DISCUSSION OF LESSONS LEARNED FROM UNAMIR

1. There was a general feeling among those interviewed and as expressed at the Comprehensive Seminar that the mandates of UNAMIR were a product of the international political environment in which they were formulated, and often tended to reflect concerns and imperatives of certain Member States that had little to do with the situation in Rwanda. A fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of the conflict also contributed to false political assumptions and military assessments. The Security Council, which has the primary responsibility for the formulation of peacekeeping mandates, at the beginning of the crisis, tended to view the situation in Rwanda as a small-scale civil war, stated some Council members. The internal political conflicts within the Government of Rwanda, and the mounting evidence of politically motivated assassinations and human rights violations in the country, were ignored or not explored. It was suggested at the Comprehensive Seminar that the Security Council needs to improve drastically the quality of background information it has on situations on its agenda.

2. UNAMIR was established on 5 October 1993 as a result of a request by the Government of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF), who took the unprecedented action of paying a visit in a joint delegation to the United Nations, to assist them in the implementation of the Arusha accords. The accords -- comprising the Arusha Peace Agreement of 4 August 1993, a cease-fire agreement and six detailed Protocols on the rule of law, power-sharing, repatriation of refugees and resettlement of displaced persons, integration of armed forces and miscellaneous issues -- had been painstakingly negotiated for almost two years under the auspices of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), with the negotiations being observed by the United Nations. The impact of the joint request can only be fully appreciated when compared with the serious difficulties being faced by the United Nations, at that time, with the willingness of parties to the conflicts in Somalia and the former Yugoslavia to cooperate with it.

3. A permanent member of the Security Council that wished to withdraw its military personnel from Rwanda without creating a critical security vacuum, as well as the OAU, urged the United Nations to play a more active role and assist the parties in implementing the accords. States neighbouring Rwanda -- the United Republic of Tanzania, Uganda, Zaire and Kenya -- wanted the United Nations to bear its share of the burden of bringing peace to a country long beleaguered by conflict and human tragedy. In February 1993, the Secretary-General dispatched a goodwill mission to the region to encourage the negotiations and to explore the possibilities of deploying military observers along the border between Rwanda and Uganda. At the request of Rwanda and Uganda, the United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR) was established in June 1993 and deployed along their 150-kilometre common border in order to prevent the military use of the area, especially for the transportation of military supplies into Rwanda.

4. With the conclusion of the Arusha accords, Rwanda seemed to be a textbook case for a successful peacekeeping operation. In retrospect, it is apparent that the underlying issues were not resolved at Arusha. Within Rwanda, too, some political factions had voiced open opposition to the entire Arusha process. Observers of the Arusha negotiations have stated that the two sides represented at Arusha were not balanced: the RPF came as a consolidated block with a common position on each issue, while the Government side was divided and riven with internal conflict. There was a jockeying for control and ministerial portfolios among the Rwandese political parties and some had rejected the Agreement outright. It was suggested at the Comprehensive Seminar that to better understand a particular situation, the Security Council should be much more actively involved in peace processes prior to their conclusion.

5. UNAMIR's first mandate was formulated in the midst of a grim international situation in Bosnia, Iraq and Somalia. Two days before the adoption of Security Council resolution 872 establishing UNAMIR, 18 American soldiers were killed in Somalia. One day after the adoption of resolution 872, the United States Government announced that it was withdrawing its forces from Somalia and the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM). Shortly thereafter, most Western States announced that they would do the same. Even before these events, the United States had begun a critical review of its role in peacekeeping and there appeared to be a general unwillingness to become involved in operations costly in blood or resources. A presidential directive had been issued which strictly defined the conditions under which the United States would be involved in peacekeeping missions. And in his address to the General Assembly in October 1993, the United States President said that the United Nations must learn to say "no" to peace-keeping operations that were not feasible.

6. It was in that environment of caution and fiscal austerity that UNAMIR was established for an initial period of six months, with the proviso that it would be extended beyond the initial 90 days upon a review by the Council. A broad-based transitional government was to be installed by the end of 1993, national elections and the installation of a new government would follow and the process was expected to be completed by October 1995, or by December 1995 at the latest. The idea, it was suggested by some participants at the Comprehensive Seminar, was to assist the Rwandese, but as cheaply as possible, without being drawn into a protracted conflict.

7. The first mandate of UNAMIR included these elements: to contribute to the security of Kigali, inter alia within a weapons-secure area established by the parties in and around the city; to monitor observance of the cease-fire agreement; to monitor the security situation during the final period of the transitional government's mandate, leading up to elections; to assist in the coordination of humanitarian assistance; and to investigate and report on incidents regarding the activities of the gendarmerie and police. By the same resolution, the Security Council urged Member States, the United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations to provide and intensify their economic, financial and humanitarian assistance in favour of the Rwandese population and of the democratization process in Rwanda.

8. The force approved to implement this mandate -- 2,548 all ranks to be deployed in a graduated manner -- was lightly armed and equipped, and was to operate under the assumption that the parties would hold to their side of the bargain agreed to at Arusha. In retrospect, it was suggested by some participants at the Comprehensive Seminar, that this was an overly optimistic assumption and that one of the painful lessons of Rwanda was: "Go in too light and, in the end, instead of keeping the peace, the Blue Helmets become vulnerable targets".

9. Bangladesh and Belgium were the only countries to offer troops for the first battalion of UNAMIR, and each provided a 400-man contingent. Once the Force Commander and a small advance party arrived on 22 October 1993, they soon realized their lack of political preparedness in dealing with the situation in Rwanda. They were now beginning to see elements of the political impasse, the seeds of which had been sown as far back as August 1993. Despite the installation of Juvenal Habyarimana as President on 5 January 1994, the transitional national assembly and the transitional government could not be installed on the same day. Implementation of the peace accords was falling behind schedule and the activities of certain political elements were becoming increasingly violent. By the end of February 1994, the second battalion of UNAMIR, from Ghana, had been deployed, bringing the troop strength of UNAMIR to the authorized level of 2,545 all ranks. The UNAMIR civilian police contingent had reached its authorized limit of 60.

10. On 6 April 1994, after the plane carrying President Habyarimana crashed, the civil war broke out and the commission of genocide began. UNAMIR's mandate to monitor observance of the cease-fire agreement became irrelevant. The Mission had neither the appropriate mandate nor the means to take any effective action. Senior military officials are in agreement that the force level of 2,545 was too small for any military action to protect victims of the slaughter, even in self-defence, and the force's capabilities had not been put together with a conflict situation in mind. With an extremely weak logistics base, UNAMIR was also rapidly running out of food and medical supplies, even sandbags to protect its accommodation. It had no ambulances and mainly soft-skin vehicles for the transportation of troops. "We were to pay very dearly for that weak logistics and medical support when the civil war broke out," one senior official said.

11. Some people have advanced the argument that UNAMIR could have resorted to its rules of engagement, one paragraph of which was interpreted as authorizing the operation to take any necessary action, including the use of force, to protect civilians at risk. Other participants at the Comprehensive Seminar warned against any attempt to usurp the powers of the Security Council, which, under the Charter of the United Nations, is the only body authorized to decide on mandates of peacekeeping operations. Senior military officials of UNAMIR stated that, during that period, even if they had wanted to invoke that paragraph of the rules of engagement, they did not have the physical capability and the means to do so.

12. In the circumstances of an effective mandate vacuum between 7 and 21 April 1994 when the Security Council adjusted the Mission's mandate, some Member States intervened on 9 and 10 April to evacuate their nationals from Rwanda, without adequate coordination and advance warning to UNAMIR. A similar situation arose during the Congo operation in 1960-1964, when Member States dispatched troops to the conflict area to evacuate their nationals, without coordinating with the peacekeeping operation. In the Congo crisis, the Security Council regarded such action as foreign intervention not authorized by the Council, thus, endangering United Nations troops on the ground. In Rwanda, senior UNAMIR military officers felt that such actions led to UNAMIR being suspected of collusion, especially when the intervening forces, at one point, used United Nations marked vehicles to undertake their evacuation tasks.

13. It was stated at the Comprehensive Seminar that the inaction of the Security Council in those critical days immediately following the crash of the President's plane was due to several factors, including an insufficient grasp of the depth of the problem. The Council only dimly perceived the steady deterioration of the situation in Rwanda and, even then, saw it only as a delay in the implementation of the Arusha process, not as a prelude to a genocide. Some Council members recommended that the Secretariat must find ways to ensure that the Council is fully briefed on all aspects of a critial situation being discussed. Another complicating factor mentioned at the Comprehensive Seminar was the presence on the Council of a representative of the Habyarimana regime, since Rwanda was serving a two-year term as a non-permanent member. This representative, it was suggested, naturally sought to focus the discussion on the actions of the RPF and ignore what was happening in Government-controlled areas.

14. With some troop-contributing countries unilaterally withdrawing their contingents from UNAMIR, the Secretary-General reported to the Council, on 20 April 1994, that UNAMIR personnel "cannot be left at risk indefinitely, where there is no possibility of their performing the tasks for which they were dispatched". On that date, the military strength of the Mission stood at 1,515. The Secretary-General presented three options to the Council: immediate and massive reinforcement of UNAMIR with a changed mandate allowing it to coerce the parties into a cease-fire and to attempt to restore law and order; a drawing down of the Mission to a small group headed by the Force Commander who would remain in Kigali to mediate a cease-fire, with the SRSG continuing his efforts to mediate the political negotiations; or the complete withdrawal of UNAMIR.

