

**Press Conference by Jean-Marie Guéhenno
Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations
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Unofficial transcript

Now I know you all have on your mind what is on my mind too, that is Lebanon, that is Sudan, but I also have on my mind, the 16 other operations that we run that's why I thought it would be good to focus in my opening remarks on this unprecedented growth.

Before coming here I was checking on the latest statistics. We now have over 93,000 total personnel in the field and almost 70,000 of them are just in the military. When we integrate the full deployment in Lebanon, the deployment in Darfur, when we get the conditions for that right, the full deployment in Timor-Leste, we would reach as many as 140,000 peacekeepers; military, police and civilian. The present figure is already unprecedented: 140,000, which would mean a 50% additional increase in the budget that would top \$6 billion and is likely to be higher.

When I look these figures, I see a vote of confidence in UN peacekeeping and also a good sign that a number of conflicts are ending. We can't have peacekeeping in the midst of a shooting war. But I also see, and is my duty to see it, the enormous challenge that represents; the managerial challenge to make sure that on those 18 different operations, 18 different political processes, we are attentive to them, we support them adequately, the very practical challenges of supporting that number of people, making sure that they have the right quality and that they have the professionalism that we want them to have. That there is the proper oversight in all areas, that is when you think also that these 140,000 people tomorrow, that means in terms of rotation of population that go through peacekeeping is much bigger, these are not the 140,000 that have been in peacekeeping forever. They are coming and rotating and there are new ones. This means an enormous effort.

I want to say one good word on all the people who are doing that – the people in this Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the people in the field. I don't think we

would have been able to address that enormous surge without the immense work, both in our headquarters and in the field, there are people who are really selfless and have done their best in the face of extremely difficult circumstances.

But a lot of work remains to be done. First to complete the deployment and address the challenges ahead and also to make sure that peacekeeping is successful. We have our work really cut out for us. We have it cut out in the sense of the managerial challenges that I mentioned but also for the Member States, their political engagement. Sometimes there's a sense that once the peacekeeping operation is authorized then the work shifts from the Member States to the Secretariat. I don't think that's the case. Of course it's more work for us, but it also means that the member states have to be doubly engaged so that the political processes that our deployments are expected to support, come to fruition.

The pressure is in the hands of the Member States. It's not in our hands. We are the orchestrators, we are the implementers, but the political will, the energy, the pressures, the incentives, the disincentives, that is with the Member States. My concern sometimes is, everyone talks about the military overstretch, the managerial challenges. Sometimes I'm concerned about the political overstretch. How can the international community be focused enough to address at once so many important issues? That's a real challenge for the UN, for this Department, for the Secretary-General, but it's a challenge for the leaders of the world.

The other challenge is of course addressing a political process is important but one thing I've learnt in heading the Department is that peacekeeping opens a window but if you don't have [inaudible] that window, a major peace building, reconstruction effort which entails in particular the retooling of the security forces of the country that is affected by conflict then a big part of our exit strategy is at risk. We see it in many peacekeeping operations, whether the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Timor-Leste, Liberia, Sierra Leone, having the right security sector, having reforms that have gone in sufficient depth is key to the success in managing down, in gradually withdrawing but leaving a stable

situation behind. I don't want to speak for too long as you probably have questions. But these are the issues on my mind today.

Q: We see Darfur where we have no real agreement that [inaudible] Why not go ahead and deploy in Chad or somewhere else? Any thoughts on that?

A: The first thing is to get Darfur right and to support AMIS. I'm pleased to report to you, that this is going ahead full speed. We're going to have some military staff officers, some logistics officers, we have equipment being shipped to help the AU mission, because we understand that after the declarations of the President of Sudan that the Government of Sudan does welcome support to AMIS and that's key, because it's in Darfur [inaudible].

We are looking at Chad to see what could be done. It is very difficult. The refugee population there, there is a cross border movement. It is as forbidding an environment as Darfur itself because it is a long unmarked border. We are actually working with colleagues in UNHCR, with our colleagues in OCHA to see what practical things could be done but I don't want to leave any illusion that Chad would be any easier than a Sudan/Darfur operation.

