Notes for briefing the Security
Council regarding inspections in Iraq
and a preliminary assessment of Iraq’s declaration
under
paragraph 3 of resolution 1441 (2002)
19 December 2002
First
part: situation report on inspection
effort
Before I take up
the major subject of my briefing, which relates to the Declaration submitted by
Iraq under operative paragraph 3 of resolution 1441(2002), I should like, with
your permission, to report briefly on where the UNMOVIC inspection effort
stands today, 41 days after the adoption of the resolution on 8 November.
As you will
recall, inspections resumed on 27 November.
·
Since then
the number of UNMOVIC inspectors in Baghdad has increased from 11 to over
90. In addition there are some
55 support staff.
·
Since the
adoption of the resolution on 8 November, we have signed over 145 employment
contracts, most of them for staff in Baghdad but some to strengthen our
capacity here in New York.
·
During the
autumn, we have signed contracts for equipment and services amounting to
some 32.3 million dollars, assuming that the services run for a year. Out of this, the largest part of 22.3
million will be for air operations.
·
Since the
adoption of the resolution, we have initiated an air shuttle between
Larnaca in Cyprus and Baghdad, with a field office in Larnaca and service
facilities at Saddam International Airport in Baghdad.
·
We have
recently deployed one helicopter to Baghdad and are expecting 7 more
before the end of the year. All will be
stationed at the Rasheed airbase, where the Iraqi authorities provide service
facilities.
·
We have put
the Baghdad Ongoing Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Centre (BOMVIC)
into operation and the Iraqi authorities are cooperating with us in the
establishment of a field office in Mosul.
The build-up
could hardly have been faster. We have
benefited from the extensive preparations which we made for deployment during
the past years, the training of potential inspectors, the early identification
of potential suppliers and the identification of sites to be inspected at the
initial phase. We have also benefited
from the excellent cooperation and assistance extended to us by many divisions
of the UN Secretariat in New York and by the UN organizations in Baghdad,
Cyprus and Brindisi. Here, in New York,
we have been given more office space necessary for our functioning but
difficult to obtain in the crowded buildings of the UN. For Baghdad, we plan to expand the premises
as soon as possible. The Iraqi
cooperation has been very helpful for our logistical and infrastructure
build-up.
Second
part: results so far of the inspection
effort
Let me next
report on some of our activities and experiences from the past three weeks:
·
We have
inspected 44 sites declared by Iraq or inspected by UNSCOM or the IAEA
in the past, among them 3 in the Mosul area and 8 newly-declared locations.
·
We have
inspected some sites, which were previously indicated by Iraq as sensitive or
presidential. They were now inspected
in the same manner as other sites.
·
Access to sites has been prompt and assistance
on the sites expeditious. It seems
probable that a general instruction has been issued not in any way to delay or
impede inspection of the kind of sites we have gone to so far. This is welcome and it is to be hoped that
such an instruction will extend to all sites we may wish to inspect in the
future, regardless of location, character and timing.
·
With respect to the results of our
inspections, I should note that several sites, which have been the subject
of public discussion, have been inspected and questions as to their use may
have been answered.
·
We have
identified the location of some artillery shells and containers with mustard
gas. They were placed under UNSCOM
supervision in 1998. They will now be
sampled, and eventually destroyed.
·
Criticism
has been voiced by the
Iraqi side regarding some inspections:
·
The
inspection of a presidential site took place without problems – after a
minor delay in access. However, it was
subsequently stated from the Iraqi side that the inspection was unjustified and
that the inspectors could not have looked for weapons of mass destruction, as
they did not wear protective gear.
Clearly, we do not need to justify any of our selections of sites and
one does not need protective gear to look for documents or computer files.
·
Some sites
were inspected last Friday – the Muslim day of rest. In one of them, the Iraqi staff
were absent and a number of doors inside locked, with no keys available. The Iraqi side offered to break the doors
open – while videotaping the event.