15. Given the reluctance of troop contributors to expose their soldiers to unreasonable risk and in the absence of a consensus on providing the force with enforcement powers, the Security Council, on 21 April 1994, adjusted the mandate of UNAMIR "to act as an intermediary between the parties in an attempt to secure an agreement to a cease-fire; to assist in the resumption of humanitarian relief operations to the extent feasible; and to monitor and report on developments in Rwanda, including the safety and security of the civilians who sought refuge with UNAMIR". The Council also decided to reduce UNAMIR's troop strength to 270, and reaffirmed that the Arusha accords remained the key to the peace process in Rwanda. It was obvious that with that force level, as well as the revised mandate, there was no effective action UNAMIR could take to halt the genocide. In fact, there was a certain reluctance among Council members to acknowledge that the problem in Rwanda was one of genocide.

16. Even a Security Council presidential statement on 30 April only demanded that the interim Government of Rwanda, proclaimed on 8 April, and the RPF take effective measures to prevent any attacks on civilians in areas under their control, and asked UNAMIR to continue efforts for a cease-fire between the two. The statement, however, did recognize that "attacks on defenceless civilians have occurred throughout the country, especially in areas under the control of the members or supporters of the armed forces of the interim Government of Rwanda"; thus, acknowledging what was going on in the cities, towns and communes under Hutu control. Yet, it was not until 17 May 1994 that the Council, adopting resolution 918, recognized that "UNAMIR may be required to take action in self-defence against persons or groups who threaten protected sites and populations" and, in that context, authorized the expansion of the UNAMIR force level to 5,500 troops. UNAMIR's mandate was expanded to enable it to contribute to the security and protection of displaced persons, refugees and civilians at risk and to provide security and support for relief operations.

17. When it came to finding the troops for the expanded operation, however, problems arose. Only African countries and four non-African countries were willing to provide the troops. Logistical support for the ill-equipped African troops was hard to come by and, when offered, required long and tedious negotiations on the conditions under which it was being contributed. The Secretariat was also frustrated by the process of matching each contingent with equipment they needed and knew how to operate. On 18 July, the RPF unilaterally declared a cease-fire, effectively ending the civil war. When a new government of national unity was formed on 19 July, UNAMIR had fewer than 500 all ranks on the ground in Rwanda.

18. Before the expanded UNAMIR could be fully deployed, the Security Council authorized, under Chapter VII of the Charter, the French-led Operation Turquoise for humanitarian purposes. That force was on the ground in the space of a few days, while troops and logistical support for the expanded UNAMIR could not be found. When the expanded UNAMIR was finally fully deployed by November 1994, the Rwandese again questioned the appropriateness of its mandate. Which refugees and civilians at risk was UNAMIR protecting now, they asked. Why was this protection not provided to the victims of genocide? It was argued by some of the Rwandese authorities interviewed that the mandate of the expanded UNAMIR was, once again, irrelevant to the situation on the ground. It has also been argued by others, including senior UNAMIR officials, that what Rwanda needed at that time was not infantry units, but a mixed force to assist it in restoring vital services. However, others are of the opinion that the expanded military force was a stabilizing factor in post-war Rwanda and was essential in providing a sense of security for returnees who feared a reverse genocide through reprisal killings.

19. While it has been said that the mandates of peacekeeping operations must be clear, direct and limited, it was argued at the Comprehensive Seminar that the mandate of the peacekeeping operation in Rwanda should have been conceptualized with greater flexibility. The traditional peacekeeping role of a United Nations military presence -- to separate combatants and, if peace is not possible, to provide security and humanitarian relief for the civilian population -- needs to be expanded to a peace-support and conflict-repair operation. When the war ended, UNAMIR had the troop strength and the technical and logistical support to start the repair operation, but no mandate to do so.

20. However, some participants at the Comprehensive Seminar stated that this aspect of the mandate of peacekeepers deserved further study. The purely developmental aspects of peace-building should not be part of the mandate of peacekeepers and must be financed from the traditional source of voluntary funding.

21. On 11 June 1993, about two months before the Arusha Peace Agreement was signed, both the Government of Rwanda and the RPF sent a joint request to the Security Council calling on the United Nations to send a reconnaissance mission to Rwanda to prepare for a quick deployment of a neutral international force as soon as the accords were signed. The request welcomed the OAU's suggestion that the United Nations should assume responsibility for, and command of, such a force.

22. As soon as the Arusha accords were signed, the Secretary-General dispatched a reconnaissance team to Rwanda. The team was led by an officer who was to be the Force Commander of the new operation, and included another military officer who had been part of the Secretary-General's team observing the negotiations at Arusha and who would now serve as the Chief Military Observer of the operation. It also included political, military, humanitarian desk officers for Rwanda from the relevant departments, as well as officers from FALD and UNHCR. The team, however, lacked a public information officer who could develop the public information strategy for the operation. In retrospect, the Force Commander stated that the team was not adequately prepared for the intricacies of the political situation in the country, a factor that contributed to a naive optimism about the entire operation.

23. The team discussed two options for troop requirements for UNAMIR: one option envisaged 2,500 troops, while another, more ambitious, plan of operations envisaged 4,500 troops. During consultations with Member States, one country was of the view that only 500 military observers were needed to do the job, and another suggested 1,000 troops. Finally, the Secretary-General recommended a force of 2,545 all ranks, which was accepted by the Security Council in its resolution 872. In putting together the first battalion for the force, the Secretariat found that only Belgium could offer half a battalion of 400 all ranks. When the Secretariat pleaded with Member States for a well-equipped contingent to provide logistical support to UNAMIR, countries with the capacity to do so were not responsive. It was left to Bangladesh, a developing nation, to offer to provide the logistical element with 400 troops. Those interviewed expressed great admiration for the Bangladeshi contingent, but stated that it had insufficient equipment to carry out its logistics tasks. This became a critical factor during the civil conflict. The planning of future missions must consider the capacities of troop-contributing countries to perform assigned functions.

24. Views have been expressed that in today's post-cold-war world, most Western armies have limited support capabilities. While soldiers could be found for peacekeeping operations, countries were unable to support them. At the time of the formation of UNAMIR, there were about 80,000 peacekeeping soldiers deployed across the world. Many countries did not offer troops for UNAMIR because they were already stretched too thin and it was stated that most countries lack the capacity to be involved in more than two peacekeeping operations at any given time.

25. When the Security Council decided, on 17 May 1994, to expand UNAMIR to 5,500 all ranks, planning was hampered by the uncertainty as to whether troops and logistics could be found. Never before in the history of peacekeeping had the United Nations deployed such a large number of troops and logistics to a land-locked country. Further, to do so with such little cooperation from Member States became a nightmare for the planners and continued to be so throughout the time the operation was in-country.

26. Another problem that adversely affected the planning process was the absence of adequate analysis of available information. The lack of information analysis continued to be a major problem even after UNAMIR was deployed. No capability was established to collect, analyse and disseminate information. There is an emerging consensus that the United Nations lacks an adequate system for information gathering and analysis. It lacks a system for drawing on existing information sources, such as Government agencies, academic institutions, rights monitoring groups and other non-governmental groups, as well as the various agencies of the United Nations itself. It lacks a specialized unit, without operational responsibilities, for analysing such information and translating it into evolving strategic options. This becomes particularly critical when the Organization must deal with a deteriorating situation in a crisis.

27. The United Nations needs to re-evaluate its attitude towards the role of intelligence and information in peacekeeping operations. Its traditional aversion to the collection and use of intelligence information has not served it well in the past and Rwanda clearly exemplifies this. In response to the experiences of UNAMIR and in other crisis areas, an interdepartmental framework encompassing the DPA, DPKO and DHA has been set up to improve planning and coordination.

28. The question of information provided by Member States also needs to be reviewed, perhaps by improving cooperation between the United Nations and those Member States that have the capacity and capability for such information gathering and analysis. In addition to the Situation Centre which was established at Headquarters, it was suggested that, at the field level, a joint military-civilian information analysis mechanism with the necessary resources could be set up within the Office of the SRSG. This mechanism should be manned by qualified military, political and humanitarian analysts and should have the capability to direct, collect, analyse and disseminate information. These activities can assist in allowing the mission to make a proactive, rather than reactive, response to the situation in the field.

29. The humanitarian situation of Rwanda in 1993 was also a vital clue to the impending political explosion in the country. A comprehensive humanitarian plan, developed along with the military and security plan for the mission, would have allowed for a better meshing of objectives of both from the initial stages. It would have sensitized the humanitarian and military actors to the mandate, procedures and culture of the other, allowing them to work better together during the crisis period following April 1994. Further, such planning could have helped avoid ad hoc responses to humanitarian crises and allowed for a comprehensive approach to assistance, which, in turn, could have prevented later problems such as the preponderance of aid in the refugee camps in Goma, Zaire, which were in great part controlled by persons implicated in the genocide, with little attention being paid to the internally displaced.

30. In Rwanda, United Nations activities were hampered by poor coordination. There was a need for a clear chain of command within the Mission. Ideally, all mission components should work through the SRSG. Headquarters, too, when making requests or issuing instructions, should go through the SRSG, and/or the Force Commander on military/security matters. They, in turn, would then pass the instructions on to the relevant office or mission component. There were also mixed reviews of the coordination between the humanitarian community and UNAMIR, particularly its military component. The humanitarian agencies believed their relations with the peacekeeping operation were good, and coordination and willingness to share information were better than most other situations where peacekeepers and humanitarian agencies work together. The UNAMIR military, however, considered the humanitarian community's coordination with the operation to be limited and conditional.

31. During the Comprehensive Seminar, former UNAMIR officials repeated what has been found in other missions: humanitarian agencies tended to be more cooperative when the security situation in the country was tense and they needed the protection of the peacekeeping operation. However, as soon as security concerns diminished, they preferred to distance themselves from the operation, particularly its military. There is no clear chain of command between a peacekeeping operation and United Nations agencies operating in the same country. According to UNAMIR officials, in Rwanda the relationship was based solely on "perceived need". Sometimes the lack of coordination had no other reason than differences in perception of the respective organizational cultures of the military, the humanitarian community, the development agencies, the civilian police component, the human rights monitors, and other actors. One senior official also pointed out that lack of coordination among the different components in the field was often a reflection of lack of coordination at Headquarters. The interdepartmental coordinating framework was set up to address this issue, among others.

