no such thing as a completely ‘clean bill of health’ - neither
in medicine nor in inspection. The best
that can be attained is that after very thorough inspection and good
cooperation no significant questions remain and no indications of proscribed
items are found.
·
A third point is that no inspecting authority should ever testify to
more than actually has been clarified and established. Inability to establish real facts may be
understandable and excusable, especially if there is no cooperation, but it is
not the task of the inspecting organization to discount other than marginal
unresolved issues - and these should be clearly reported. Nor, indeed, should an inspecting authority
artificially enlarge the question marks it cannot straighten out. It should have no other agenda than to use
its skills and instruments to establish the facts and to neutralize the weapons
of mass destructions and their means of delivery.
WHAT WILL HAPPEN?
It is now over a year since the Security Council adopted
resolution 1284 (1999) and established UNMOVIC. Neither the resolution nor UNMOVIC, which has been built up in
the past year, have been accepted by Iraq, nor have any inspections taken place
since UNSCOM left at the end of 1998.
What will happen?
Iraq contends that all weapons of mass destruction have been
eradicated, that the requirements of 1991 have been fulfilled and that the
economic and financial restrictions should be immediately lifted. Public opinion in many parts of the world,
sympathizing with the people of Iraq, supports a lifting of sanctions. At the other end of the spectrum, many warn
that Iraq has not fully revealed its arsenal of WMDs and long-range missiles
and that it may be taken for granted that more prohibited items have been
produced and hidden during the absence of inspectors. It is also argued that if
Iraq were freely to use its oil proceeds much of it would go to
rearmament. What are we to make of
these conflicting views?
First, we must note that although there are, indeed,
differences between the Members of the Security Council, they seem to remain
firmly behind the demand in resolution 1284 (1999) that Iraq must accept
inspection by UNMOVIC. Further,
although the resolution acknowledges that Iraq has made progress towards the
required eradication of its programme of WMDs, it states explicitly that there
remain “unresolved disarmament issues” and among them “key remaining
disarmament tasks to be completed by Iraq”.
Referring to the failure of Iraq to implement relevant
resolutions fully, the Council states further that it is unable to lift the
prohibitions (sanctions). It offers
Iraq a – somewhat less ambitious way from the economic restrictions imposed by
the Security Council. The resolution of
1991 holds out a lifting of sanctions in return for an eradication of the
programme of WMDs as foreseen in the resolution.
The 1999 resolution offers the suspension of sanctions in
return for “cooperation in all respects” with UNMOVIC and progress on “key
remaining disarmament tasks”. While Iraq
seems to decline the new path traced by the Council, it should be noted that it
is additional to the original solution, which remains in place. It should also be noted that “sanctions” in
1991 included a total ban for Iraq to sell oil; today, Iraq can sell all the
oil it is able to pump. “Sanctions”
today is rather a control of what Iraq is allowed to import.
If Iraq accepts inspection, it would seem that ‘cooperation
in all respects’ with UNMOVIC will be necessary, regardless of which attitude
it takes to resolution 1284 (1999).
Indeed, as I have already explained, cooperation between an inspected
State and the inspecting organization is a crucial factor to achieve credible
verification. Such cooperation has no
room for harassment, humiliation or provocation from the inspecting party but
also no room for laxity. Cosmetic
inspections are worse than none. They
may create impressions that do not correspond to the reality. Only firm, professionally competent and
effective inspections serve the purpose for which they are undertaken, namely,
to create justified confidence.
Resolution 1284 (1999) envisages such inspection and explicitly makes
‘cooperation in all respects’ - including progress on ‘key remaining disarmament
tasks’ the crucial condition for a suspension of sanctions.
Iraq might perhaps ask what UNMOVIC will regard as such
cooperation. It is not possible to make
a checklist. In some earlier comments
on this question, I have pointed to two essential matters and they may deserve
to be repeated.
First, Iraq must cooperate to ensure the full protection of
UNMOVIC personnel. The Government of
Iraq has full control on the ground and is responsible for the security of our
personnel, premises, equipment and transportation against any violence, threat
of violence or harassment.
Second, Iraq must cooperate to assure UNMOVIC and the IAEA
access to all sites that they wish to inspect.
As the Security Council has stated many times, access must be
“immediate, unconditional and unrestricted”.
There are good reasons for these requirements. Access that is not ‘immediate’ loses in effectiveness. If the inspected party were to learn in
advance about the object of an inspection, it would be in a position to remove
or conceal objects and equipment. Even
if it would not do so, the very possibility that it could have done so, would
reduce the value - the effectiveness - of the inspection. Obviously, infrastructure and heavy
equipment could not be moved away or hidden in minutes but documents
might. I should add that for the
special case of inspections of sites that are ‘sensitive’, UNSCOM issued
special internal guidelines and UNMOVIC is doing likewise.
As it is in the interest of both Iraq and UNMOVIC that
inspections have maximum credibility, there should be cooperation to ensure
immediate access. An obvious need
parallel to the need for immediate access is that inspections should take place
without prior notice or, with short notice.
Another need is for the means of transportation to allow the speediest
possible arrival of inspectors on site.
For distant sites, fixed-wing or helicopter transport is desirable. To reduce transportation time, there may
also be good reasons for some field offices in areas far away from Baghdad.
