Mr. Chairman,
Distinguished Delegates,
Ladies and Gentlemen,

I am delighted to appear before this Committee again, now for the fourth time. I look forward to these sessions as an opportunity to exchange views with you on the future of UN peacekeeping and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, which I am honoured to head.

The topics for discussion at this year's session are clear, as laid out in the Secretary-General's report. It should contain no surprises. We have also circulated a matrix summarizing the implementation status of all of the Committee's previous recommendations that are not covered in the report.

I look forward to hearing your initial reactions, especially on the proposals to establish a standing civilian police capacity and a military strategic reserve force. These are two investments, in my view, that could help make UN peacekeeping operations more efficient, effective and therefore more cost-effective as well.

Too often we spend a great deal of effort and money making up for lost time and correcting mistakes committed at the outset of missions. But imagine if we were able to deploy, within 72 hours, 20 highly skilled police specialists, geographically and gender balanced, who had trained and worked together before, to plan and kick start UN police mandates? They could probably make more of an impact than 10 times their numbers of generalists, trickling in, piece-meal, over the course of several months.

And what if there was a predictable and rapid military response available to shore up a UN peacekeeping operation threatened by crises beyond its means to contain? The proposed UN strategic reserve force would be an important insurance policy for the substantial investments you make in complex peacekeeping operations. The certainty that a mission would be provided with swift additional help if seriously challenged could also deter potential spoilers.

I know that you have considerable interest in these proposals, but also questions and concerns. As there will be ample opportunity to discuss these and other important initiatives later in the week, I thought I would take advantage of this occasion to share my reflections with you on the big picture. What were the most important developments in UN peacekeeping in 2004, and what might they imply for the year ahead? For me, three things stand out in particular, as follows:

• First, there were many positive developments that may not be on everyone's radar screen . Several missions have met or exceeded expectations, and a few are preparing to actually wind-down, having successfully completed their mandates. A substantial number of the reforms proposed in the Brahimi Report, and supported by you, have been implemented and have improved the way we plan and deploy UN peacekeeping and related operations. We continue to get better at what we do. Your investments over the past four years have paid off. They will continue to yield dividends in the years to come.

• Second, I am nevertheless concerned about taking on too much and spreading ourselves too thin. Despite the successes and the depth of reform that has taken place, several missions are operating in volatile and precarious environments. They need to be bolstered and supported, in order to achieve their mandated objectives. There are also many reforms that still need to be consolidated. And, there are complex strategic dilemmas about the direction UN peacekeeping should take over the next five to ten years, the implications of which have yet to be fully thought through, let alone reconciled. For these, among other reasons I will explain a bit later, I sincerely hope that the Organization will not be required to deploy any new complex peacekeeping operations in 2005, beyond what is already on our plate or in the pipe-line.

• Third, allegations that MONUC personnel have sexually exploited and abused Congolese is cause for serious concern . Just as the catastrophic failure of any one operation could irreparably erode public confidence in UN peacekeeping, so, too, could acts of gross misconduct, if we do not respond to them with the utmost seriousness in 2005. We have a real substantive problem, not just a PR issue that needs to be “spun”. We have to deal with it collectively, aggressively and quickly. And, we must prevent it from happening elsewhere.

I will elaborate on each of these three points.

Point 1. The good news is that investments and reforms are paying off.

In many respects, 2004 has been a very good year for UN peace operations. L ong-term efforts are bearing fruit in a number of locations previously considered irreparable, for example:

•  in Timor-Leste, the UN is successfully winding down its mandate to assist in creating the sustainable institutions of a viable and independent democratic state;

•  in Sierra Leone , a democratically elected government, while still consolidating a fragile situation, is in the process of taking over responsibility for security from the UN mission. Prior to the mission's arrival, over five years ago, the country was fractured and engulfed in bloody and vicious warfare;

•  the UN mission in Afghanistan started the year by successfully supporting the Afghan Constitutional Loya Jirga as it approved a new constitution, and in October, UNAMA played an instrumental role in helping Afghans – including millions of women – to democratically elect and install Hamid Karzai as their President;

•  in Liberia, over a decade of war has come to an end and the country, a founding member of the UN, is experiencing a measure of stability that its younger generations have never known;

•  and, the UN operation in Burundi deployed swiftly and established its credibility from day one as a critical component of promoting peace in the country.