32. The close relationship between the level of security and the effectiveness of humanitarian assistance highlights the need for coherence in the strategies adopted by the political, military and humanitarian components. The Rwanda crisis demonstrated the need for much closer linkages between humanitarian and political endeavours. To improve coordination, particularly during the resettlement of internally displaced people, an integrated operations centre was set up in January 1995 in the Ministry of Rehabilitation and Social Integration, with the participation of all United Nations operational agencies, two representatives from the nongovernmental community and from the two major donors, the United States and the European Union. The Ministries of the Interior, Planning, Justice, Defence were also represented. The centre contributed to improved coordination of activities relating to the resettlement of internally displaced persons and helped, to some degree, in the definition of common objectives.

33. While the creation of such centres can be recommended, there should be clearly defined objectives for future United Nations humanitarian coordination assignments. Mission objectives should not only be country and situation specific, but also should reflect precise inter-agency and interdepartmental agreement on the overall policy and priority activities of the United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator. At the internal consultation, some participants suggested that in order to strengthen coordination between the humanitarian community and the SRSG, the deputy to the SRSG could be drawn from one of the humanitarian agencies.

34. In the post-genocide period, the proliferation of United Nations agency personnel in Rwanda created confusion for the RPF officials now in charge as they were unfamiliar with the United Nations lines of authority and probably did not realize that there were so many different, and sometimes competing, mandates. The ensuing chaos undermined the authority of the SRSG, especially after the Rwandese soon discovered that it was UNDP and UNHCR, not the peacekeeping operation, that had the resources to assist them. When the Rwandese requested the agencies to coordinate their activities through the SRSG, some agencies successfully appealed to their headquarters to put political pressure on the new Government to allow independent access for them to Government officials and channels.

35. The United Nations has to ensure that the SRSG is not only nominally, but institutionally, the head of the United Nations family in a country where one has been designated. In order to strengthen the position of the SRSG, it is advisable that he be appointed as early as possible and be the first senior United Nations official to arrive in the mission area. In Somalia, the Humanitarian Coordinator operated for several months before the SRSG arrived in the field. In Rwanda, the Force Commander arrived in October 1993 and the SRSG in November 1993. In both situations, those senior officials had established themselves before the arrival of the SRSG. Consequently, unnecessary tension impaired coordination efforts at the beginning.

36. It was also suggested by some officials that for effective overall coordination and to avoid negative political fall-out, the SRSG must be consulted on all matters that have political implications. This would not mean interfering in the specific mandates of the agencies; rather, it would be aimed at allowing the United Nations to present a united, coherent front to the host Government, not as a conglomerate of disparate units pursuing their own agendas.

37. One instance where the different entities in Rwanda did not adequately coordinate their efforts, UNAMIR officials interviewed stated, occurred in late 1994. At the time, UNAMIR believed that the situation was ripe for the refugees to return to Rwanda: the Mission was deployed in three quarters of the country; it had 4,000 troops on the ground; and its officials felt that there clearly was a window of opportunity to allow the refugees to return home in relative safety. Efforts, including the distribution of pamphlets, were made to encourage the return of refugees. Unfortunately, the Mission did not consult with DHA or UNHCR before launching its initiative, and the latter protested the action.

38. Outside of the United Nations family, but still a part of the humanitarian assistance landscape, are the many non-governmental organizations that work alongside the peacekeeping operation. While they can be extremely supportive of many of the peace-building and humanitarian initiatives of the mission, they tend to protect their independence fiercely and resent the implications of working under the coordination umbrella of a United Nations agency. In Rwanda, though, DHA believed that its United Nations Rwanda Emergency Office (UNREO) worked extremely well with non-governmental organizations. Others stated that UNREO's role was limited primarily to facilitating information sharing and its contribution to coordination of humanitarian assistance was, therefore, also limited.

39. When UNAMIR was first deployed in October 1993, its purpose was to assist in the implementation of what were regarded as comprehensive peace accords, with the support of the parties. Due, among other things, to the absence of information analysis, the assumptions under which it was deployed did not correspond to the realities on the ground and UNAMIR was ill equipped to cope with those realities. Speakers at the Comprehensive Seminar suggested that the United Nations must develop a rapid reaction capability to respond to changing situations on the ground.

40. Despite the prevailing uncertain political climate in early 1994, the Kigali weapons-secure zone had been established by the parties and an RPF battalion of 600 men had been brought into the capital to protect RPF leaders, as had been agreed. In retrospect, it appears that when the implementation of the Arusha accords was stalemated shortly after the installation of President Habyarimana on 5 January, weapons for the Rwandese Government Forces (FAR) and the militia had begun arriving in Rwanda. The RPF, too, began infiltrating more troops into Kigali to strengthen its 600-man contingent.

41. The discussion that occurred between UNAMIR and the Secretariat on the issue of searching for and confiscating weapons in early 1994 elucidates the relationship that exists between a peacekeeping mission and Headquarters. Interviews revealed that, on the one hand, it is the role of Headquarters to prod reluctant mission leaders to take action in conformity with the mission's mandate. Yet, on the other hand, it must temper the enthusiasm of mission leaders who may either wish to stretch the mandate or believe that they have the means to carry out ambitious plans, although within the mandate, but not practical within existing means.

42. With the reduction of the force during the genocide to 444 all ranks, UNAMIR adopted a self-defence posture, defending the civilian population which had sought refuge within UNAMIR's defence perimeter. It had no capacity to go out of this perimeter and protect or rescue people at risk. Even if it had decided to fight in self-defence, the force had very low levels of ammunition, limited fuel, food and medicines, no sandbags for overhead protection and no ambulances. In such a situation, the force could not even contemplate offensive measures.

43. Despite its reduced presence, UNAMIR troops protected tens of thousands of Rwandese who took shelter at sites under their control. Yet, there are those who feel that many more lives could have been saved if the peacekeeping operation had been reinforced at that critical juncture. However, the speed with which the massacres were carried out and the organized control of their commission suggests that in the time it would have taken for an expanded force to be deployed, much of the damage might still have been done. None the less, it was argued at the Comprehensive Seminar that a demonstration of international will at that time would have sent a message of international resolve to those who were organizing the killings. One member of the Security Council stated that the Council showed a lack of leadership in those critical days and, thus, failed to send a clear message to potential troop contributors as well as to the rest of the world. Subsequent events further demonstrated the lack of political will by the international community to provide protection in cases of such gross violations of human rights and sadly led to the withdrawal of most UNAMIR troops while genocide was being committed.

44. On the issue of individual Member States evacuating their personnel from a conflict area, it was suggested that the Secretary-General be informed in advance and that these actions be taken in coordination with the Force Commander. The authorization of the Security Council could also be sought before such attempts are made. Representatives of some States who intervened to evacuate their nationals from Rwanda in April 1994 indicated that both the Secretary-General and the Security Council were informed, possibly simultaneously with the landing of their evacuation forces. However, it was suggested at the Comprehensive Seminar that, in future, such evacuations should, if possible, be made in complete cooperation with the United Nations troops on the ground.

45. The French-led Operation Turquoise was deployed on 23 June 1994, only a day after it had been authorized to do so by the Security Council. It was not clear to UNAMIR exactly where those troops were deploying, since they entered Rwanda through Goma, Zaire, north-west of Rwanda. It was known that the RPF was not in favour of the deployment of Operation Turquoise. They were still advancing, in an attempt to establish their control over the entire territory of Rwanda. Given the possibility of a clash between the advancing RPF and the deploying Operation Turquoise, UNAMIR found itself in great difficulty, but in its contacts with both Operation Turquoise and the RPF, the intentions of the parties were clarified. France, thereafter, announced that Operation Turquoise would establish a "humanitarian protected zone" in the Cyangugu-Kibuye-Gikongoro triangle in south-western Rwanda, covering about one-fifth of Rwandese territory. The RPF, while still opposing the deployment, assured UNAMIR that it would not challenge it.

46. According to one senior UNAMIR military officer, if one country, acting as a lead nation, could have used overwhelming force to stop the violence -- not only to protect refugees in one part of the country -- the FAR and the gendarmerie would have had the necessary support to restore law and order. This approach seems to have been adopted in the planning for the United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (UNTAES), where it is understood that should things go wrong there that UNTAES cannot handle, the Implementation Force (IFOR) will intervene to assist.

47. France announced on 11 July that Operation Turquoise, which had been authorized to be deployed until 21 August 1994, would begin its withdrawal by 31 July. The intention of the RPF to move into the south-west region as the French-led operation withdrew conjured up the spectre of another disaster. UNAMIR once again had to negotiate with the RPF to delay their advance into the area until UNAMIR had established itself in the zone. Thus, on 22 August, when the forces of Operation Turquoise withdrew, UNAMIR was able to take over peacefully the humanitarian protection zone. The following September and October, the Rwandese Patriotic Army (RPA) successfully brought the zone under their control.

48. When relative peace had been established in Rwanda, UNAMIR grew much bigger under its new mandate. By November 1994, UNAMIR had reached its authorized strength of 5,500 troops. Subsequent Council resolutions on the extension of the operation called for a systematic reduction of troop strength -- in response to the demands of the Rwandese Government -- from 2,300, to 1,800 and, after December 1995, to just a little over 1,000 troops until the final mandate period which ended on 8 March 1996. Sixteen countries contributed troops to the operation; all except four were African countries.