However, they agreed with a suggestion that the doors in question could
be sealed overnight and the offices inspected the next morning. Clearly, we have the right to undertake
inspections at any time, night or day, whether on weekdays or religious
holidays. We intend to exercise this right – not to harass – but to demonstrate
that just as there are no sanctuaries in space there are no sanctuaries in
time.
Let me report,
lastly, two formal requests that we have directed to Iraq in conformity with
the resolutions of the Security Council.
Under
subparagraph 4 of paragraph 7 of resolution 1441 (2002), UNMOVIC has asked Iraq
to provide the names of all personnel currently or formerly associated
with some aspect of Iraq’s programme of weapons of mass destruction and
ballistic missiles. During my talks in
Baghdad last month,
I indicated that
this request would be made and in the Declaration just submitted we find that,
in several chapters, the Iraqi side has refrained from submitting names
explicitly on the ground that they expected the request to come.
We have asked
that the names be submitted to us before the end of the year and suggested that
Iraq may proceed in pyramid fashion, starting from the leadership in
programmes, going down to management, scientists, engineers and technicians but
excluding the basic layer of workers.
The list of
names may have several uses. It could,
for instance, be of use to learn where those who earlier worked on the
biological weapons programme, are now.
Some persons on the list could be called for interviews. We certainly consider interviews in Iraq a
potentially important source of information – as it has been in the past.
Taking persons
to be interviewed and family members out of Iraq is authorized under paragraph
5 of resolution 1441 (2002) and is an option.
Although Iraq would be obliged to cooperate, the practical arrangements
would have to be carefully examined.
Clearly, we could not take anybody out of Iraq without his or her
consent.
The second
formal request concerns legislation implementing Security Council
resolutions. I have reminded the
Iraqi side several times in the past year that it should be easy for it to enact
such legislation, notably laws prohibiting legal and physical persons to engage
in any way in the development, production or storing of weapons of mass
destruction or missiles of proscribed range.
Model legislation was, in fact, transmitted to Iraq by UNSCOM and the
IAEA long ago.
Third
part: a preliminary assessment of
Iraq’s declaration of
I shall now turn
to discuss those parts of Iraq’s Declaration of 7 December, which concern
biological and chemical weapons and long-range missiles.
I hope that my
comments may be of some assistance especially to those Members of the Council
who have only had the working version one day and who are about to begin their
analytical work.
Although UNMOVIC
has had access to this text a whole week before the working version was made
available, our analysts have been fully occupied preparing the working version
and my comments must necessarily be provisional. I trust there will be a further occasion for discussion, when all
have had more time for study and analysis.
The first point
to be made is that Iraq continues to state in the Declaration, as it has
consistently done before its submission, that there were no weapons of mass
destruction in Iraq, when inspectors left at the end of 1998 and that none have
been designed, procured, produced or stored in the period since then.
While individual
governments have stated that they have convincing evidence to the contrary,
UNMOVIC at this point is neither in a position to confirm Iraq’s statements,
nor in possession of evidence to disprove it.
The purpose of the Security Council resolutions
requiring Iraq to declare all WMD programmes and creating an extensive and
intensive inspection system is to attain, through peaceful means, confidence
that Iraq is rid of or ridding itself of all such programmes and proscribed
items – verified disarmament.
A declaration
cannot, if it stands alone, create confidence.
The listing of sites or of persons, the reporting of production,
importation, destruction and consumption figures and the opening of doors,
giving access to inspections, is not enough to create confidence that no
weapons programmes and proscribed items remain. The statements need to be
supported by documentation or other evidence.
Only so do they become verifiable.
During the
period 1991-1998, Iraq submitted many declarations called full, final and
complete. Regrettably, much in these
declarations proved inaccurate or incomplete or was unsupported or contradicted
by evidence. In such cases, no
confidence can arise that proscribed programmes or items have been eliminated.