The reforms at Headquarters initiated in 2001 also are paying off in how we generate forces, deploy and sustain them. If not for the investments you made a few years ago, we would not have been able to meet the dramatic surge in activity in 2004. Today, the 17 UN peace operations managed by DPKO comprise over 75,000 military, civilian police and civilian personnel, compared to 55,000 this time last year. That represents a net increase of over 35 percent.

In total, 120,000 military and civilian police personnel, drawn from over 100 countries, rotated through our missions in 2004. We generated resources, deployed and sustained them, this time around, in a manner that no other organization in the world could replicate as efficiently or as cost-effectively. This has entailed making skillful use of 127 systems contracts, aggressively deploying Strategic Deployment Stocks (SDS), negotiating over 300 Memoranda of Understanding with Member States, and conducting in-depth evaluations and inspections. We chartered 319 aircraft and 52 ships, and currently operate an aircraft fleet comprising 57 fixed-wing and 114 rotary-wing aircraft – a 50% increase in 2004. We transported 580,000 passengers and 470,000 metric tones of cargo- in over 90,000 flight hours. We currently operate 14 military hospitals and 120 clinics, operate over 4,000 generators with a total capacity of 300 MW, enough to supply power to 200,000 homes – one third of Long Island , NY . You will no doubt appreciate that much of this activity was achieved in areas with little or no infrastructure at all.

New missions deployed w ith force packages that took into account the recommendations of the Brahimi Report and the painful lessons of the 1990s. They arrived with close air support assets (i.e. attack helicopters), quick response forces and formed police units capable of responding to civil unrest without resorting to lethal force. This shift in our posture has already paid off. In Liberia and Haiti , for example, UN forces were tested and proved equal to the task, helping to restore order in Monrovia and working with local law enforcement to improve security in Port-au-Prince .

The way we plan new operations has also undergone a positive transformation. DPKO planners have been present at key moments in the peace talks on Sudan . In some instances they have been able to advise on the feasibility of security provisions. They have been able to conduct planning on the basis of first hand knowledge of the negotiations. Concurrently, an advance mission was established in situ , thereby ensuring that the core of the mission's headquarters would already be on the ground once the anticipated full-scall deployment began. And, at Headquarters, our Sudan Team in the Office of Operations has guided a truly inclusive planning process along the lines recommended by the Brahimi Report and articulated in the Integrated Mission Planning Process template. These reforms should not be over-looked, even if the tragic developments in Darfur , and the parties' own sensitivities vis-à-vis the force composition, have greatly complicated efforts.

As you can see, a great deal has been accomplished in 2004. Of course, none of this would have been possible without the contribution of troops, civilian police, financial assistance and political support from you, the Member States. In a world in which the commitment to work together for the common good is not always clear, your continued investment in UN peacekeeping represents just that. I can sincerely say that, in many countries recovering from war, that investment has been worth it. Millions of some of the world's most vulnerable populations now have a real chance for a peaceful, prosperous and democratic future.

The second point I want to stress is that we should now consolidate the successes and reforms, instead of growing too fast or spreading ourselves to thin.

Despite the good news, there should be no illusions. The road ahead in Afghanistan , Burundi , Liberia , Haiti , the DRC, and Cote D'Ivoire will be perilous. Political processes we are concurrently managing in Kosovo , Eritrea / Ethiopia , and Georgia remain extremely complex and sensitive. Add to these 9 very fluid cases, several other more predictable yet important operations, and the imminent deployment of a complex operation to Sudan , Africa 's largest country. We will have our hands full.

Moreover, we are not resourced or structured to keep launching one new mission after another, while keeping the reform effort on track. During the deliberations on the Brahimi Report, we asked you how many new complex operations we should be prepared to launch in any given year. You indicated one. Yet, we had to launch three in quick succession – in Burundi, Haiti, and Cote D'Ivoire – in the first half of 2004 alone, virtually on the heals of deploying our largest operation to Liberia, at the end of 2003. The expansion and restructuring of MONUC in 2004 might be added to the list, insofar as it has been as complicated and labour intensive as establishing a new operation.