49. UNAMIR's mission after the civil war and until its closure was to provide security and support for the distribution of humanitarian relief; to bring back refugees and displaced persons and to settle them in their respective home communes; and to perform other tasks, such as protection of the personnel of United Nations agencies, human rights monitors and non-governmental organizations, and provide security for the nucleus of the International Tribunal for Rwanda.

50. Using UNAMIR's available resources, such as its transport and coordination expertise, Operation Homeward was mounted in September 1994, followed by Operation Retour, to assist relief agencies in relocating internally displaced persons to their homes. Over 40,000 internally displaced were evacuated by vehicles while many others returned to their homes on foot. The whole endeavour was undertaken in collaboration with the Government, with the integrated operations centre playing a pivotal role.

51. UNAMIR also worked closely with the new Government in some security operations. In December, it launched Operation Hope, a brigade-size cordon-and-search operation in coordination with the RPA to clear Kibeho and Ndago camps of criminal elements which were looting and committing acts of banditry and murder aimed at discouraging people in those camps from voluntarily going back to their respective home communes. The RPA contributed two battalions during the operation, as the outer cordon of troops, as well as a small number of liaison officers. The operation was successful; several hundred weapons were confiscated and 44 suspected criminals were apprehended and handed over to the Office of the Prosecutor in Gikongoro, in the presence of human rights monitors and representatives of the Red Cross.

52. One instance when the coordination mechanism of the integrated operations centre failed was in the Kibeho camp for internally displaced people in late April 1995. The Government's decision to close the camp, by force if necessary, resulted in a stampede in which many people lost their lives. Some of those interviewed stated that if the Government, UNAMIR and the humanitarian community had coordinated well with each other by providing transportation and allowing sufficient time to those who were willing to return to their home communes, some lives could have been saved.

53. The first phase of UNAMIR included a small civilian police (CIVPOL) component of 60 observers that were to be deployed throughout Rwanda to investigate and report on incidents regarding the activities of the gendarmerie and the police. They were also to play an advisory role in the implementation of the Arusha Peace Agreement. The CIVPOL observers were deployed gradually and functioned until April 1994, when the civil war broke out. Its numbers were then reduced from 60 to 15 observers, who acted as a liaison with the local authorities.

54. After the new Government came to power on 19 July 1994, it immediately requested UNAMIR's assistance in creating and training a new national police force, most of the former gendarmerie and police having fled the country. The Rwandese Police Training Programme was the most important task of UNAMIR's Civilian Police Unit and one of the most concrete and best perceived of UNAMIR's activities. The programme's objective was to train as quickly as possible a sufficient number of gendarmes and policemen, who would constitute the core of a new Rwandese police force, and to provide a modest number of trainers to ensure follow-up, after the withdrawal of UNAMIR. From the beginning of the programme in August 1994 until the end of the CIVPOL mandate in December 1995, 919 gendarmes and 750 police officers received training. Training manuals were prepared and subsequently handed over to the Rwandese authorities.

55. Regrettably, the training programme, which was for long a priority, was terminated by Security Council resolution 1029 (1995), at the request of the new Government, just when the CIVPOL had managed to gather the necessary financial support, something it had lacked until then.

56. The CIVPOL component faced a number of problems in implementing its mandate. Throughout the unit's life after the civil war, CIVPOL never attained its authorized strength because of the reluctance of contributing States, especially French-speaking countries, to send police observers. Most Rwandese trainees were French-speaking and those who spoke English, Kinyarwanda or Kiswahili required bilingual instructors. Where instructors were not available, lectures were given through local interpreters who were not always up to the task. Further, many CIVPOL observers did not have the necessary qualifications, particularly with regard to language ability and driving skills. As a result, 31 had to be repatriated immediately after their arrival.

57. It was also reported that the general conduct of some CIVPOL observers involved in training in Rwanda set a poor, rather than an exemplary, professional standard. Some failed to wear uniforms, others did not arrive on time to conduct classes. In response to some of these problems, the CIVPOL Unit of DPKO is now in the process of refining procedures for assisting Governments in their selection of CIVPOL observers sent to serve in United Nations missions.

58. The CIVPOL component was also constrained by inadequate budgetary provisions, with the result that it was not possible to provide regular support for the training programme and equipment for use by the police. As a result, the young gendarme and police graduates were deployed in the field without material support of any kind from UNAMIR. Throughout the programme, UNAMIR's training of the Rwandese police was undertaken without educational aids, such as books, investigation equipment, cameras, overhead projectors, thereby affecting the quality and the credibility of the programme.

59. The training programme was formulated in close cooperation with the Rwandese authorities. It was the responsibility of the Government to select trainees, ensure their upkeep and provide the infrastructure for training, including supplies and equipment. Despite their best intentions, there were delays in the fulfilment of these commitments. This could have seriously affected the proper implementation of the programme had it not been for the assistance provided by UNDP, the World Health Organization (WHO) and the World Food Programme (WFP). It was recommended at the Comprehensive Seminar that to ensure the success of a police training programme, it must be supported by the provision of adequate equipment, teaching aids and other resources.

60. CIVPOL worked closely with both the military and civilian components of UNAMIR and the specialized agencies of the United Nations system present in Rwanda. The greatest degree of cooperation and collaboration was with the monitors of the Human Rights Field Operation in Rwanda. However, this cooperation was not automatic and a formal framework for cooperation with the monitors was established so as to work effectively together in the field and undertake sensitive investigations. Such formalized cooperative agreements should be considered for other situations, especially if the other entity is not part of the peacekeeping operation. The idea was to marry the practical experience of the police observers with the legal and human rights expertise of the monitors. CIVPOL also pursued monitoring activities in conjunction with military observers quite successfully.

61. The experience of CIVPOL in Rwanda has once again emphasized the multifaceted character of peacekeeping operations and the substantial contribution of the various components in such an undertaking. The fulfilment of the functions ascribed to the CIVPOL component of UNAMIR required the use of techniques and procedures that should be standardized and disseminated to other similar missions.

62. It is necessary for the police officers arriving in the mission to be properly prepared and to have the required profile, determined according to clearly defined criteria that should be known before their departure. It is also fundamental that the host country accept the civil police presence as part of the mandate of the peacekeeping operation. In Rwanda, CIVPOL's contribution allowed it to be accepted by the authorities, despite their initial reluctance to its presence.

63. At the Comprehensive Seminar, it was suggested that the CIVPOL component should, for the purpose of unity of command, be under the command and control of the Force Commander. Others believed that this arrangement could be useful in certain cases where the CIVPOL was asked to monitor the activities of a national police force that was more of a paramilitary force or even part of the armed forces, and the activities of the CIVPOL observers were carried out in conjunction with those of the military observers. However, in many other operations, the CIVPOL had an entirely separate mandate, and such an arrangement may not be the ideal one.

64. Land-locked Rwanda was a logistical nightmare for UNAMIR, particularly during the initial stages of deployment and the final liquidation of the Mission. UNAMIR was one of the largest operations in a land-locked country ever undertaken by the United Nations. Troops and equipment had to be brought in through a port in a neighbouring country and then airlifted or trucked to Rwanda, setting up a long logistical chain. This was one of the primary causes for the delays in the deployment of troops inside Rwanda.

65. In addition, UNAMIR was faced with some of the old problems that have plagued other peacekeeping operations: troops were inadequately equipped and needed such equipment as armoured personnel carriers and even helmets and bullet-proof vests. The Mission relied on armoured personnel carriers in less than satisfactory condition for moving troops from one part of Rwanda to the other.

66. Despite the Arusha Peace Agreement and the seeming simplicity of the task, troop contributions for UNAMIR were scarce. During the first phase of the Mission, the only offers for troops for logistics came from Bangladesh. The United Nations had no choice but to accept, even though it was apparent that the Bangladeshi battalion did not have a sufficient resource base to provide the logistical support necessary.

67. Some of the logistical problems faced by UNAMIR were a result of the protracted process of obtaining financing for the Mission, followed by the long procurement process for supplies and equipment. The delay in appointing a substantive Chief Administrative Officer (CAO) early in the Mission's life added to these problems. Until April 1994, there was no confirmed CAO for the Mission. There was no organized system of resupply, and during the height of the crisis, food, medicines and other essentials ran dangerously low. The new Force Commander, who arrived in Kigali in July 1994, was an experienced logistician and worked hard to unblock some of the logistical bottlenecks that were paralysing the Mission.

68. Senior UNAMIR military officials suggested that the United Nations must have two logistics systems: One for "garrison" or "steady-state" missions, based on the "pull" concept, and which should take four to six months to establish. This would be the norm for functioning missions. The other would be an "emergency" or "crisis" system, based on the "push" concept, that could be established rapidly in a few days or, at most, weeks, to meet the demands of a deploying mission in a crisis. Once the mission is deployed, or the crisis has passed, and a steady-state mission is in effect, the system would convert to a "garrison" mode. Based on the experience of UNAMIR, for the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III), FALD did indeed resort to logistics from one country with a proven capability in that field for a pre-agreed period of 90 days, until the United Nations could set up its own logistical system.

69. During the second phase of UNAMIR, the Mission used civilian contractors for certain services. One complication of this arrangement was that the privileges and immunities of the contractors were not, according to the new Rwandese authorities, adequately covered in the original status-of-mission agreement. The Government of Rwanda was to later use this interpretation as a political leverage point against UNAMIR, with whom its relations were steadily deteriorating. It demanded that the civilian contractors pay enormous sums in taxes on their operations in Rwanda, since they were not, according to their interpretation, covered by the provisions of the status-of-mission agreement. Learning from this experience in Rwanda, future status-of-mission agreements now provide for certain facilities for contractors providing services to the United Nations, including the prompt issuance of visas; freedom of movement; and the right to import, for the use of the United Nations, supplies, equipment and material, free of tax or duties.

