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Mr. Chairman, Peacekeeping is again at a crossroads, and this Committee's session once again offers a timely opportunity to begin to discuss the way ahead. Four years ago, when I joined the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, DPKO was at an historic juncture. The recommendations of the Brahimi report were before us, and together, we set out from that milestone to ensure that peacekeeping would be ready, operationally, to address the lessons of the 1990's and meet the challenges of the future. In 2001, we worked to strengthen the staff of DPKO, and give it the human resources necessary to properly backstop our missions. And we have accomplished that. In 2002, we focused, among other things, on rapid deployment. We managed to bring into existence the Strategic Deployment Stocks and the Pre-mandate Commitment Authority. We could not have deployed the new missions over the past year, as we have done, without these significant innovations. We also looked closely at the question of the Rule of Law and how it fits in with peacekeeping efforts. There, too, we have started to make real progress in developing a common vision for the way forward. Last year, our wide-ranging discussions included coordination with regional organizations. The fruits of that effort can be seen in the UN-EU Joint Declaration, and ongoing UN – AU cooperation. We also discussed gender issues. This week we will be launching the gender resource package for peacekeeping and other field operations. We have made real progress, on these and other fronts, and we can take some measure of pride in what we have accomplished together in the past four years. In August 2005, it will be five years since the Brahimi process was launched. That milestone should understandably lead all of us to reflect on some fairly fundamental questions. To what degree has the world of peacekeeping changed since then? What will the next five years hold for UN peacekeeping and what might that imply for the types of capacities the UN System – DPKO, in particular -- should begin to build now in order to be prepared? These are the big questions that we in the Secretariat need to begin discussing with Member States, but just as importantly, that you need to begin discussing with one another, in the lead up to the Summit to be held in September 2005. The soon-to-be issued report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change will certainly contribute significantly to that discussion. I, therefore, would not want to anticipate or preempt what the Panel will say on the subject of peacekeeping, or how the Secretary-General or you will react to it. But, I would like to use this opportunity to inject into the dialogue a few personal reflections on certain trends and realities that appear to be dominating the peacekeeping terrain. First, the peacekeeping demands throughout the world today exceed what the UN or any other regional or sub-regional organization, by itself, can meet. From the UNs perspective it is very welcome that a growing number of international organizations and actors are engaging in post-conflict work. Regional and sub-regional organizations should equally welcome continued investment in the UN's capacity for peacekeeping. After all, the fact that DPKO has reached a total of 17 operations now, with more potentially on the horizon, is ample confirmation of the fact that UN peacekeeping remains indispensable. The universality of the UN continues to offer UN peacekeepers a unique legitimacy. And UN peacekeeping has built up - over decades of hard-won experience – a formidable degree of expertise and some unique capabilities. Second, if the current demand for UN peacekeeping will remain roughly constant over the next five years, concurrent with the demand for non-UN run operations, then we are going to face a serious resource deficit in the field. There is a need to take a very serious look at the total pool of financial and human resources – military, civilians, and police -- available for post-conflict work; and, to agree on reliable bases for their allocation to UN and other operations, as and when needed. Third, that there will be demands for peacekeeping is one of the few things in this business that is predictable. As for the rest, we should be prepared to expect the unexpected. We need to equip ourselves for nimble, competent, quick and flexible response. Operations continue to have to be mounted with short notice, and without the sort of planning lead times that would give our SRSGs and their staff the preparation they would ideally want. Moreover, though we are learning lessons and codifying best practices, we must also recognize that, to a great degree, each of the operations we mount remains sui generis. They each face unique political, economic, social and security challenges, with different mandates and a different array of partners and spoilers. Cookie-cutter or rigid template approaches will not, therefore, provide a short-cut to rapid and effective deployment. Fourth, the complexity of post-conflict transitions means that our operations must advance concurrently on many tracks – political, humanitarian, development, human rights and security – often in high risk environments. Many of their tasks are peace building, as much as peacekeeping, and so our integrated peace operations must be linked to longer term peacebuilding