Lessons Learned Report on Rwanda

COMPREHENSIVE REPORT ON LESSONS LEARNED FROM UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA (UNAMIR) OCTOBER 1993 - APRIL 1996

Table of Contents

1.INTRODUCTION

2. PART ONE: Lessons Learned from United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda

3. PART TWO: Discussion of Lessons Learned from UNAMIR

Environment, Mandate and Means

Planning

Coordination

Military and Security Aspects

CIVPOL Activities

Logistics and Administration

Human Resources

Public Information

Humanitarian Aspects, Refugees and Internally Displaced

Human Rights Issues

Political Aspects, Relations with Local Authorities

Peace-building, Justice and National Reconciliation

4.Annex I: Consultation with External Experts, New York, 15-16 May 1996

5. Annex II: Internal Consultation on Lessons Learned from UNAMIR, New York, 15-16 May 1996

6. Annex III: Comprehensive Seminar on Lessons Learned from UNAMIR, Plainsboro, New Jersey, 12-14 June 1996

INTRODUCTION

1. From April to July 1994, between 500,000 and 800,000 Rwandese, mainly of the Tutsi ethnic group, were massacred in Rwanda. Without a resolute and immediate response from the community of nations, the slaughter continued in the presence of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), a lightly armed and equipped peacekeeping force sent to the country in October 1993 to assist in the implementation of the Arusha Peace Agreement, which had obviously collapsed. Genocide was committed while UNAMIR was left with only 400 peacekeepers without a clear mandate, the means or necessary support to stop it.

2. From its inception until its eventual withdrawal, UNAMIR seemed always to be one step behind the realities of the situation in Rwanda. It was deployed in October 1993 to assist in the implementation of a peace process that seemed to have stalemated even before it began. At the height of the crisis, the unilateral decision of some Governments to withdraw their national contingents left the remnants of UNAMIR even more vulnerable and unable to provide protection to civilians at risk. Even when the strength of UNAMIR was increased in May 1994 in response to the continued killings, by the time the authorized strength of 5,500 was reached it was November 1994, the civil war was over and the needs of the country were no longer assistance in the maintenance of security, but assistance in national reconstruction.

3. The United Nations and its family of agencies, although after some delay, did exert considerable efforts to assist the Rwandese people, particularly in the rehabilitation of the country's justice system and to alleviate the very harsh conditions of many of the roughly 60,000 detainees in the prisons. UNAMIR itself was instrumental in restoring the telecommunications capabilities of the country, doing road and bridge repairs and rehabilitating basic infrastructure. However, the Rwandese considered those efforts to be inadequate in the face of the post-conflict requirements of Rwanda. And on 8 March 1996, at the insistence of the Rwandese Government, the mandate of UNAMIR was terminated.

4. With the benefit of hindsight, how could the international community have improved its response to the situation in Rwanda? In attempting answers, it is important not to search for idealistic solutions, but rather to remain within the constraints of the reality of the United Nations system today and identify actions that could have improved the response. If all elements of the United Nations -- the Secretariat, the specialized agencies and the Member States -- as well as the international community as a whole, including non-governmental organizations, other countries experiencing conflict, and the media can benefit from this exercise, then the tragedy of Rwanda may just prevent other such tragedies from occurring. And yet, with the situation in Burundi confronting the international community, and despite repeated calls for action, it is still uncertain whether appropriate action will be taken in time to prevent another humanitarian and political disaster.

5. The Lessons Learned Unit of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations embarked on a study of UNAMIR in an effort to draw lessons from the experience for the improved functioning of ongoing operations and better conduct of future ones. After examining relevant documents and reports on or about the operation, teams of the Unit interviewed Secretariat officials and those of agencies who worked with the operation, officials of the permanent missions to the United Nations of troop-contributing countries and Security Council members, as well as former UNAMIR officials. A team visited Rwanda in March 1996 to interview UNAMIR personnel still there. The team met with Rwandese officials, both in Kigali and New York. Another team visited Canada to speak to two former Force Commanders of the operation and the former United Nations Military Adviser.

6. On 28 March, a meeting of external experts was held to discuss various aspects of the operation and the study. An internal consultation for members of the United Nations system was held on 15 and 16 May and, finally, a Comprehensive Seminar on Lessons Learned from UNAMIR was held from 12 to 14 June in Plainsboro, New Jersey, involving Member States, senior UNAMIR officials, national contingents' commanders, non-governmental organizations and specialized United Nations agencies. (See Annexes I, II and III, respectively, for lists of participants.) This report is a product of all these deliberations and the associated research efforts. Part I contains the lessons learned from UNAMIR, with short, explanatory paragraphs taken from the general discussion contained in Part II. Read alone, Part I provides the equivalent of an executive summary of the more detailed discussion contained in Part II.