70. Since the United Nations recognizes the fact that commercial service contractors used in support of military elements are not capable of providing for their own security, and place an added burden on the military elements to do so this factor should be considered when determining troop strength for an operation.

71. The Administration Office of UNAMIR also felt burdened by the support requirements of other United Nations operations and entities in the region that were not directly associated with the peacekeeping operation but required assistance from it. These included the International Tribunal for Rwanda, the human rights operation in Rwanda and in Bujumbura, as well as the Office of the SRSG for Burundi. These support activities were often not foreseen and hence not budgeted for. Indeed, budgets for peacekeeping operations should be drafted in close consultation with all components.

72. Another problem encountered was that for quite some time, UNAMIR operated without an approved budget. In recognition of the financial problems faced at the inception of a mission, the General Assembly has now authorized the Secretary-General to seek up to $50 million in commitment authority to meet start-up costs.

73. Staff in regions or sectors need to be provided with petty cash accounts to deal with small administrative matters that should not need authorization from headquarters. The current system of having a petty cash account authorized from headquarters creates bottlenecks in the running of the mission.

74. During the liquidation of UNAMIR, the Mission encountered some of the same problems that other missions had in the past, including attempts by the Government to keep as much of the equipment brought in for the Mission as possible. This became a charged political issue and a point of some dispute between the Government and UNAMIR. It was recommended by senior UNAMIR officials that when liquidating a mission, Member States should give some weight to the needs of the new Government. The mandate for peace consolidation and peace-building should extend to the provision of much needed assistance.

75. Further, it was suggested that the planning process for the liquidation of the mission is not something that should happen at the termination of the mission but ought to be an ongoing process. Missions should be prepared to leave at short notice. FALD has prepared provisional liquidation guidelines to ensure the process is discussed at the outset of the mission by all concerned. It has also asked all missions to make back-up copies of their mission records.

76. All those interviewed stressed the importance of the quality of staff appointed to missions, particularly one so complex and demanding as UNAMIR.

77. From the time the Mission was established in October 1993 until the beginning of the civil war on 6 April 1994, UNAMIR had no confirmed CAO. In addition, the Mission initially suffered from a poor capability in the public information field and the lack of a legal affairs officer. The post of the legal adviser was filled very late, and at critical moments there was no one to advise the Mission on the legal interpretation of its mandate, details of the Arusha Peace Agreement and the rules of engagement, and on such issues as contracts and national and international law.

78. Some of those interviewed also commented negatively on the quality of some of the police officers and military observers who were sent to UNAMIR. It was stressed that contributing States should try and send their best and most energetic officers.

79. Since Rwanda uses both French and English, it was important to have staff that was fluent in one of the two languages and had a working knowledge of the other. One UNAMIR legal officer mentioned that it was essential for the legal officers assigned to be fluent in the language in which the laws of the land were written. In the case of Rwanda it was French, even though the business of Government under the RPF was being conducted in English.

80. The attitude and behaviour of United Nations troops and staff are also critical to the success of a mission. Adding to the present Government's anti-UNAMIR stance, the behaviour of some staff members did nothing to endear them to the Rwandese population. Those interviewed recommended adequate briefings in the culture, traditions and history of the host country for all staff and troops assigned to a peacekeeping operation. Knowledge of the United Nations system and its principles and purposes was also recommended and it was felt that critical posts should be filled by personnel from within the system who are familiar with the functioning of the Organization, particularly at the start-up of a mission.

81. Initial briefings for senior staff in substantive and administrative areas should include an emphasis on the responsibility for team-building, in situ, and must include respect for and recognition of, local staff. The designation of a focal point to hear staff grievances must also be considered. The staffing table of each mission should include a community relations officer who would serve as a focal point for grievances raised against the United Nations by the local population.

82. A number of reasons were given for the difficulty the United Nations faced in recruiting qualified and competent staff for UNAMIR, as well as other peacekeeping operations. As a result, a large percentage of the personnel who serve in missions are recruited from outside the United Nations system. Staff within the system are generally reluctant to go on missions because of lack of career advancement when they return to their headquarters or duty stations. Years of service in missions and the experience gained there are factors not given due weight when promotions are considered. Also, the current financial crisis afflicting the United Nations has frightened Secretariat personnel into turning down mission assignments for fear that their posts would have been cut or frozen by the time they return.

83. Information staff in peacekeeping operations, particularly those who head information components, should be thoroughly familiar with United Nations public information and administrative procedures. The Deaprtment of Public Information (DPI) and DPKO have made some tentative steps to develop a screening questionnaire for public information candidates. DPI is also reviewing potential personnel for mission service and maintaining informal rosters, but the United Nations needs to be more systematic about anticipating information needs in the field, identifying and selecting candidates and making sure that they are adequately briefed.

84. The experience of UNAMIR highlights the need for the dissemination of clear guidelines on the responsibility of the Organization towards local staff in the event of an evacuation. Moreover, there is need for a United Nations system-wide coordinated effort to ensure consistency in the implementation of those guidelines. While guidelines on this subject exist in the Field Security Handbook, it is recommended that the matter be addressed by the United Nations Security Coordinator, who would be the appropriate focal point for coordinating such an interdepartmental, inter-agency discussion.

85. Another need underscored by UNAMIR's experience was the presence of qualified personnel in the mission area to counsel staff in stress management. For UNAMIR staff, a team was sent to Nairobi to provide such assistance in the aftermath of the civil conflict. Similar assistance has also been provided for mission staff who served in Liberia and Lebanon.

86. The lack of an effective public information programme was a serious weakness for UNAMIR from the outset. It was unable to inform the Rwandese public and the world at large about the achievements of the Mission and the constraints of its mandate. Faced by increasingly hostile propaganda from the Rwandese authorities or certain sections of the political spectrum in Rwanda, UNAMIR seemed powerless to correct this negative image.

87. Many Rwandese believed that the United Nations was there to stop the genocide and were bitterly disappointed when this was not the case. It has been suggested that UNAMIR should have done much more to inform the public about its limited role and mandate early on, particularly for the protection of civilians at risk, so as not to give the people a false sense of security. This might have also averted disasters such as the Kibeho massacre, where internally displaced people in the Kibeho camp believed that UNAMIR soldiers would protect them from the RPA.

88. Even more insidious than the anti-United Nations sentiment was the anti-Tutsi hatred spewed by hate radio stations, such as Radio Mille Collines, during the height of the civil war in 1994. UNAMIR was unable to counter this propaganda with sane comment and a call for restraint through its own independent broadcast medium. When it was finally set up, Radio UNAMIR, by all accounts, did a great deal as an impartial and objective voice and source of information in Rwanda, but it was too little, too late. The Government's procrastination in allocating frequencies for the radio station was an important cause of the delay in establishing the station.

89. It was recommended that planning for peacekeeping missions should include a public information component and strategy from the outset. Also, it was suggested at the Comprehensive Seminar that UNAMIR could have been given the necessary technical expertise and equipment to jam the radio broadcasts that were inciting the violence. Further, it was recommended that a monitoring of the radio broadcasts of Radio Mille Collines from the outset, prior to April 1994, could have also provided insights and information to the Mission on the background to the turmoil and Rwanda's drift towards chaos.

90. Another problem related to personnel: The best and most qualified persons were not always sent to fill the important position of spokesman. Practical experience in journalism or public relations should be a prerequisite for anyone sent to act as spokesman for a mission, it was recommended. Senior public information personnel should be familiar with the United Nations system, particularly with Headquarters and how it works. This was not always the case in UNAMIR.

91. In a situation as fluid and chaotic as Rwanda during the civil war in 1994, coordination between the peacekeeping mission and the United Nations agencies in a mission area is perhaps the greatest public information challenge. There is no easy solution to the problem of proliferating "spokesmen" cited by the press. It was stated by participants at the lessons learned internal consultation on Rwanda that the starting point must be an understanding among all United Nations agencies and offices of the central role of the SRSG and his information staff in managing any public information that has political implications. This is equally true for military public information personnel. Agency and military spokesmen can be relied upon for information about their particular area of expertise, while the SRSG and the mission's civilian spokesman should be at the centre of the United Nations system's public information efforts in the field.

92. Naturally, the SRSG must have the resources -- in terms of staff, equipment and support from Headquarters -- to play this central public information role. A coordinated and clear message from the United Nations system as a whole, particularly during a crisis, is critical. There must be structure and discipline in the mission area which ensures that the roles and activities of agencies, the mission, the humanitarian actors are recognized and publicized, while ensuring that the central political role of the SRSG is respected.

93. Both DPKO and DPI played largely reactive rather than proactive roles in planning and executing public information efforts connected with UNAMIR. DPI responded to requests from DPKO for comments and proposals regarding staffing and budgeting for certain standard information services, but DPI was not closely involved in conceiving, designing or carrying out UNAMIR's information programme. While DPI has experienced personnel with skills in public information who understand the United Nations, its strengths and its constraints, the best staff are not always released for mission assignment, it was stated by some of the people interviewed.

94. United Nations public information experiences in Rwanda, Somalia and the former Yugoslavia gave added impetus to DPI's efforts last year to improve planning and coordination of public information in the field. An inter-departmental mechanism for anticipating and consulting on information needs in the field was established and is now functioning; DPKO, DPA and DHA have all been full participants. The three departments have made good-faith efforts to assess the information needs in the missions in the former Yugoslavia, Haiti and Angola. Progress has been made and the flow of information has improved. However, a great deal of work by all concerned still has to be done if consultations are to result in systematic planning and backstopping of public information activities. It was argued that if effective coordination regarding information policies is to be ensured, it would be helpful if DPI were included in the framework for inter-departmental coordination which includes DPKO, DPA and DHA.