and development approaches. Addressing multiple, interdependent problems at the same time takes integrated programmes from within and beyond the UN system. These realities present us with some difficult dilemmas. On the one hand, peacekeeping has been strengthened and we are working hard on many fronts to continue building its capacity and that of the rest of the UN system. On the other, demands are growing in scale and complexity, and resources are limited. Should UN operations work at the scale that is currently demanded? If so, are the resources available? And what more is needed to strengthen them? Or should UN peace operations focus on a more limited number of niche tasks? And if that, how else do we meet the whole range of needs on the ground? The cases of Afghanistan and the DRC alone illustrate the nature of the cross-roads at which we find ourselves. In Afghanistan , we faced a security challenge beyond the means available to the UN. In line with the recommendations of the Brahimi report, we responded by proposing to limit the scope of our mandate - albeit to a very important civilian assistance role. There were others willing and better equipped to assume responsibilities in the security sector. In the DRC, however, there has been no such alternative option. We therefore need a greater quantity of forces and increased capability if we are to achieve the basic security needed to support the transitional peace process. And as demand increases, it is harder to find the quantity of resources needed to meet our mandates. Harder still, has been finding the quality we need in specific areas. From helicopter resources to strategic lift, from specialized police trainers to judicial mentors, we find that it is often not only a question of meeting the gross numbers of mandated personnel – though that is vital – but also a question of finding specific, high-demand resources. Increasingly it is clear that there is no substitute for these specialist capabilities. All of this leads me to conclude that at least two areas are crying out to be addressed as a matter of priority in the coming year. The first concerns the processes by which we get the right capabilities – the troops, the specialized components, the police, the civilians – on the ground in time to implement the mandates of peace operations. The second relates to how these capabilities are best organized and deployed on the ground; how we integrate and rationalize the joint efforts of the UN system and the rest of the international community to assist the consolidation of a sustainable peace. The generation of capabilities Despite the winding down of significant UN commitments to Sierra Leone and Timor-Leste, the surge in peacekeeping activity over the past year has taken our total number of peacekeepers: From 32,200 troops to 54,200 The budget of our operations is approaching $3 billion a year. And this picture of current operations does not capture all the demands that are on the horizon. The field support structures in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations also support key non-peacekeeping field missions led by the Department of Political Affairs. The demand on the system's machinery will continue to increase if the UN deploys further to Iraq , and perhaps Sudan . Force Generation Out of the 17 operations we are supporting on the ground, 5 have yet to reach their mandated troop strength. The shortfall on the ground is of some 5400 troops, troops that are either pledged - but yet to deploy - or not yet available. We owe thanks to all our troop contributors for the great efforts made towards force generation that have given us a sizable proportion of the needed troops. I cannot name them all, but I want to note particularly some of those that have increased significantly their already large contributions, such as Argentina , Bangladesh , Brazil , China , Ghana , Pakistan and South Africa . However, the force generation picture is, overall, a mixed one. As I mentioned before, there are key gaps where we lack critical enabling and niche capabilities such as Maritime, Helicopter, Communications, Special Forces. Thus, our overall troop numbers do not reflect the difficulties we face finding the capabilities that can mean the difference between success and failure for an entire force structure. Rapid deployment of our forces is also key. How can we ensure that, when the call comes, the personnel needed are available, ready to move, in a rapidly deployable, coherent and capable way? We need together to explore new options, to prepare the ground to avoid future shortfalls. Our need to be able to call on and rapidly deploy coherent and capable military forces, with certainty, continues to confront us in the field. We need such forces to assist startup of new missions and to come to our assistance when existing missions are significantly challenged. The UN standby arrangements in their current form do not provide any such strategic reserve. We can foresee preparing, and maintaining in reserve, pre-trained and equipped units, held within the command of troop contributing countries. With an arrangement allowing for their quick deployment to peacekeeping operations when needed, such reserve units could reliably and quickly be called for and brought into a peacekeeping force under UN command. Apart from providing reliable capabilities, there are a number of benefits to such a strategic