The value of access would be reduced if conditions were
attached, e.g. regarding the number of inspectors to be admitted, or
restrictions on samples to be taken or similar. The credibility and value of inspection would also be reduced, if
there were restrictions as to where on a site inspectors could go. Locked rooms, rooms for which keys are lost,
etc. do not inspire confidence.
While access usually denotes access to sites, access to
persons, data and documents is of similar great importance. Iraq has submitted large volumes of data to
UNSCOM in the past and will be asked to continue to do so.
At this point I should like to add, however, that UNMOVIC
should avoid making requested cooperation unnecessarily burdensome. We should make periodic reporting as simple
as possible and we might discuss with Iraqi counterparts how to achieve
this. There is no point in asking for
data that are not needed. It would
burden both them and us. It would be
important, on the other hand, to have data in electronically readable form.
We should also aim to be as transparent as possible. When Iraq is expected to cooperate with
UNMOVIC, it is reasonable that we make it quite clear what cooperation is
expected.
By cooperating in
all respects with UNMOVIC in providing data and access to sites and persons and
destroying whatever is left of the programme for WMDs and long-range missiles,
Iraq can facilitate implementation of the Security Council’s resolutions. This is precisely what Iraq needs in order
to build confidence, and to be enabled eventually to resume its place in the
family of nations. Evidently, the
Members of the United Nations - and not least the Members of the Security
Council - must, on their part, also fully abide by Security Council decisions –
as, indeed, they are obliged to under Art. 25 of the UN Charter.
A COMPREHENSIVE DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE UN AND IRAQ
There is no sign at the present time that Iraq is inclined
to accept inspection whether related to the resolution of 1991 or that of
1999. In this situation, the
Secretary-General of the UN has agreed to a ‘comprehensive dialogue’ with Iraq.
Although UNMOVIC is not a party to this dialogue and no
agenda is indicated, we may surmise some of the items that may be in focus.
From the side of the UN, the implementation by Iraq of
binding resolutions seems likely to be a priority item, e.g. regarding
inspections, repatriation of Kuwaitis or third country nationals and
cooperation with the UN coordinator for that issue. The Iraqi side has urged that the dialogue should be without
preconditions. The Secretary-General,
for his part, has noted, naturally, that the UN must take cognizance of
existing resolutions.
The Iraqi side might raise the issue of no-fly-zones and the
bombings, and demand respect for the principle of territorial integrity and
political independence. This UN Charter
principle is, evidently applicable to Iraq as it is to all other States,
including Iraq’s neighbours. Iraq might
also like to know what arrangements there would be at the end of the tunnel
that leads to suspension, in particular the
“effective financial and other operational measures” that
are to be put in place in connection with such suspension “to ensure that Iraq
does not acquire prohibited items” (para. 33).
While these and many other matters that might come up in the dialogue
are not linked to UNMOVIC, some questions relating to Security Council
resolution 1284 (1999) are.
For a suspension of sanctions, progress has to be made on
“key remaining disarmament tasks to be completed by Iraq” (para. 7). Iraq would like to know which these tasks
are. The procedure foreseen in the
resolution is that UNMOVIC will list them in a work programme to be submitted
for Security Council approval 60 days after the organization has started work
in Iraq. In the last resort, it is thus
the Security Council, which will decide, which the ‘key remaining disarmament
tasks’ are, although it is envisaged that the Council do so on the basis of a
report from its technically competent subsidiary body, UNMOVIC. Iraq may have an idea of which issues were
regarded as ‘priority issues’ by the Security Council panel that was headed by
Ambassador Amorim early in 1999. However,
about two years have passed since then without inspection and ‘key issues’ cannot
be defined by UNMOVIC until it has acquired substantial experience through new
supplementary Iraqi declarations and has undertaken new on-site inspections.
What UNMOVIC is trying to do today is to make an inventory
of the much broader category of “unresolved disarmament issues’.
Even this task can only be tackled provisionally, pending access to
supplementary declarations and essential rebaselining.
For its part, Iraq seems to be saying that, contrary to the
view expressed by the Security Council, there are no unresolved disarmament
issues and that it will demonstrate this by documents. It would be welcome if Iraq could volunteer
new information that may shed light on issues - not least the biological ones -
which were deemed unresolved, when inspections ceased at the end of 1998. However, such information will not obviate
the need for new inspections. Given the
statements of Iraq that all prohibited programmes have been eradicated and that
this can be shown, it would seem natural that Iraq would avail itself of the
opportunity to place relevant evidence, especially new evidence, before UNMOVIC
as the professional international inspection regime set up by the Security
Council.
Two more points.
Iraq seems to have been concerned about the time frames laid down in
resolution 1284 (1999) – that new inspections would go on forever. Let me say
that it is regrettable that over one year has been lost in starting the
activities foreseen. For its part,
UNMOVIC is at present doing all it can with a staff that represents the whole
UN family to move close to a readiness for work inside Iraq. However, before there is green light for
inspections, we do not wish to assume large financial commitments, e.g.
contracts for helicopter services. Nor
do we want to take a large number of staff on board at present. The training we provide is designed to give
us a rostrum of experts who would be available to work for us in Iraq.
Lastly, there is sometimes a tendency to see disarmament
functions and humanitarian functions as conflicting efforts. I think that is a false way of looking at
the problems. To provide food and other
necessities for life and to seek to ensure the absence of weapons of mass
destruction are, in my view, both humanitarian missions. UNMOVIC works side by side with the Oil for
Food Programme and the rest of the UN system.
* * * *