Making headway with logistics and capacity

Making headway with logistics and capacity

"PREPAREDNESS" --- OPERATIONAL NECESSITY FOR UN PEACEKEEPING
In recent years, the Secretary-General, Member States and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) have placed great emphasis on measures to improve the ability of the UN to respond quickly to an international crisis and to deploy a mission rapidly. A number of different initiatives all aimed at increasing the speed with which a peacekeeping mission can "hit the ground" following a Security Council resolution have been introduced. In 1997, SHIRBRIG or the Standby High Readiness Brigade is a multilateral initiative launched by a group of Member States, which builds on the UN Secretariat's attempts to enhance reaction capacity including the Mission Planning section of DPKO, Standby Arrangements Systems and the Rapidly Deployable Mission Headquarters.

The Secretary-General noted at the launch of the planning element of SHIRBRIG that "the international community must be able to intervene swiftly and effectively. In the short term, the rapid deployment of a peace-keeping operation can prevent enormous agony".

SHIRBRIG is being developed outside the auspices of the UN, and focuses on operational coordination to achieve the highest possible level of "intra-operatablity." SHIRBRIG is intended to be deployed under a Chapter VI mandate on short notice, for a limited duration, to prevent or contain crises. SHIRBRIG will include coordinated training, a headquarters unit, infantry battalions, reconnaissance units, extensive engineer and logistic support and ideally the development of identical or compatible operational equipment such as walkie talkies, vehicles, communication equipment, computers, etc. between Member States' forces. SHIRBRIG will work towards developing common procedures, training standards, and operational and logistic concepts. SHIRBRIG's headquarters will be located in and hosted by Denmark at the Hoevelte Barracks. The SHIRBRIG effort has emerged under the impetus of the Nordic countries, with about 4,000 to 5,000 troops already committed.

Another development dating back to 1994 is the Standby Arrangements System for which so far nearly 70 countries have identified 88,000 troops, greatly enhancing DPKO's capacity to plan a potential mission. A major component of the system is that Member-States identify which type and how many troops and equipment would be made available for peacekeeping, in principal. Their deployment by Member States would still be subject to national political decisions.

DPKO has created a database of the potential troops and services which may be made available by Member States which would greatly alleviate the logistical problems of the past. DPKO now has at least some idea of the equipment, services and troops available and has a realistic idea of what can be accomplished on the ground before ever "setting up shop" in the mission area.

Another key element of the ability of the UN to quickly respond to a crisis is the Mission Planning Service (MPS) which constantly researches, studies and plans for potential operations, including taking part in survey missions. The MPS tries to anticipate a crisis and to initiate the planning process at an early stage before the Security Council gives the authorization for a peacekeeping operation. While much of the work of MPS can go unnoticed, particularly if a mission is never deployed, the preliminary work done is crucial in order for a mission to fullfill its mandate. MPS combined with the database of standby arrangements allows for more realistic and beneficial goals to be developed and accomplished.

As these mechanisms are developed and refined, preparedness to act may become less a motto and more a reality.

CONSUMER LOGIC APPLIED TO THE UN'S SURFACE TRANSPORT NEEDS
"We still have a trailer dating from 1943 in UNIFIL," pondered Ray Botham of the Surface Transport Unit of the Department of Peace-Keeping Operations (DPKO), "and that's not the worst of it". The Surface Transport Unit is exploring a new method of procurement which could save the UN up to $70 million dollars. Under this new method called the "Best Value Option" (BVO), the Unit would evaluate the purchase of vehicles, trailers and construction equipment based on the vehicles' life-cycle costs and the UN's long-term needs. The distorted age profile and a proliferation of makes are only two of the problems plaguing the vehicle fleet of the UN, acquired for peacekeeping operations over the last fifty years. Officer-in-Charge Botham and his staff are confronting several difficulties, due in part to the scheduled removal from action of nearly 75 percent of the fleet at the end of 1997.