Such was the
situation at the end of 1998, when inspectors left Iraq. The many question marks are documented in a
report to the Council early in 1999 (S/1999/94) and in the so-called Amorim
Report (S/1999/356). To these question marks, nearly four years
without any inspection activity have been added.
In resolution
1441 (2002), Iraq was given an opportunity to provide a fresh declaration and
to make it verifiable to the inspecting authorities by submitting supporting
evidence. It remains to analyse in
detail how much is clarified by the new declaration and supporting
material. When we have performed a more
thorough analysis, we may ask Iraq for supplementary information and
clarifications.
The overall impression is that not much new
significant information has been provided in the part of Iraq’s Declaration,
which relates to proscribed weapons programmes, nor has much new supporting
documentation or other evidence been submitted. New material has, on the other hand, been provided concerning
non-weapons related activities during the period from the end of 1998 to the
present time.
It would appear
that the part that covers biological weapons is essentially a reorganized version
of a previous declaration provided by Iraq to UNSCOM in September 1997. In the chemical weapons area, the basis of
the current Declaration is a declaration submitted by Iraq in 1996 with
subsequent updates and explanations. In
the missile field, the Declaration follows the same format, and seems to have
largely the same content as Iraq’s 1996 missile declaration and updates.
Although it must
be noted that much of what Iraq has provided in the weapons part of its
Declaration is not new, there are some sections of new material. In the chemical weapons field, Iraq has
further explained its account of the material balance of precursors for
chemical warfare agents. Although it does not resolve outstanding issues on
this subject, it may help to achieve a better understanding of the fate of the
precursors.
In the missile
area, there is a good deal of information regarding Iraq’s activities in the
past few years. As declared by Iraq,
these are permitted activities, which will be monitored by UNMOVIC to ensure
that they comply with the relevant Council resolutions. A series of new projects have been declared
that are at various stages of development.
They include a design for a new liquid oxygen/ethanol propellant engine
and rreplacement
of guidance systems for several surface-to-air missiles. These projects will need to be investigated
and evaluated by UNMOVIC.
Iraq has also
provided information on a short-range rocket that is manufactured using 81 mm
aluminium tubes. Although this is not a new disclosure, the information may be
relevant to well-publicized reports concerning the importation of aluminium
tubes. At this stage, UNMOVIC has drawn
no conclusions concerning the tubes, and further investigation of this will be
conducted.
While I am on
the subject of new information, I would like to mention a document recently
provided by Iraq. This is the so-called
Air Force document, which was once in the hands of an UNSCOM inspector and
which relates to the consumption of chemical munitions in the Iraq/Iran
War. Potentially, it could assist in
resolving some questions relating to the material balance of chemical weapons.
We are now closely examining this document to establish the scope of the
information and to evaluate it in the light of information in our
archives. It is too early to say
whether it will support the information in Iraq’s Declaration.
I now turn to
some inconsistencies and issues that will need clarification. In the biological area, Iraq previously
provided, in its submission to the Amorim panel in February 1999, a table
concerning the additional import of bacterial growth media. Growth media was used by Iraq in the
production of anthrax and other biological warfare agents. This table has been omitted from the current
Declaration and the reasons for the omission need to be explained.
In the civilian
chemical area, Iraq has declared that it has repaired and installed equipment
that had previously been destroyed under UNSCOM supervision, under Council
resolution 687 (1991). The equipment is
now at a civilian chemical plant and used for the production of chlorine and
other chemicals.
An UNMOVIC team
has recently inspected both the plant and the equipment. Consideration will now need to be given to
the fate of this equipment, as well as other equipment, which was presumed
destroyed.
In the missile
area, Iraq has declared the development of a missile known as the Al Samoud,
which uses components from an imported surface-to-air missile.