Q: Mr. Guéhenno, you made it very clear that there are several challenges in peacekeeping and that there are two sides, yours and that of the government. Strictly from your side, and in the light of the Brahimi report, what transformations have taken place in your department to meet these challenges you spoke about?

A: Well I'm grateful to Lakhdar Brahimi that he really defined a roadmap that has informed the transformations of the department in the last few years. If we hadn't had that transformation, frankly we would've collapsed under the weight of the new operations that had to be launched. The key transformation is really the professionalisation of peacekeeping while keeping our flexibility. That is at the heart of being an effective peacekeeper. Peacekeeping is the most difficult job, because you don't

have under your control all the factors, as you point out there is a government, including the government of the host country. You're dependent on their political will to follow up on whatever agreement they have agreed. You never control the full picture. When you insert yourself in a country, you need to have the highest degree of professionalism, in all functions of the mission, whether political, logistics, support, military function so that you gain credibility. I have seen by visiting many missions that the personal credibility of peacekeepers whether of military commanders or civilian staff, is a key to the success of an operation. If you have a good concept but the people are not right, you will fail.

In the transformation of the Department, I think that now when I look at the structure of the Department from the top down we have a number of extremely professional people who were quite impressive in the way that they can manage enormous challenges; managing a quick deployment.

When you look at Lebanon, it is quite amazing to see that this a deployment that has happened very quickly because there is a good interaction between the troop contributing countries that are going out of their way for quick deployment and the DPKO and the force commander on the ground. I think that is a good example of the kind of progress that we can make. The fact that the Europeans who were out of peacekeeping since the 90's are back is also a sign that there is more confidence in the way UN peacekeeping is managed.

So to answer your question, there is the old issue of personnel, the way we structure the dept to be more supportive of the field, to be a field oriented dept. because in peacekeeping very important to have a close interaction with the Security Council because it is our boss. But it is in the mission that you fail or succeed. We are trying to develop a real mindset in DPKO that the purpose of this dept is to serve the field and that culture is also at the heart of the transformation of peacekeeping. And then strengthening oversight, which is an ongoing process and a part of quality control, like the personal conduct unit etc to make sure that we address problems and control them.

Are we at the end of the road? Certainly not, and that's why we've developed a plan for peacekeeping for 2010. We do believe that in a number of areas we need to go deeper and be aware that peacekeeping is a core activity of the UN and therefore it has to be addressed with the kind of professionalism and systematic approach that any continuous activity requires.

Q: You mentioned how important it is to leave the right security sector in the countries where there are huge operations e.g. in the western Balkans. Problems are already born e.g. in Bosnia as you know last week Bosnian Minister for Human Rights held talks in your office with Mr. Annabi and can you tell us what is the core of the problem of the certification of police men? Do you face such problems anywhere else around the world? What can be done in particular in Bosnia to solve this kind of problem?

A: We are very proud of what the UN has achieved in building the Bosnian police core. This is one of the great achievements of the UN in recent years. You have thousands of police officers who have been vetted, who are professional and who are I think, the best functioning institutions in Bosnia. There's an issue with a number of them in the certification process that they challenge and that's what we are working on with the Bosnian authorities, with the high representative to sort that out.

It is complex legal issue; we have made every effort to make sure that it is resolved satisfactorily, but the bottom line I think for Bosnia is that the immense majority of the Bosnian police officers were vetted by the UN, I think that's a great contribution that the UN has made to the stabilization of Bosnia after the tragedies that the country went through.

Q: Any time line that you are particular that you are committed to trying to solve that problem?

A: It's being worked out but I don't want to commit to any particular time line.