The numbers I mentioned earlier are impressive, but they come at a cost. I am certain that there would be more consistency in the quality of people we recruit, if we were not overwhelmed by the sheer quantitative demands. I am also convinced that we would have done demonstrably better in preparing our people to do their jobs, if we had had to launch only one new operation in 2004, rather than three and half.

The sui generis nature of each undertaking is a given. That should not, however, mean that each operation should be launched as if it were the first. We have learned a great deal about some practices and procedures that should be standard features of any operation. Yet, this was not fully reflected in the new missions established in 2004.

We are still facing difficulties to put together quickly the right mission leadership teams and to provide them with the type of standardized induction and orientation that they deserve. Quick and transparent recruitment of niche expertise, as opposed to generalists, remains a serious challenge. So, too, is the rewarding of our best performers and the weeding out of the poorer ones. And, there is still a paucity of guidance documents, in the form of updated manuals, SOPs and specific training programmes to help personnel who are new to the UN not only to hit the ground running, but also to ensure they are pointed in the right direction.

The qualitative challenge is as daunting as the quantitative one. The operations now in existence range from complex transitional administration of territories to small “traditional” observation and monitoring missions. Some are primarily comprised of civilians deployed along a “light foot-print” model with regional and bilateral arrangements providing security; others are fairly “heavy-deployments”, with the UN taking on the full range of military peacekeeping, “police-keeping” and peace-building responsibilities. It is no wonder that there is some confusion about what distinguishes a “peacekeeping operation” from a “peace operation” or an “assistance mission”, or for that matter why DPKO is not called DPO, i.e. “the Department of Peace Operations”.

Furthermore, the Department not only manages its own operations, but also provides services and support to an almost equal number of operations and offices managed by others, principally DPA, including the UN Assistance Mission in Iraq . And now, with Darfur , we are providing some support for an operation run by the African Union. Is this a trend you expect to continue?

More generally, what kind of operations and services, and how many, will the department be called upon to manage over the next five to ten years? The answer to this question will set the strategic direction for the department. It needs to be thought through carefully with you, the Member States, and with our partners in the UN system and in regional organizations, within the broader context of the deliberation on the recommendations of the High Level Panel. As the report before you indicates, getting the relationships right with our partners inside and outside the UN system remains a strategic priority for us this year.

In summary, we need to reflect on the strategic direction of the department, consolidate the reform effort, make Sudan a model deployment, and give proper attention and support to existing operations, at least 9 of which are extremely active, operationally challenging and politically complex. That is a fairly tall order for 2005.

Please do not misunderstand me. I am not making a pitch for another 50 percent increase in resources for DPKO, as was provided through the “Brahimi process”. Our current management structure is not designed or equipped to absorb such an increase effectively. We will be seeking less than a 10 percent increase in the next support account submission, because we believe that is the minimum required to handle the dramatic increase in work-load, while ensuring that each post is properly justified and can be put to good use.

In any event, limitless growth is not a smart business model in any field, and especially not in ours where humility should be the rule. Surely, one of lessons of the 1990s is that the UN was asked to take on too many peacekeeping operations, with too few resources, in too many places where they did not necessarily belong. Let's not repeat history.

There comes a point when the demands exceed your ability to get the job done properly, while concurrently putting in place in the reforms necessary to make sure that we do it even better down the road. As we experienced in 2004, as in the early 1990s, it is difficult to run and tie your shoe-laces at the same time. But, if you do not tie those laces, there is a danger that you will trip and fall. I want to avoid that. I want us to take care of the loose ends, before we push our luck by taking on additional new complex operations in 2005, beyond Sudan . I would rather use whatever breathing space and time we can steal, to clarify our strategic direction and invest in the reforms needed to improve the performance of missions that may need to be established in 2006 and 2007.

The third point I want to make is about the allegations of MONUC personnel sexual exploiting and abusing Congolese

This is more than a loose end. It is more than a minor setback. Let me be clear. If we do not tackle this problem as one of our highest priorities in 2005, then the damage to the image and reputation of UN peacekeeping could be irreparable. The multi-lateral system is under strain at the moment, and its capacity to absorb bad news is weak.