reserve concept that may not be immediately obvious. The mere existence of this sort of capacity can deter so-called spoilers in the first place. It would allow more certain risk management regarding the size of our missions. We would welcome the opportunity to discuss and work out the details of any such arrangement, including the financial and logistical requirements to maintain and eventually deploy, on short notice, such a reserve. But I would be grateful to have your initial views on such a concept. I believe it could represent an important advance in peacekeeping. Police In terms of generating our civilian police requirements, we have a similar picture, particularly in Francophone missions. With a total of 9,704 civilian police, including formed units, on the ground, we still need 960 - and all of them French-speakers. This is a real challenge, and I should mention the contributions of Francophone police made by Senegal and Cameroon , and the efforts of non-francophone countries such as Spain , Turkey and the United States to locate those skills in their police forces. We also need to reconsider our overall approach to meeting police requirements. Lessons from past operations indicate that merely training police officers is not sufficient. There must be a sustainable law enforcement institution to support them and bolster the rule of law. Our civilian policing philosophy has evolved with mainly a bottom up approach, focusing on the individual local police officers. We need to augment this with what might be termed a top down approach, paying greater attention to helping local police institutions. While such an approach might require fewer civilian police, it would call for more highly qualified police officers and civilians - experts in such areas as policy and planning, police operations, police administration, budgets, personnel and logistics, intelligence and investigations. We need to develop these specialist capacities. The “On Call” list system was supposed to address this need. It is not working very well, to be frank. We need therefore, to consider moving from unreliable standby arrangements to a small but reliable UN standing capacity on this front. We are therefore considering how we might establish a small body of professional civilian police staff, ready to plan, deploy and frame the strategies of mission civilian police components. I also look forward to your views on these issues. Civilian Personnel The critical backbone of all our peace operations are the civilian staff who ensure support to all components of the mission and help move peace processes forward. We can and will do a better job at identifying, selecting, and recruiting the range of civilian specialists that our missions need today. This will be a priority for DPKO in the coming year. We need to attract, recruit and retain high quality staff. We look to you to help as well, in providing the conditions that will attract the best. We must remember the complexity and hardship of their work, as well as the increasing security challenges. It is has become imperative to review the conditions of service in the field. This starts with a change in the use of 100 and 300 series contracts in the field - the subject of a recent report by the Secretary-General. The proposal, for which I request your support, is to use short term contracts for personnel engaged in time-limited activities while regular 100 series contracts should, as a rule, be offered to staff engaged for six months or longer in functions for which there is a continuing requirement. Mission support With respect to mission support , the Brahimi reforms have improved our capacity for rapid deployment, but those mechanisms too have been stretched by the surge in demands, and need to be recalibrated. Pre-mandate commitment authority has proven a very effective tool to advance mission start-ups by funding the deployment of initial civilian and military personnel, the purchase of equipment and materiel not available in from our stocks. However, we may need to take another look at the level of resources available under the mechanism, since the funding can be rapidly exhausted when supporting larger missions. The establishment of the Strategic Deployment Stocks in Brindisi has allowed the UN, perhaps for the first time, to provide the kind of logistical support required for rapid deployment, as we saw in the start-up of the mission in Liberia . While SDS works well for the first mission, additional missions have proved challenging. You will recall that SDS was only approved to support one complex mission at a time. Faced simultaneously establishing three new missions, the limits of these stocks have been strained. We may need to re-examine SDS levels, the mix of stocks, and replenishment mechanisms. Integration Distinguished Delegates, I have mentioned some ways in which we can build upon the gains made since the Brahimi report, to augment the UN's peacekeeping in light of new demands. I want to turn now to the nature of peacekeeping itself, and how DPKO works with the whole of the UN system. Consider for a moment, the SRSGs who lead our missions in Afghanistan , the Congo Haiti and Liberia , to name only a few. They are mandated to draw the entire UN family together, to integrate UN activities on the ground so that each plays a mutually supportive part, supporting the political processes, institutions and development needed on