Q: [inaudible] issue of compensation for families of those who got killed by Israelis in Lebanon. Just briefly, I understand that there's the general problem with vacancy rates in civilian staffing of various missions. If you could give an update on how severe that problem is. How difficult it is to get staff in some of these places that aren't a centre of news. And one just final quick, silly one; who decides the names for these things? Some have UN, some have ONU, some have MON? Some are short, some are long., Is there any kind of rhyme or reason on how these names are made up?

A: I'm told that in previous times there was one distinguished staff member of DPKO who was really in charge of the names. Now we haven't assigned one particular person for that critical responsibility. In Francophone missions most of the time we use the French order of letters that is why you would have MONUC. Sometimes myself I write ONUCI and I see letters with UNOCI but I think the two can be used. In non-Francophone missions the English order of letters prevails so I beg to be contradicted but apart from ONUCI I think it's the one (see I said ONUCI) that's the only one.

Your second question was on civilian turnover. That is one of the key challenges. We have too high vacancy rates. We are caught in the dilemma. We don't want to recruit the wrong people for very difficult jobs. We want also to retain the good people. What we see in those missions which are very difficult where you can't have your family. You live in a place which by definition is unsettled. You have conditions of services that are usually inferior to the conditions of services provided to agencies, funds and programs. So it's not always easy to retain the good people that we train. So we keep filling posts and we keep having people who leave for a better situation.

That's where I think the broader reform efforts of the Secretary-General in terms of managing the human resource at the UN is key to the success of peacekeeping. We want to develop a professional cadre of peacekeepers 2,500 because we see that as core that is essential for the sustainability of peacekeeping but we also want beyond that cadre to have a management of peacekeepers that allows them to move from Headquarters to peacekeeping, from peacekeeping to another part of the UN system and that would allow

us to go to another level of professionalisation and also to bring down a bit the rotation of some civilian staff in peacekeeping missions and bring down the vacancy rates.

Compensation is another part of the reform package.

Q: PB Khiam: Will Israel pay compensation the families?

A: As you know Israel has accepted full responsibility for the tragedy of Khiam. Indeed we will be, we are studying with our legal department how to go to Israel for compensation as will the Member States and that is being looked at.

Q: Mr. Guéhenno I wanted to ask you, today you're talking about the surge of peacekeeping operations but I wanted to know what impact does that have on the smaller operations e.g. MINURSO that is coming up for mandate renewal at the end of this month. There have been a lot of calls on its reforms saying that the smaller operations maybe need to be phased out. I needed to get your opinion on that. Also, how detailed will the report be that's going to go to the Security Council this month on MINURSO.

A: I think MINURSO is a good illustration of what peacekeeping can achieve and what peacekeeping it cannot achieve. Peacekeeping is a half-way station. When you deploy a peacekeeping operation, you can prevent the resumption of conflict. Can you impose a solution? Can you convince the parties, if they are not convinced that this is the deal? You can't. That is why I refer to the political engagement of Member States. In the case of MINURSO the mission has been instrumental in stabilizing the situation and preventing the resumption of conflict. It is quite interesting to see that while the parties differ on many things, they don't differ on the importance of MINURSO in preventing the resumption of conflict. Does that mean that we are satisfied with the situation? Obviously not. I would want more political engagement to come to resolution of that long standing conflict in Western Sahara.

Q: My first question actually, it would only need to be in French – what is your message today?

Aujourd'hui on voit que le maintien de la paix atteint des niveaux inégalés. On est à plus de 93,000 on sera demain avec le déploiement complet au Liban, et j'espère au Darfour, et à Timor-leste, on atteindra les 140,000.

Ce niveau inégalé de déploiement, c'est un vote de confiance dans le maintien de la paix des Nations Unies, c'est un signe que beaucoup de conflits arrivent à leur terme, mais c'est aussi un énorme défi.

C'est un défi de gestion parce que être certain que ces 140 000 personnes vont être bien gérées, être certain qu'il y aura le support adéquat pour ces 140,000 personnes, c'est un défi politique par ce que 18 opérations de maintien de la paix, c'est 18 processus politiques différents, c'est donc 18 situations où il faut non seulement que le Secrétariat des Nations Unies se mobilise, mais où il faut aussi que les Etats Membres se mobilisent.