95. Radio broadcasting is another area where there is a need to improve cooperation from the earliest phase of mission planning. In Rwanda, a feasibility study for a radio station was undertaken without reference to DPI. The Department's input was confined to proposals for staffing tables and candidates, only after the decision was made to go ahead with the procurement of equipment. The Mission confronted difficulties and delays in securing the needed licences and frequencies, which ultimately complicated programme planning and staffing.

96. Radio UNAMIR finally went on the air in February 1995. By most accounts, it made an important contribution to giving UNAMIR access to Rwandese listeners in the country and in the refugee camps. However, the conditions under which the radio station worked were probably more difficult than they needed to be. Radio UNAMIR was under-resourced, had limited equipment and no facilities for technical maintenance of the equipment. It was never able to increase its programming beyond a four-hour broadcast day. If the United Nations is to have maximum impact and ensure that public information efforts are sustainable, it needs to anticipate and minimize the obstacles beforehand, and plan activities, such as radio programming, with a clear understanding of all the United Nations unique requirements and, perhaps, its limitations.

97. The question of United Nations radio broadcasting in mission areas deserves serious and systematic examination -- particularly in light of the investment already made in broadcasting equipment for the mission in Angola and the intention to establish a full-fledged radio station in UNTAES. Where radio broadcasting is concerned, the objectives must be clear, and the United Nations must be realistic about the resources required, and available, to achieve them in a timely manner. Radio broadcasting's potential problems and their solutions in such areas as legal and political constraints, programme content, organizational, financial and technical requirements, should be identified.

98. Public information policy in the field must be guided by the SRSG, and Headquarters has a responsibility to make sure that SRSGs are adequately briefed about standard United Nations guidelines for public information in the field, and about the resources and support available to them from Headquarters. The public information guidelines adopted in the inter-departmental working group are a blueprint for standard structures, activities and equipment required for effective public information in the field. SRSGs should be familiar with their existence. In Rwanda, closer attention from Headquarters to ensuring that UNAMIR's public information operation was always staffed and equipped in line with the guidelines would have improved its capacity to sustain outreach within the country, and externally. This might have helped UNAMIR communicate more effectively with the local population and the international press.

99. A stronger information component would also have helped DPI and the Spokesman's Office in New York highlight the Mission's activities and accomplishments as well as explain the constraints under which it was operating.

100. At the Comprehensive Seminar it was noted that the humanitarian crisis in Rwanda did not begin with the April 1994 massacres. Yet, this dimension was not included in the original operational plan for the Mission. Overall, the international community, including the humanitarian actors, failed to recognize the deepening humanitarian crisis in Rwanda, and was relatively unprepared for the events that followed and the intervention that was required. A successful political and humanitarian early-warning system requires the targeting of warnings to appropriate political actors.

101. It was suggested at the Comprehensive Seminar that humanitarian assistance cannot be used as a substitute for political action. The provision of relief, without addressing the root causes of what was causing the refugee movements and the displacement of people in Rwanda, amounted only to managing the symptoms without treating the disease. The generosity of the international community in providing aid to the refugee camps, particularly in Goma, was spurred partially by the intense media coverage of the cholera and dysentery epidemics in the camps and to some degree by a sense of guilt for not doing enough during the genocide itself. This international response was viewed with suspicion by the new Rwandese authorities who saw this massive aid effort as clearly supportive of the genocidal killers who were hiding in the camps, while those who survived the horrors of the genocide in Rwanda were being given no support to rebuild their shattered lives and country.

102. It was recommended at the Seminar that a comprehensive approach to assistance be developed based on critical analysis of the nature of the conflict and context within which the aid is being delivered. Aid strategies must be well coordinated among all the actors involved and must include the objective of ultimately freeing the recipients from dependence on aid. The comprehensive approach should begin with an assessment of humanitarian needs, and not be driven by the "CNN factor". Some participants stated that while the humanitarian agencies, particularly DHA, which launched appeals for countries in crisis, could highlight the real needs, they often did not control the flow of resources provided by donor Governments and agencies. Resource allocations were often driven by national political agendas or other considerations.

103. UNAMIR's contribution to the humanitarian effort was considerable. The Mission worked closely with the advance humanitarian team sent by DHA to Rwanda during the crisis in 1994, and which later helped to develop means to discourage the outflow of refugees with the withdrawal of the French-led Operation Turquoise. In its second phase, UNAMIR assisted the Government in rehabilitating infrastructure, providing basic services and carrying out emergency repair and construction work. The presence of UNAMIR effectively provided security to returnees and aided the process of repatriation. The Mission also served as an important source of general information, security advice and back-up to agencies. The logistical support provided by UNAMIR, especially the use of its vehicles, assisted in the transportation of returnees.

104. During the period of genocide, a weak humanitarian presence in Rwanda led to an inadequate humanitarian response. It was suggested at the Comprehensive Seminar that the humanitarian community cannot play a useful role if it is not physically present in the crisis area. The difficulty of monitoring, analysing and anticipating massive population displacements also compromised the effectiveness of aid efforts. Once the genocide had started, and given the reduced presence of UNAMIR, it became increasingly hard to assess how many would flee and in which direction. Pooling of information from United Nations and non-governmental agencies as well as from Member States could help resolve this problem in the future.

105. An issue that was a source of some difference of opinion between UNAMIR and the humanitarian community was that of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and who was to provide assistance to them. While UNHCR took the lead role in providing assistance to refugees, there was no clear assignment of responsibility vis-a-vis the internally displaced. UNHCR and UNAMIR adopted different approaches in their dealings with IDPs. Whereas UNAMIR saw the need to facilitate the early closure of IDP camps and also provided transport to IDPs wishing to return to their home communes, UNHCR gave precedence to conditions of return, as well as counselling and preparing the returnees to go home with materials ready to start a new life. UNHCR representatives stated that, for UNAMIR, the question of numbers transported seemed to be more important than the conditions of return. Some humanitarian agency personnel also felt that within the integrated operations centre more emphasis was being placed on operations leading to eventual camp closure, without critically examining the question of who had responsibility to defend IDP rights with the Rwandese Government. The SRSG, as the senior United Nations official in the country, should be a powerful advocate for humanitarian and human rights issues.

106. The use of military assets for humanitarian purposes was often another bone of contention. UNAMIR provided a great deal of its equipment, personnel and resources to assist humanitarian operations. The humanitarian agencies recognized that each contingent might need to maintain its own identity and sometimes relied on resources provided to it by its Government or other sponsors, rather than the United Nations. However, this often reduced the flexibility to redeploy resources for humanitarian purposes as each contingent commander could contribute assets as he saw fit, instead of the overall commander being able to order who had to contribute how much and when.

107. Although there were good relations between the peacekeepers and the humanitarian community, it would appear that the humanitarian agencies and the military had a lack of understanding of each other's mandates, roles and procedures. It is necessary to bring the military and the humanitarian community to the point where they support each other, while respecting each other's mandates and organizational cultures. Military peacekeepers and the civilian staff have to integrate with each other and with the local population through a process of training and cross-cultural exchange. Briefings and orientations that promote this exchange must be held on a regular basis.

108. The rapid influx of non-governmental aid organizations into Rwanda following the end of the civil conflict created problems of its own. While some organizations performed extremely well in Rwanda, others created more problems than they solved and some seemed to be using the situation to their own benefit alone. Participants at the Comprehensive Seminar welcomed efforts within the non-governmental humanitarian community to establish a common code of conduct and the development of an international system of accreditation, at least for those acting in complex emergencies, to increase accountability and transparency of their actions.

109. In the spring of 1993, the Commission on Human Rights Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions undertook a mission to Rwanda to make a first-hand assessment of persistent reports of massacres of Tutsi, and other politically motivated killings in Rwanda. There were several developments that prompted the visit of the Special Rapporteur, one of only two special visits he made that year. (The other was to Peru.) During 1992, the Special Rapporteur received reports and allegations relating to extrajudicial and arbitrary executions of unarmed civilians by FAR elements in connection with its armed conflict with the RPF since October 1990. He also received reports of killings of Tutsi, particularly of the Bagogwe clan, allegedly perpetrated with the direct or indirect involvement of the security forces. The Commission's Special Rapporteur on the question of torture, as well as its Working Group on Enforced and Involuntary Disappearances, had both made presentations to the Commission on the human rights situation in Rwanda.

110. The Special Rapporteur's report, issued in August 1993, stated categorically that the victims of the attacks, Tutsi in the overwhelming majority of cases, had been trageted solely because of their membership of a certain ethnic group, and for no other objective reason. The report outlined the methods of the massacres, chillingly foretelling the pattern that was to be followed in April 1994: "Massacres of civilian populations have been perpetrated either by the Rwandese security forces or by certain sectors of the population. ... It has been shown time and time again that Government officials were involved, either directly by encouraging, planning, directing or participating in the violence, or indirectly through incompetence, negligence or deliberate inaction. ... The FAR have also played an active and well-planned role at the highest level in certain cases of killings of Tutsi by the population ... there are numerous well-documented reports to the effect that certain mayors have spread unfounded rumours exacerbating ethnic hatred and have encouraged the population to massacre Tutsi people. ... It is also noteworthy that at the time of the violence, the persons perpetrating the massacres were under organized leadership." The report even pointed out that Radio Rwanda, the only source of information for the majority of the people, had played a pernicious role in instigating several massacres.

111. The report proposed specific recommendations on how the situation in Rwanda could be improved. However, the Commission on Human Rights did nothing to ensure their implementation when it met in February 1994, and no one in the United Nations system took any concrete steps to bring to the attention of all concerned the seriousness of the warnings contained in the report. It was suggested at the internal consultation and at the Comprehensive Seminar that all relevant departments -- the Centre for Human Rights, DPA, DPKO, DHA -- could have given prominence to the issue. Relevant proposals could have been made to the Security Council which the peacekeeping operation and others could then have pursued. It was suggested that this did not happen within the Secretariat for at least two reasons: a lack of information exchange among departments; and the lack of an analysis of the deeper causes of conflicts that often result in gross human rights violations. There must be a concerted effort to share information within the Secretariat. The interdepartmental framework for cooperation established for DPA, DHA and DPKO is a positive step in this direction.