The report before you explains the nature of the problem and the immediate steps we are taking to address it. Some issues bear elaboration.

Scores of MONUC personnel, in all categories, are alleged to have solicited prostitutes. The term “prostitution”, incidentally, can mask the exploitative nature of the dynamic. In many cases in the DRC, the so-called sex workers have been paid scraps of food, and have been girls as young as 13 and 14 years of age. And, in several cases, the allegations are of an obvious criminal nature, involving rape, including of children.

Regardless of one's moral or philosophical views on prostitution, the fact is that the Secretary-General's October 2003 Bulletin on Special Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse, the United Nations Code of Conduct for Blue Helmets, and MONUC's Code of Conduct are clear on this issue. Any exchange of money, employment, goods or services for sex is strictly prohibited. Furthermore, any type of sexual activities with persons under the age of 18 years is prohibited. Mistaken belief in the age of a child is not a defense or an excuse. Where substantiated, these acts warrant summary dismissal in the case of civilian staff, and repatriation and subsequent disciplinary action by Member States for military and civilian police personnel. Where crimes have been committed – whether by civilians or uniformed personnel – it is incumbent upon Member States to ensure that their nationals are brought to justice. The UN, as you know, has no means or authority to do so.

Never before in the history of the United Nations have we witnessed allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse in this order of magnitude. And, never before has the UN investigated them as intensively as it is now doing.

One civilian staff member is now in jail in his home country facing charges. Another is no longer in the employ of the Organization. Twenty detailed reports involving allegations against military personnel have been transmitted to the Member States concerned for action, as a result of OIOS investigations in Bunia. More reports from elsewhere will follow. ASG Angela Kane is leading a special team now in the DRC to conduct investigations into all outstanding allegations. ASG Jane Holl Lute is leading a Task Force here at Headquarters to ensure a coordinated intra- and inter-departmental response to this crisis.

And, HRH Prince Zeid Ra'ad Zeid al-Hussein, the Permanent Representative of Jordan , graciously accepted to serve as the Secretary-General's Adviser on this issue. As you know, Prince Zeid has been helping us to ensure that the concerns of the membership, the Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) in particular, factor into all facets of our response, as we develop a plan of action to prevent the reoccurrence of these despicable acts.

A problem has been identified and we are taking aggressive action. The road ahead, however, will not be easy.

It is, quite frankly, hard to believe that scores of allegations can emerge without being illustrative of a wide-spread problem. We do not know how many cases are going unreported, whether in MONUC or elsewhere. In all likelihood, peacekeepers have committed acts of sexual exploitation and abuse in other missions throughout the past decade, but the vast majority has not been formally reported to Headquarters. It is now apparent that neither you nor we have been aggressive enough to search for and expose these cases. That new allegations came to light in DRC, even after the OIOS investigation was launched, makes it patently obvious that some peacekeepers even still have not gotten the message.

We need your help to send the right message to them, by taking swift action where clearly warranted, while respecting due process and the presumption of innocence before guilt is proven. We need your help to address obvious shortcomings in our investigative capacities. Proving sex crimes is one of the most difficult prosecutorial challenges for even the most sophisticated criminal justice systems let alone for peacekeeping operations, which, at present, are woefully ill-equipped to investigate them. And, we need your help to make significant improvements in prevention measures.

The public relations dimensions of this problem are secondary. The most important priority is for us to collectively tackle this issue, substantively. We simply cannot abide by the vulnerable being victimized by even one peacekeeper sent to protect them. We need to do the right thing, even if that means exposing further weaknesses in the system in the short-term.

That is why we have taken several measures that are described in the report before you. It is also why we are proposing in our next Support Account submission to establish a dedicated unit, in my office, headed at the D-1 level to deal with all forms of personnel misconduct including sexual exploitation and abuse.

But these measures will not be enough. A drastic overhaul of the system is required. In the report before you, the Secretary-General indicates that he would be willing to put bold, imaginative and creative ideas on the table for you to consider, very quickly, building on the excellent work of Prince Zeid. I sincerely hope that you will take him up on the offer. The Secretariat cannot solve this problem on its own. We need your support and full cooperation.