Il faut qu'il y ait l'engagement politique des Etats Membres pour que la fenêtre d'opportunité que le maintien de la paix ouvre elle soit pleinement exploitée, de telle manière qu'on ne se retrouve pas dans une situation où on stagne, où l'on n'avance pas et donc aujourd'hui mon message c'est la communauté internationale se tourne vers les Nations Unies pour traiter un certain nombre de situations, et c'est un signe que le monde va vers la paix, mais en se tournant vers les Nations Unies, le travail des Etats Membres ne s'arrête pas, il commence. C'est-à-dire qu'il faut maintenant un engagement très fort de la communauté internationale à la fois pour fournir les moyens nécessaires aux Nations Unies, que ce soit les troupes, les personnels qualifiés, mais pour fournir aussi l'engagement politique qui permettra à ces conflits d'être véritablement résolus au fond.

Q: Countries like Canada in the past have had a proud history of peacekeeping and used to be one of the largest contributors. In recent years Canada has dropped down to about a 100 peacekeepers according to our ambassador.

I'm wondering, what are your thoughts on Canada's contribution to the peacekeeping core? If you could answer that in English and in French?

A: Canada has enormous experience in peacekeeping. Canada is actually one of the founding countries if I may say, of peacekeeping. We are going to celebrate Lester Pearson's UNEF operation in a few months. Canada has a major role in peacekeeping. I think at the end of the cold war, there was a very steep shrinking of armed forces throughout the western world and so less troops available. There were competing demands. Canada is very much involved in Afghanistan and we welcome that involvement. These competing demands have meant that we have seen, it's true, very small numbers of Canadian blue helmets. We would like to see Canadian blue helmets because I strongly believe that the strength of peacekeeping depends very much on its universality. So you need all categories of countries; developing countries, highly developed countries to be in peacekeeping, not just for the capacity they bring but also because of the flag they bring. The strength of peacekeeping is the combination of the blue flag of UN and the national commitment of the countries that come into peacekeeping.

Q: On Sudan, have you drawn up any plan for Chad as the resolutions required for you to help peacekeeping to help out in Chad? Secondly, is there a plan B for Darfur since plan A gets rejected once a day by President Bashir. And on the vacancy rate, just so I understood correctly, in other words, none of the reforms that have been done that allow you flexibility moving peacekeepers in and out between the field and the department and so forth as the Secretary-General suggested?

A: On Chad, we are actually actively engaged with our humanitarian partners in looking at what kind of peacekeeping presence and what kind of actions could be taken to address the situation in Chad, especially since there was further deterioration in Darfur. On plan B for Darfur, we continue to believe as peacekeepers that it is essential to convince the Government of Sudan of the merits of the peacekeeping operation in Darfur.

We continue to be convinced that there has to be a political approach to Darfur that the notion that there's a military solution to Darfur would be a tragedy. That has to be

absolutely avoided. There is no military solution in Darfur and so the Secretary-General as you know is intensifying his efforts with key leaders, with the AU, with the Arab league, with the Security Council to address that. The notion that if there is no political solution, there is no peacekeeping, that peacekeeping can only happen if there is a political solution. Then what? Then that is not a UN peacekeeping answer. We are in a different world. Peacekeeping is there to address situations when there is a political process. We think that Darfur desperately needs a political process. What we see on the ground is fragmentation of the rebel groups, what we see is in fighting between various rebel groups leading to more suffering, leading to more displaced person. What we see if fighting for control of IDP camps, all that shows that you absolutely need to bring the key players and key actors in Darfur into a political process. If that does not happen, it would be very difficult to find any credible solution to the tragedy of Darfur.

Q: [inaudible] continued rejections from Khartoum [inaudible]. Is there any planning by the DPKO to work through, AMIS becomes the Trojan horse for an expanded peacekeeping operation, whereby UN logistics and support will go in but be helmeted under AMIS mandate and an expanded mandate worked on the [inaudible] agreement. Is there any planning of that at the moment?