The distorted age profile of the fleet results from a major increase in vehicle purchases in 1992, when peacekeeping operations grew suddenly and signficantly. UN vehicles have a life-span of five years before they are removed from the field (mainly peacekeeping missions) and sold to civilians. The fleet consists of over 10,000 vehicles of which there are 1,300 different makes, models and years of vehicles since purchases had to be made on an ad hoc basis when, at an all-time peak, some 78,000 peacekeepers had to be deployed in 17 operations in late 1994, up from 11,000 in 1991.

"Spot Procurement" is the currentmethod by which the UN purchases vehicles for use in peace-keeping operations. It involves finding the lowest prevailing retail price based on the specifications DPKO sets for a vehicle. This method only considers the price and the adherence to necessary specifications, not the potential after-service costs for the vehicle. Repairs, maintenance and spare parts can be costly for many models and requires additional spending after purchase.

Vehicles need to be regularly replaced and Botham argues in favour of moving towards the best value option method of procurement. "The best value option method considers low capital costs in addition to low spare parts price in terms of the estimated life-cycle costs," said Botham. "It is something which you and I do every day when evaluating a purchase -- the consumer asks himself, despite the price of the product, is it going to cost a lot to use and maintain?"

The BVO plan includes three major components including a comparative evaluation of purchase price and maintenance costs. Botham also wants to "tie" manufacturers to the vehicles with required ancillary services, or post-sales customer service as part of the purchase contracts, a standard practice in most large military and civilian fleets. Accessibility to spare parts and the process of repairing vehicles would be much more effective and efficient.

The final portion of BVO would be to standardize the entire fleet of vehicles to one or two makes and models. Standardization would make the task of maintenance cheaper and more effective. Standardization would also include standardization of tires, batteries, other parts and a centralized disposal of vehicles. It would allow the missions greater flexibility and less time spent trying to track down a rare battery for a particular model, because the entire fleet would be identical and parts interchangeable.

Botham is optimistic about the proposed changes in procedure: "I believe the problems we've experienced with the fleet could be addressed with a revised procurement system that uses the best value option to reach potentially massive savings."

THE UN LOGISTICS BASE IN BRINDISI

Under a rent-free arrangement with the Government of Italy, the UN Logistics Base in Brindisi has been in operation since late 1994. Its strategic location was a key factor in the choice of site--13 of the current field missions are located within 5,000 kilometres of the Base. Warehouse facilities, open-air storage space, administrative facilities, direct access to an airfield capable of handling the largest transport aircraft, close proximity to a deep seaport, and highly developed motorway and railway networks are some of the advantages Brindisi offers.
The principal functions of the Base are to:
store reusable assets from liquidated field missions, when it is economic to do so and use them for new or existing missions;
prepare and maintain two mission start-up kits, each designed to provide the basic support requirements for up to 100 persons for a period of up to three months in a "bare base" environment, anywhere in the world;
act as a satellite communications link between UN Headquarters and the peacekeeping operations in Central Asia, the Middle East and the former Yugoslavia.

Assets from recently-closed UN field operations were used to develop start-up kits containing basic equipment and supplies to initiate and sustain the non-military components of a peacekeeping operation. These supplies can be moved to virtually any port in Africa capable of handling ocean-going ships in less than three weeks. Detailed guidelines have been issued to closing missions on what should be returned to the Base, and what should be disposed of locally, by sale or, where approved, by donation. For example, surplus assets from UN missions in Mozambique, Rwanda, Somalia and the former Yugoslavia, have been refurbished and redistributed. Redistribution of assets can take two to four weeks compared to 12 to 18 months for new procurement. Not only does this reduce the time spent in procurement, it is estimated that the Base has also yielded savings of roughly $50 million for the UN in new procurement costs.
To make sure that the Base is funded steadily, field missions may be charged for the services performed by the Base on their behalf. The individual peacekeeping budgets would be assessed on a prorated basis for the estimated costs of the Base, put at $14 million for the period 1 July 1997 to 30 June 1998.