112. It was argued by participants that the case of genocide as a crime against humanity is so compelling that the United Nations must act expeditiously under one conceptual umbrella. It was suggested at the Comprehensive Seminar that a human rights component should have been incorporated into the peacekeeping operation at the very outset. The human rights field operation would have benefited from common administrative and logistical systems with the peacekeeping operation and the military and CIVPOL components of the mission would have been made aware of the human rights dimension of the situation in Rwanda and how best to respond to it. In turn, the military and CIVPOL components, which have closer communication with the local military and police, could have provided information and a perspective of vital importance to human rights protection. Under such circumstances, the United Nations political presence is informed about the political context in the country and the decision-making of the international community in a way which can assist the judgements of those directing the human rights monitoring operation.

113. The Human Rights Field Operation in Rwanda was launched in September 1994, independent of UNAMIR, and months after the worst of the massacres were over. The new Rwandese authorities questioned its usefulness, now that the country was no longer at war. They also questioned the human rights monitors' intent: Were the monitors there to check up on human rights abuses by the victims of the genocide, while the perpetrators sat far from scrutiny in refugee camps across the border? The extremely slow deployment of monitors and their relative inability to communicate with the local population -- many did not speak French and almost none spoke Kinyarwanda -- made their usefulness even more suspect.

114. The Human Rights Field Operation and CIVPOL were both involved in training the gendarmerie, but it was stated by officers of the Human Rights Field Operation that this was done without systematic coordination of their efforts. The military and CIVPOL components of UNAMIR were both involved in human rights monitoring, yet they had no human rights training or guidance to assist them in this role. It was eventually agreed, in principle, between the SRSG and the Human Rights Field Operation that the latter would organize such training. However, this was done too close to the end of the mandated period of the Mission for it to be implemented. Learning from the experience of Rwanda, the Centre for Human Rights is now involved in the training of CIVPOL observers being sent to peacekeeping missions.

115. The Human Rights Field Operation was also involved in institution-building for human rights in Rwanda from late 1994. It was recommended that human rights components of post-conflict peace-building should be incorporated into the activities and mandates of peacekeeping operations as early as possible. Guidelines for military and police units on human rights monitoring and actions to be taken by them in the event of gross human rights violations could also be developed, especially since the new generation of peacekeeping operations invariably has a human rights dimension.

116. When UNAMIR was deployed in October 1993, it faced political problems that had not been anticipated. On the one hand, UNAMIR had to deal with the Habyarimana Government, which was the legitimate Government of Rwanda. The legitimacy of Habyarimana's presidency was confirmed when he was installed as the President of Rwanda on 5 January 1994, in accordance with the Arusha accords. Habyarimana's hand was further strengthened when Rwanda became a member of the Security Council, five days before his installation as President. UNAMIR also had to deal with the RPF, whose legitimacy had been recognized in the Arusha accords and which was, in January 1994, still not part of the Government, as agreed to by the accords.

117. The strategy of the parties seemed to be to use UNAMIR to buy time. As UNAMIR officials sought to negotiate the political impasse and, thus, spent time with both President Habyarimana and the RPF's General Kagame, a perception developed that seemed to compromise the impartiality of UNAMIR. The issue of impartiality of a peacekeeping operation is bound to be a problem when it is deployed in the context of a civil conflict, it was suggested.

118. After the RPF took power in July 1994, in the aftermath of the civil war, the relationship between UNAMIR and the new Government deteriorated. The RPF felt betrayed by the international community, especially the United Nations. In the 1959 civil disturbances in Rwanda, hundreds of Tutsi were killed and by late 1964 about 330,000 Tutsi had been forced into exile, fleeing persecution. From April to July 1994, the genocide of mainly the Tutsi again took place, this time in the presence of UNAMIR. Instead of stopping the massacres, in the view of the RPF, the United Nations withdrew most of its troops, leaving the beleaguered population at the mercy of the Hutu extremists. Yet when the RPF was marching to control their country, the United Nations authorized Operation Turquoise to try, as the RPF saw it, to deny them total victory and give protection to the Hutu -- protection that had been denied the Tutsi and was now being provided to some of those who had conducted the genocide.

119. Having brought peace to the country on its own, the RPF expected immediate assistance from the United Nations. When the expanded UNAMIR was fully deployed, months after the end of the civil war, the new Government did not understand what was the purpose of the new force. It had initially resisted the idea of the deployment of a large United Nations force after the civil war. When the Government relented, it was with the belief that the force would bring with it resources for the rehabilitation of the country. While UNAMIR did bring with it a fleet of white vehicles and an array of equipment, these were to sustain the Mission, the Government was told, and not to help rebuild the country. This display of apparent wealth in the face of a population traumatized by genocide and civil war made the Government feel that UNAMIR was not responsive to its needs. It was suggested at the Comprehensive Seminar that the Rwandese would probably not have been so resentful of the assets of the peacekeeping operation had they been used for nation-building and repair along with sustaining the Mission.

120. Despite the cordial relations between the new Government and the senior leadership of UNAMIR, the Government declared that the operation, the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda, was a misnomer. When had the Mission actually assisted Rwanda, they asked. One senior official suggested that UNAMIR should have changed its name, before the expanded operation was deployed, to dissociate it from the failures of the past.

121. By the time United Nations specialized agencies and UNAMIR contingents began to assist in the rehabilitation of essential services, the Government refused to associate these projects with UNAMIR and gave itself credit for the rehabilitation. The Government, in the post-civil-war period, regarded UNAMIR not as a partner but as a rival undermining its authority. Harassment of UNAMIR and violations of the status-of-mission agreement, which the new Government believed it was not bound by, became commonplace. The Army increasingly denied UNAMIR personnel freedom of access, searching UNAMIR vehicles and orchestrating anti-UNAMIR propaganda as well as seeking confrontation with specific targeted UNAMIR contingents to force their withdrawal.

122. UNAMIR, without an adequate public information strategy, could not even project to the population the efforts it had made in the rehabilitation of essential services. Instead, it saw the anger of the Rwandese being turned against it and, on the insistence of the Government, withdrew from Rwanda on 8 March 1996.

123. It was suggested in interviews with the Lessons Learned team that the United Nations must maintain a continuous dialogue with the local authorities and be responsive to their needs in order to avoid such problems. Mandates of operations should be drawn up in consultation with the local authorities. While UNAMIR officials and those at Headquarters in New York did their utmost to engage the Government in an attempt to resolve problems over the status-of-mission agreement, the amendments demanded by the Government were considered to be fundamental violations of the internationally recognized privileges and immunities of the United Nations, leaving no room for negotiations. "We were dealing with an entity that was not experienced in international law and its practice", one official said. The status-of-mission agreement was an international treaty between Rwanda and the United Nations, and the new Government was obliged to respect it.

124. It was suggested at the Comprehensive Seminar that, given the attitude of the Government, the Mission should have had the opportunity to prove its usefulness to the authorities by a judicious mix of "both carrots and sticks".

125. By July 1994, fighting had ceased in Rwanda but there was always a threat that the former Rwandese Government Forces would launch a counter-attack. When Operation Turquoise withdrew in August 1994 and the RPA was to assume control of the former humanitarian protection zone, it was not clear what would happen. Thus, there was logic in still proceeding with the deployment of the expanded UNAMIR in the formation that had been approved by the Security Council in May -- five infantry battalions. However, as the situation stabilized, the Rwandese began to question the task of UNAMIR in what they regarded as a peaceful Rwanda; UNAMIR began to be seen as an occupying force, rather than an assistance mission, and as an obstacle to the new Government's efforts to take full control of the country.

126. Following the civil conflict in 1994, the Secretary-General established a special trust fund to support rehabilitation programmes in Rwanda. The new SRSG and the Force Commander of the expanded UNAMIR clearly understood that if UNAMIR was to play any meaningful role, it had to be involved in activities that would consolidate the peace in Rwanda. These included reopening of airports; restoration of essential services, such as water supply, power, telecommunications; and repair of essential buildings and civic services, such as public transport, hospitals, schools and municipal services.

127. It has been argued that peacekeeping troops are often on the spot early in a post-conflict situation and have the technical and logistic capability to address essential post-conflict needs. Moreover, the specialized agencies cannot immediately marshal troops, technicians, vehicles and logistics -- as the military are capable of doing -- to address these immediate needs. There is, therefore, a grey area, a "twilight zone" of a limited duration, in post-conflict situations in which the peacekeepers can start the emergency infrastructure repair operation and gradually hand over to the development operations of the specialized agencies. Some are of the opinion that, ideally, a civilian "white helmet" unit of engineers, technicians and others equipped with appropriate heavy-duty vehicles, communications and other equipment should arrive in a devastated zone to lead relief operations. However, no such "white helmet" unit exists, as yet, in the United Nations system. Therefore, military units can assume this role.

128. The expanded UNAMIR, once fully deployed, had the technical capability, in the form of its doctors, engineers, telecommunications technicians and logistics (light and heavy vehicles, cement mixers, helicopters, generators) to perform this peace-building task. The inhibition lay in the mandate, as senior officials were constantly reminded that the military technicians and their equipment were financed by assessed contributions to support UNAMIR and not the Government and people of Rwanda. That task was development oriented and the responsibility for that lay with the specialized agencies, which operate on the basis of voluntary contributions.