A: Well as I said in response to an earlier question. (Interruption, inaudible)

What we know and what we hear from the AU is what we hear from the Peace and Security Council and the African leaders that they want a transition to the UN because they believe that considering the scope and range of the tasks that need to be addressed in Darfur.....

(Interruption, inaudible)

We believe that the real solution is a transition to a UN operation. We are very convinced that that is the feasible, practical answer. We don't think that we can live under illusions that there is some miraculous solution. We do believe that it is very important to work very closely with the AU and that is what we're doing. We believe that working with the AU will be another way of conveying the message to the authorities of Sudan that we are

up to nothing but helping the situation in Darfur and they will see it very concretely in the way we help AMIS and so I do believe that in that sense the support package that we are developing for AMIS may help create a different set of conditions for that will allow the transition for UN.

Q: As a follow up to your answer on needing a political solution, the President of the US obviously doesn't share your assessment and yesterday he said that, even if there was a not a solution, that the UN should go into Darfur, so this is the country that contributes more than 25% of the peacekeeping budget, so how do you respond to the urging from the United States that the UN go in without such solution?

A: Frankly I think one had to really define what peacekeeping can do and cannot do. Peacekeeping is based on the assumption that there is a political process and agreement of the parties that a military force is going to help implement that process. Not all situations correspond to that situation, and at some point the Member States may come to the conclusion that in Darfur there is a different situation. But what is very clear is that then it's not peacekeeping, we are in a different world.

Q: I have two questions. First I would like to ask about the troop contributing meeting that DPKO had regarding [contributions] to Darfur. A second question is more of philosophical issue: what do you think that people of Darfur are going to make of this issue of political will/military options, people are dying, some people call it a genocide, and we are here talking about a political solution, what do you think it means, the people in Darfur need help and we need to stop the genocide, what does it mean to them?

A: I totally agree with you that there is enormous..., there is immense urgency, I mean, I've been to Darfur, I've seen what the situation is in Darfur, and I think that anybody who has seen that situation sees that it has to be addressed. But what I see, as the head of peacekeeping, is that military force itself in an area that is half a million sq. kilometres cannot do it, unless you have levels of force that are just not forthcoming, and that is your first question, we had this TCC meeting because we want to make sure that, if the

political circumstances change, the Member States will be ready to contribute to a UN effort, so we don't want to give any wrong signals that we are just abandoning the effort, we are not, we want to mobilize the Member States but does that mean that we have an army of 200,000 people ready to deploy in Darfur, to police Darfur? No, and anybody who tells me that half a million sq km can be policed, that law and order can be imposed by an outside force, which is not in huge numbers, I think he is wrong, we know from experience that that is not the case.

A peacekeeping force can make a huge difference if it operates, so to speak, at the margin, so that there is some basis for law and order, which is based on a political agreement and then you hit hard on anybody who doesn't abide by the agreement. That's how a peacekeeping force is effective, the rest is beyond peacekeeping. When one looks at the history of peacekeeping, peacekeeping has been enormously successful when it happened within the parameters that really are the conditions for successful peacekeeping. When you try to apply peacekeeping to any kind of situation and confuse peacekeeping and peace enforcement you run very quickly into great difficulties.

Q: A question on MONUC in the DRC, the EUFOR is leaving November 30th and some say that it should stay longer but the Germans say that it should leave, what's your thought on that? And also, I wanted to ask you, there was an incident in eastern Congo, in the Ituri region, in the village of Kazana, I've asked about this before, a village was burned down, you said from this podium that there was a report that you would look into, since then your staff in DPKO has acknowledged that the day of the incident was wrong and that huts were in fact burned down by FARDC, not by MONUC, but with MONUC standing by and watching. The report we were giving is a one-pager with lots of typos on it and I would like to know if some formal document has been released given the shifting facts, and if it is not going to be released, why wouldn't it be released?