Concluding remarks

I have spoken at length on this subject because it greatly pains me to know that it is an ugly stain on a remarkable record of achievement in 2004.

Thousands of peacekeepers risked their lives, braved violent and desperate conditions, put their personal obligations to family and friends on hold, in order to bring peace to war-torn countries. It is ultimately thanks to their professionalism, bravery and sacrifice that the successes I mentioned earlier could be achieved. That includes the ultimate sacrifice that over 100 of our fallen peacekeepers made in 2004. I take this opportunity to pay tribute to their memory and to reiterate the debt of gratitude the international community owes to them and to the Member States from which they come. Member States contributing the largest numbers of troops and civilian police, in particular, deserve to be thanked rather than have their national honor impugned by the gross misconduct of a minority, whether from within or outside their ranks. The vast majority of them perform their duties with great distinction. It is and should be a source of pride for all of us.

When I said earlier that 2004 has been a very good year for peacekeeping, I sincerely meant it. In order for 2005 to even better, we have to attend to unfinished business. Prudence and bitter-experience dictates that we should get the jobs done and invest in the future, before we take on more responsibilities. It will be up to the Security Council, of course, to determine if, in 2005, prudence is a luxury we can or cannot afford.

UN peacekeeping is not always the right solution for a post-conflict situation. But, in order for UN peacekeeping to be a viable option among a variety of tools, it requires constant reform, retooling and investment. That is what the report before you is ultimately about. The senior management team in DPKO looks forward to fleshing out these proposals with you during this session, and throughout 2005.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I would like to say a word about our senior management team.

Kiran Bedi is ending her two-year tour of duty as the Police Adviser in DPKO, in order to return home to national service. The Civilian Police Division, under Ms. Bedi, has had to generate and deploy 14,000 civilian police officers to 15 missions during her tenure. This includes 2,000 for francophone missions, which has been extremely challenging. The Division has done an admirable job under her leadership and I thank her for the tremendous energy and dedication she brought to the task, and the government of India for making her services available to us. We wish her the very best in her career.

All of you now know well Major-General Patrick Cammaert. He has ably led the Military Division over the past two years. I am especially grateful for the military advice he has provided to me and the department, during a period of tremendous surge. Fortunately, we will not be losing General Cammaert's experience, but rather applying it to one of our most challenging missions. As you know, the Secretary-General has asked him to serve as Division Commander of UN forces in the eastern DRC. He has already left New York and regrets that he could not be here with us today. We are grateful to the Netherlands for continuing to make his services available to the UN.

Just as I have been committed to having DPKO staff rotate to the field, so, too, have I been keen to bring field-tested veterans to Headquarters. I am therefore pleased to announce that both the new Military and Police Advisers have served with great distinction in UN peacekeeping operations.

The new Military Adviser, Major-General Randhir Kumar Mehta of India proved his dynamic leadership and planning capabilities as Sector Commander in UNAMSIL, helping pull the mission back from the brink of disaster in the wake of the May 2000 crisis.

The new Police Adviser, Mark Kroeker of the United States , arrives fresh from his assignment as Police Commissioner in the UN Mission in Liberia . This is his second tour of duty for the UN. He previously served as Deputy Police Commissioner of the UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina . In both assignments, he has demonstrated his intimate understanding of what it takes to build responsible and accountable police services in countries recovering from war.

There will also be a change in the leadership of the UN Mine Action Service. We are actively looking now for a successor to Martin Barber, who is retiring in a few months time. His shoes will not be easy to fill. Relying on decades of experience, from headquarters and the field, Martin has put UNMAS on the map as one of the most innovative and effective parts of the UN system. He earned the respect and trust of UN agencies and donors alike. I am very grateful for the contribution he has made and will sorely miss his wise counsel. We will be looking to fill the position with yet another field-tested and seasoned veteran.

I am sure that the new DPKO senior management team in 2005 will bring great dynamism and experience to bear, as we seek to strengthen UN peacekeeping in the years ahead. I know I can count on your support to all of them. We now look forward to listening carefully to your statements.

Thank you.