129. At the Comprehensive Seminar, it was noted that Member States, particularly those that bore the largest burden of the assessed contributions for peacekeeping, saw infrastructural development as something within the domestic jurisdiction of a State and an activity that should be funded internally. Once the Council delved into such development, especially in collapsed States, there was no end in sight, it was stated. The resources to fund this activity were simply not there in the peacekeeping budget. A solution could be to put in place, at an early stage, other support structures, funded through voluntary contributions, that did address the issue of peace-building.

130. None the less, from July to December 1994, the military assets of UNAMIR were used to provide medical support to the Rwandese. The Red Cross and other non-governmental organizations joined UNAMIR in providing these services all over Rwanda, while the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) supported other peace-building activities. The SRSG proceeded, in consultation with the specialized agencies, to draw up a Rwanda Emergency Normalization Plan, which would jump-start the rehabilitation of the country. The Plan called for the Rwandese Government to be provided with funds to pay salaries and repair essential infrastructures; the reopening of hospitals and health-care centres; reopening of airports and restoration of commercial air traffic; transporting of returnees and displaced persons; restoration of power and electricity; repair of water supply; reopening of schools; strengthening Radio Rwanda; improvement of telecommunications; demining and improvement of the judicial system; agriculture restoration; training of police and administrative cadres; restoration of municipal services; and repair of ministries.

131. While the SRSG was hoping for contributions to the trust fund for the rehabilitation of Rwanda, he mobilized the specialized agencies and UNAMIR to implement whatever they could in the Plan. Australian, British, Canadian, and Indian contingents, as well as the World Health Organization, UNHCR, UNICEF, the World Food Programme (WFP), UNDP and non-governmental organizations contributed in their own way. However, because only the Netherlands contributed $5 million to the trust fund, the effort had a limited impact.

National Reconciliation

132. Several experts have argued that the best route to peace-building and national reconciliation in Rwanda is to support local non-governmental society and the leadership of civil society. The international community should work with and through these local networks at the community level to address the numerous problems the country is facing, whether it be the provision of social services, the reintegration of combatants into society or the provision of opportunities for training and employment.

133. At the Comprehensive Seminar, it was stated that most of the fundamental problems that either led to genocide or that militate against peace-building and national reconciliation continue to exist in Rwanda today. As long as the opposition abroad and the refugees are not included in an effective power-sharing, the political situation will remain fragile. This does not mean that those suspected of being implicated in the genocide should be imposed on the Rwandese Government. Holding the masterminds of the genocide accountable for their deeds is essential for the reconciliation process. Once the organizers of the genocide are seen to have been brought to justice, the surviving Tutsi may have less of a desire to seek revenge by extra-legal killings and the Hutu peasants in exile may have less fear of returning home. Then efforts can be made for a genuine reconciliation, breaking the pattern of "alternate exclusion" that has characterized political life in Rwanda.

134. Another factor complicating national reconciliation is the problem of impunity and the culture of violence that have plagued Rwanda over the past decades. The Government of Rwanda has argued that it is indeed pursuing this path towards reconciliation and addressing the culture of impunity. Representatives of the Government that were interviewed stated that the Government has taken harsh measures against people, including RPA soldiers, guilty of conducting revenge killings. They also stated that the four pillars of the Arusha accords -- the rule of law, power-sharing and a political culture of integration, the integration of the armed forces of the two sides into a single national army, and to work towards the repatriation and resettlement of refugees -- have not been abandoned. They have only been modified to suit the changed circumstances.

135. Not only are the institutions of Government still weak in Rwanda, but the social and economic infrastructure is very fragile. The absence of a functional judicial system is delaying the process of national reconciliation. Further, there is a huge imbalance between the heavy resourcing of the humanitarian operations on the one hand, mostly outside Rwanda, and the minimal investment of the international community in recovery and rehabilitation within the country. It is unlikely, within the foreseeable future, that opportunities for employment, income generation, education at all levels and access to essential services will be available to the majority of the population.

136. The combination of under-investment and the lack of justice today contribute to continued instability in and around Rwanda. Events in Burundi and Liberia have raised doubts about the willingness of the international community and individual Governments to allow the lessons of Rwanda to inform specific policies in situations of extreme conflict. The absence of political will, whether in the United Nations, the OAU, amongst the major Powers, or even in the region, means that further conflict in Rwanda is inevitable.

137. As one UNICEF official put it: "At a different level, each of the organizations or departments has learned a great deal from the Rwanda operation about how do we improve our respective capacities, our strategies, our communications, our administrative efficiency and our coordination. If these are the lessons that the Organization wants to learn, then a great deal has been learned. But at the political level, in a country or region of little strategic significance to the major international actors, the major lesson is that the Rwandas will be repeated elsewhere, peacekeepers and humanitarian agencies will be mobilized as a substitute for, rather than as an outcome of, the political will to address the root causes and consequences of internal conflicts, to promote peace-building and national reconciliation."

138. The international community can assist Rwanda in its efforts at national reconciliation by supporting the economy and helping create economic oportunities for all. The Bretton Woods institutions, along with bilateral aid donors, must be fully involved in this endeavour. Lessening of economic tensions will contribute to a lowering of political and ethnic tensions as well.

International Tribunal for Rwanda

139. The International Tribunal for Rwanda, though not an integral part of UNAMIR, is nevertheless a relevant factor in the study of the Mission, since it is essential to the entire peace and national reconciliation process in Rwanda. Until justice is seen to have been done, many people interviewed concluded that Rwanda will not be able to achieve national reconciliation.

140. While there was no organic link between the Tribunal and UNAMIR, the Tribunal is none the less an important part of the overall United Nations presence in Rwanda. Cooperation between UNAMIR and the Tribunal took the form of sharing of facilities, premises and equipment, and the provision of security to the Tribunal.

141. Having established an International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia a few months earlier to prosecute persons responsible for war crimes, the Security Council could not have acted differently in the context of Rwanda without sending a wrong message of double standards. The attitude of the Rwandese Government, which back in August 1994 had requested the setting up of an international tribunal, shifted throughout the negotiation process leading to the establishment of the Tribunal. With the realization that the international jurisdiction envisaged by the Security Council would not be entirely responsive to the wishes of the Government -- that it would not be empowered to impose the death penalty, and that the International Tribunal was not equipped to undertake the prosecution of thousands of detainees already held in Rwandese prisons -- the Government of Rwanda decided to vote against the resolution establishing the Tribunal.

142. If Rwanda, nevertheless, agreed to cooperate with the Tribunal, that was because it realized that as a body created under Chapter VII of the Charter, it was the only entity capable of enforcing the surrender of war criminals to its jurisdiction. Rwanda also still hoped that the seat of the Tribunal would be established in its territory and that its proceedings would be widely and publicly disseminated so that the local population could see that justice was being done. However, the Security Council decided to set up a Tribunal in Arusha, United Republic of Tanzania, for reasons of justice, fairness, administrative efficiency and proximity to witnesses. But the Council also decided to set up an office of the Tribunal in Rwanda to conduct proceedings. Thus, a symbolic presence of the International Tribunal in the form of the Prosecutor's Office came into existence.

143. One of the criticisms levelled against the Tribunal has been the slow pace of its activities. Several of those interviewed stated that, more than two years after the genocide, the Tribunal had not yet tried a single person, which had adversely affected the image of the United Nations as a whole in Rwanda. It was also suggested that had the Tribunal moved faster in indicting and trying key leaders and organizers of the genocide, the Government would have responded by releasing some of the thousands that are held in Rwandese prisons today. The people's call for justice and the fear of reprisals has necessitated the detention of thousands, it was said, and that the Tribunal could have helped the situation by showing the people that justice was indeed being done.

144. Yet, as the Director of Investigations of the Tribunal stated at the Comprehensive Seminar, the Tribunal was a criminal court and not a truth commission or a forum for public inquiry. Its allegations had to be proven in a court of law, and beyond a reasonable doubt.

145. The question of whether the establishment of an international tribunal for the prosecution of war criminals was the best and most appropriate response of the international community to what happened in Rwanda is still being explored. It has been suggested that the Tribunal will not be able to try more than a handful of the top organizers of the genocide. These people will be detained in conditions far superior to those that exist in the prisons of Rwanda today where thousands are interned, without due process, on a mere suspicion of being involved. The organizers of the genocide prosecuted by the Tribunal will also not be subjected to the same sentence that has already been passed on others, far lower in rank and culpability, that were alleged to have been involved -- the death sentence. Finally, there are the practical difficulties in obtaining eyewitness testimony in a country where many of the witnesses live in refugee camps and still very much under the watchful eye of command structures that planned and conducted the genocide.

146. What is the possible role which may in the future be attributed to peacekeeping operations in assisting an international jurisdiction in a similar situation? Ideally, it would seem that the role for a peacekeeping operation would be the pursuit of war criminals. UNOSOM II was mandated, under Security Council resolution 837 (1993), to secure the arrest and detention for prosecution, trial and punishment of persons responsible for the armed attacks against United Nations peacekeepers. If an international tribunal is established to prosecute war criminals in the name of the international community in situations where States refuse to cooperate and where war criminals are shielded by "friendly States", it would have to rely on enforcement measures mandated by the Security Council and carried out, when necessary, by a military force in the name of the international community.

147. However, there are at least three reasons why this would probably not be a viable option. Firstly, a peacekeeping force may not necessarily operate in countries where war criminals are located. UNAMIR, for example, could have been of little use in pursuing war criminals located in Zaire, Kenya or Cameroon. Secondly, even if peacekeeping forces were to operate in territories where war criminals are located, the pursuit of war criminals may not necessarily be compatible with the mandate of the peacekeeping operation in question; and the Yugoslav experience is a case in point. Thirdly, the key to the success of a United Nations international tribunal will remain in the hands of the Security Council and its political will to enforce compliance with its orders and requests.