A: The MONUC inquiry into the situation in Kazana I think makes clear that when the forces deployed after the fighting they found four bodies of militia. The report makes

clear that there was a recce before the incident, so I believe that this inquiry has given sufficient clarity on the situation.

Q: [inaudible] Is the report this one page document that we were given? Or is there an actual document? That's all I am asking.

A: I am not going to comment on documents of that nature. Your other question was on the EU Force, right. We are very pleased that the EU deployed to the DRC and I think they helped enormously this summer when there were incidents between the two candidates, Bemba and Kabila. We want to abide by our contract, so to speak, with the EU, at the same time, we know that the period immediately after the elections is going to be very sensitive one. I think it is for the EU to look at the situation there and make a decision. We are very appreciative of what the EU has done there, I think they have to look now at the situation after the elections but we don't want to pre-empt their decision.

Q: On UNIFIL, you just said that the troops that have been deployed as of 1 October are 3,437 and that 11,563 are to be deployed. That does mean that there are no commitments and that you don't have enough troops or that there is a commitment and these troops will eventually be deployed?

A: we have all the troops that we've asked for, actually we believe that we base the deployment on what we see are the operational needs and our military is convinced that we have the right troops, the right capacities now ready to deploy in Lebanon.

Q: [inaudible] Do you have the commitments or not?

A: We have the commitments, we are pretty secure in the commitments and we are very encouraged to see that so many countries were willing to engage in Lebanon, that has helped us a lot. It's very good that we broaden the pool of peacekeepers and we see the countries that have been away for 10 years, there is going to be a "cross-fertilization" between the very strong traditional peacekeepers who happen to be in Lebanon like India

or Ghana, and peacekeepers who are coming again to peacekeeping and I think that both will learn from each other, there's a huge experience among traditional peacekeeping countries that will benefit those countries that have not been in peacekeeping for many years they will also see the transformation of peacekeeping, how we operate, the Rules of Engagement concepts of operations, the interaction between headquarters and the field and I think we will also benefit from the kind of standard procedures that exist in countries that have the kind of training that has developed in organizations like NATO.

Q: [inaudible] outstanding contribution of \$1.34 billion, how does it affect your operation, and if it does how do you distribute the shortfall, if there is a shortfall?

A: That cash issue, thank God for me, is managed by the Department of Management, so I don't have to make those decisions but it means that some missions never completely recover the funds that were needed.

Q: Mr. Guehenno, let's say all works out according to your plan and your proposed Darfur force goes in, how vulnerable a peacekeeping mission are you looking at? Compared to the ones ongoing or previous ones, may be put in context, and how do you foresee the overcome the inherent dangers, there have been calls for jihad against any UN force, you got 2.5 million displaced people in the country how do you repatriate these people without further clashes and what not...

A: When we designed the force for Darfur we had to reconcile two conflicting in a way concerns. One is, of course, the bigger you are in a way the better you are in the position to be in many places at once. But the bigger you are, you may have difficulty in finding the truth, you also can create a problem for the people in Darfur if you have a huge military force competing for scarce resources it's a problem. And you certainly want the force to be welcomed by the people so that was one concern, not to have a force that should be so big that it would become an imposition on the people.

At the same time the force that is able to cover a range of situations that's why there is in our planning, there is a great focus on mobility, air assets, and quick reaction so that there is capacity when there is information that there is a problem that is brewing here or there, to quickly move assets to that area. That's one aspect.

The other aspect is the high number as you see, in our planning for police. Because, we do see all this population in these IDP camps which are like cities. Tragic cities, but cities. There, in many situations, having police rather than troops can really help. Hence the relatively high number of police.

The last answer in a way is again a mix of politics and military. You ask how these people are going to go back to their original places of living. That is dependent on a combination of factors; the provision of security by an international force, by a UN blue helmet force that is seen to be impartial that is there really to support the implementation of a peace agreement, of the Darfur peace agreement and at the same time developing a political process, the Darfur-Darfur dialogue and consultations where the leaders really talk to each other and make arrangements so that there is a measure of political reassurance coming for the Darfurians themselves.