A variant of the
Al Samoud, with a larger diameter (760 mm) than the standard version (500 mm)
has been declared. Because of the
potential of such a missile, UNSCOM had informed Iraq that such a development
should not proceed until technical discussions had resolved the question of
capability. In the latest
update of the
semi-annual monitoring declarations, Iraq has declared that in 13 flight tests
of the Al Samoud the missile has exceeded the permitted range. The greatest range achieved was 183
kilometres.
The use of
components from the imported surface-to-air missile, which I have just
mentioned, was also the subject of the letters of March 1994 and November 1997
in which the Executive Chairman of UNSCOM stated that the activity was not
permitted. Iraq disputed the UNSCOM
view that the activity was in violation of its obligations. From its current Declaration, it appears
that Iraq has, in fact, proceeded with the conversion in recent years. The whole issue will now need to be
considered.
I have covered
new information in Iraq’s Declaration, some inconsistencies, and issues that
need to be considered or clarified through investigation or technical
discussions.
As there is
little new substantive information in the weapons part of Iraq’s Declaration,
or new supporting documentation, the issues that were identified as unanswered
in the Amorim report (S/1999/356) and in UNSCOM’s report (S/1999/94) remain
unresolved. In most cases, the issues
are outstanding not because there is information that contradicts Iraq’s
account, but simply because there is a lack of supporting evidence. Such supporting evidence, in the form of
documentation, testimony by individuals who took part, or physical evidence,
for example, destroyed warheads, is required to give confidence that Iraq’s
Declaration is indeed accurate, full and complete.
The issues that
have previously been identified include the unilateral destruction of
indigenously produced “training” missile engines, the accounting for 50
conventional warheads declared to be unilaterally destroyed but not recovered,
550 mustard gas shells declared lost after the Gulf War, declarations
concerning the production and weaponization of the nerve agent VX, the declared
unilateral destruction of biological warfare agents and Iraq’s declaration
concerning the material balance of bacterial growth media.
While in most
cases issues are outstanding because there is a lack of supporting evidence, in
a few cases, there is information in our possession that would appear to
contradict Iraq’s account. At this
point, I will only mention that there are indications suggesting that Iraq’s
account of its production and unilateral destruction of anthrax during the
period between 1988 and 1991, may not be accurate. On this matter, we shall certainly ask Iraq to provide
explanations and further evidence.
What role will
the inspection system play if Iraq fails to provide evidence supporting its
statements that there remain no weapons of mass destruction and that nothing
was produced or developed or stored during the period from the end of 1998
until now?
Inspections of
sites have, as one important objective, the verification of industrial,
military, research and other current activities with a view to assuring that no
proscribed programmes or activities are regenerated at any site in Iraq. This side of the inspection system can be
characterized as a form of containment.
Through the other side of the system of reinforced monitoring, there is
a continuation of investigations to complete the requirement of disarmament, as
laid down in resolution 687 (1991) and many subsequent resolutions.
The sites to be
inspected in the future are not only those which have been declared by Iraq or
inspected in the past, but also any new sites which may become known through
procurement information, interviews, defectors, open sources, intelligence or
overhead imagery. New techniques and
increasing resources are available for this effort.
The use of
multiple teams – in all disciplines – operating in parallel all over Iraq has
been the basis for planning our inspections.
To decrease the possibility of prediction, no systematic patterns are
being followed. Advanced technology
will play its role once procurement is finalized. Not only monitoring equipment, such as cameras and sensors, will
be used but also surveillance over-flights from various platforms, including
fixed-wing aircraft, drones and helicopters.
Inspection
activities at sites seek to establish the operational objectives of sites. They comprise searches for proscribed
material and equipment, as well as documents and computers. Sampling may also provide important
information related to any undeclared activities at sites. Arrangements are in place for the
procurement of chemical and biological analytical facilities to be installed at
our Baghdad Centre. None of these tools
and inspection activities will guarantee that all possibly concealed items and
activities will be found, but based on the extensive authority given in resolution
1441 (2002) and backed by a united Security Council, they will make any
attempted concealment more difficult.