Again the notion that the force coming from outside can on its own create sufficient degree of reassurance, I would agree with you. That is not enough. It has to be parallel by a political process and I think on Darfur there has not been enough focus on the necessity for credible political process in Darfur where all the key actors in Darfur feel comfortable that they have a say and I think the government of Sudan on that process, it's the interest of the government of Sudan and the interest of the Darfurians, that's what will make Darfur a solid part of Sudan where everybody feels comfortable in Sudan.

Q: A general question if I may, may I assume that you have an organized system of standards and briefings for people coming for the first time to one of your projects or installations, to brief them on your rules of engagement on your standards of training etc.

have you ever thought of having a central based somewhere in the world of conducting this kind of activity or how do you do it in a general way?

A: First of all, the rules of engagement, each operation has its own set of rules of engagement because they very much depend on the mandate of the operation, the rules are never made public document but no army would do that because you need to keep some flexibility for the commander on ground to use this measure of force at this point or not. So we would not have an open data base of rules of engagement. What we do with the troop contributing countries is that they get very clear instructions and when the contingents are inducted, it is the responsibility of the contingent commanders to make sure that each soldier has a card that in no unclear terms gives him or her clear instructions on the use of force.

But your question has a broader meaning as we are developing in peacekeeping, a set of different levels of doctrine, standard operating procedures, policies from the very generic, what are the key principles of peacekeeping to the very practical, how you run an airport, what does a military observer do, all the myriad that constitutes peacekeeping. We are putting that for the moment on the Intranet in the DPKO that is available throughout our peacekeeping operations so that the civil affairs officer who is in some remote place in DRC but thanks to our logisticians has access to the DPKO intranet. If he is confronted with a particular situation he can really look what are the principles and could also have access to database on various opinions because we create knowledge networks and what you do in civil affairs etc. on variety of activities. He can begin to interact with other people, other missions who may have an experience of that type.

That is a key element of the kind of transformation of peacekeeping that I was alluding to earlier, instead of trying to reinvent the wheel at each new peacekeeping operations we are gradually building a solid base so that the lessons learnt in previous peacekeeping operations, other lessons learned in mission A while mission C is having the same problem can be shared and that's part of the institutionalization of peacekeeping. Down the road we are also building links with a number of peacekeeping centers around the

world so that this Department of Peacekeeping Operations that does more peacekeeping than other organizations in the world, that the Department has the capacity to share that experience with other organizations and to benefit from other organizations also. We need to build a network on peacekeeping and that is what we're doing with our policy best practice section which is really piloting that project.

Q: When you say that peacekeeping cannot be enforcement, its got to be based on political agreement, does that mean that the responsibility to protect that was passed by Security Council pledges and by the GA, is that way too premature because it says there basically if it is no protection afforded to civilians, the UN and the international community has the right to enforce that sort of peace there, for the UN is that way too premature?

A: I don't think so. The responsibility to protect is human imperative and so I think we would've liked to see it coming much earlier actually. The responsibility to protect is something really to be enshrined in international law. What I'm saying is that in some circumstances peacekeeping is the answer to the responsibility to protect; it may not be the answer in all cases. Frankly, when one looks at the most horrific genocide of the last hundred years, the holocaust and Hitler, this is not peacekeeping, what is needed there is what happened in WWII. That is a different type of situation.

Q: [inaudible] future planning, you build any national responsibility to protect, one day the UN is going to force its way in somewhere. Is that going to happen one day?

A: The UN is not a military alliance. You don't have troops that train together in the same way as they train in the military alliance. I think there is a limit to the kind of military activities they can have. I think they can have coalition of the willing that are authorized by a UN Security Council mandate but if you want to conduct war operations, it is beyond the capacity of troops that haven't trained together before being in a high intensity conflict.

Q: So DPKO can never be in the business of peace enforcement now or ever, it would have to be a coalition of the willing

A: We are and we have shown it in the DRC and other places. There are a number of situations where there is a peace agreement and there are spoilers on the margin of the agreement and that has been one of the transformations of peacekeeping in recent years. We have developed the capacity with the spoilers, with the marginal actors, to be extremely robust and to conduct operations that are the high end of the military activity. Does that mean that we can go one step further and if there's a systemic breakdown of peace agreement, the peacekeeping force can deal with it? That is going one step too far. I am one of those who strongly believes in robust peacekeeping, that we cannot have a peace agreement hostage to one militia that would destroy the peace agreement. That would be very bad and that's why developing robust peacekeeping with robust capacities, with attack helicopters, with the kind of capacities that we now have in a number of peacekeeping operations, I think it's a significant progress and transformation in peacekeeping operations. Does it mean that we can get carried away and go all the way to war operations? I think that would be unwise and that the UN is not organized for that.

Q : A l'époque le Canada était très fier de ses contributions, aujourd'hui il reste 100 troupes avec les Nations Unies. Quelle est votre opinion pour cette question ?

Comme je l'ai dit le Canada nous aide à travers la mission à laquelle il participe en Afghanistan et nous pensons qu'il est très important que l'OTAN ait une force solide puissante en Afghanistan. C'est un élément essentiel si on veut maintenir la viabilité du processus politique en Afghanistan, donc il est essentiel d'avoir une OTAN robuste en Afghanistan, et nous sommes très heureux de voir le renforcement actuel de l'OTAN en Afghanistan. Le Canada fait partie de ce renforcement. Nous sommes reconnaissants au Canada de cela. Ce que j'espère c'est qu'en parallèle le Canada pourra le moment venu déployer des troupes aussi comme casques bleus.

Dernière question.

Q : J'en ai deux. Une sur la RDC et l'autre sur la Côte d'Ivoire. Je pose la première. Par rapport à la RDC, quelles sont les questions pratiques que la MONUC a prises pour faire face au pire au cas où il arriverait avant pendant et après les élections.

A : Nous avons-nous sommes tous en alerte sur la situation en République démocratique du Congo et le Commandant de la Force, le Représentant spécial ont examiné avec le Département des opérations de maintien de la paix et ils sont en train de continuer à examiner toute une série de scénarios. Je ne vais pas m'étendre sur eux, vous comprendrez bien pourquoi. Mais tout une série de scénarios pour être certains que la MONUC est en mesure de répondre à tout un éventail de situations et jusqu'aux élections en tous les cas nous avons aussi l'EUFOR avec laquelle nous travaillons en étroite coordination comme on a pu le voir durant les événements de l'été.

Q : Et après, est-ce qu'elle

A : L'Union Européenne a fait un gros effort en déployant cette force. Il est clair qu'après les élections il y aura d'autres moments difficiles. Mais c'est une décision pour l'Union européenne. Nous sommes très reconnaissants aux Etats de l'Union européenne de s'être engagés en RDC. C'est à l'Union européenne d'apprécier si après les élections elle doit rester ou non. Il est clair que l'EUFOR apporte une grande contribution à la stabilisation en RDC dans cette période critique.

Q : Et en Côte d'Ivoire, est-ce qu'il [inaudible] qui demande que la force onusienne en Côte d'Ivoire parte après octobre et comment ça va affecter votre travail sur le terrain, Monsieur Guéhenno.

A : La région, la sous-région d'abord est mobilisée sur la Côte d'Ivoire. Il va y avoir une réunion le 6 de la CEDEAO qui sera suivie d'une réunion de l'Union africaine les 16 et 17 octobre, et sur cette base le Conseil de sécurité prendra ses responsabilités. Il est clair que dans la période qui suit, l'après octobre, qui aurait dû voir la fin de la transition, un

règlement des élections, il est clair que la communauté internationale doit réfléchir aux moyens d'éviter que l'enlisement dans lequel se trouve le processus de paix continue après le 31 octobre.