the path from conflict to peace. The UN system at the headquarters level still has some way to go, if it is to offer those SRSGs a fully integrated advisory and support system. We have made some progress, from the first Integrated Mission Task Forces, to mission specific policy and operational teams, such as the integrated planning team for Sudan , but there is more to be done to integrate the planning, support and management of multi-dimensional peace operations. We are working with our partners in the UN system and those outside, including regional organizations, to improve from the very beginning the integrated strategies we put in place. At headquarters, DPKO cannot, and should not, duplicate capacities elsewhere. We have our core expertise, and we draw on other parts of the system to put together the expertise necessary to complete mission mandates. But where a DPKO led operation is deployed, drawing the whole system together is a central task. DPKO must serve to integrate. This task, in and of itself, requires expertise in key areas of coordination and dedicated resources. DPKO may need to restructure to play this role effectively, linking with specialized partners across the spectrum of planning, deployment and operational management. At the same time, our partners must be ready to operationalise their capabilities to the pace and scale required. Not all of the challenges of integration lie in the hands of the UN Secretariat and its partners. We will need your help too. We continue to experience the inherent weakness of using rules and regulations designed for yesterday's peacekeeping in today's complex peace operations. One of the greatest of these challenges has been the discrepancy between the financing of different activities. Certain security activities are traditionally covered by assessed contributions while reconstruction or development activity must rely on voluntary contributions. Yet the success of a peace process depends on both. For example, peacekeeping budgets today will largely cover the disarmament and demobilization costs of former combatants but not activities designed to reintegrate them or the large numbers of women and girls associated with the fighting forces, back into society. Remember too, that our missions deploy, supported by their assessed budgets, into the midst of societies left in extreme poverty and need. Our hosts see the personnel and the capabilities of the mission and naturally expect it will directly translate into improvements in their lives. But the voluntary budgets available for development programmes may be late in coming, and sometimes only a fraction of the mission budget. The result is obvious - failed expectations, and bitterness. This can even result in popular anger which can threaten the mission, and the men and women you put at the UN's service. Perhaps true integration would mean that we would consider, as a whole, the resources available to a country, and apportion it accordingly. I don't wish to be mistaken, the assessed budget is a vital element of our work, but success in post conflict work depends upon how we address the totality of the needs on the ground. Ensuring the viability of reintegration, reconstruction and other so-called peacebuilding activities is necessarily an integral part of a peace and security strategy. DPKO is ready to play its part in the dialogue between the development agencies and member states on these matters, including in the context of ECOSOC . Integration is also part of the answer to the challenge of security in the field. Even before the bombing of our Headquarters in Baghdad , there was a need to improve our security management. Over the past two years, in close coordination with UNSECOORD, DPKO has established specific policies and procedures, starting with a DPKO policy statement and security operating procedures for its field missions. These documents all carry the same message throughout peacekeeping; that is, security cannot be dissociated from operational activities. Security must not be viewed as a Mission stand-alone function or be narrowly defined. Rather, it has to be seen as an operational function that cuts across all military, civilian police and civilian activities, ranging from planning to contingency response, and, in this way, forms an integral part of mandate implementation. It is also an important goal for our missions to work effectively with our humanitarian, development and other partners in the field. This is increasingly important as we expand our operations. The sharing of information is key—our collective security depends on it. We cannot afford not to know the threats we collectively face. It is for these reasons that DPKO has pursued, in full consultation with UNSECOORD and UN field agencies, the development of a unified integrated security management structure, with the sole responsibility for security management invested in a single UN official in-country. Efforts towards the establishment of unified security management structures are now underway, in particular in Afghanistan and Sudan . The aim is to optimize the human resources and technical capabilities made available to the UN community to mitigate the risk they face on ground. Now, as you are aware, the Secretary-General has recently issued a report on A Strengthened and Unified Security Management System for the United Nations under a new Directorate of Security. If adopted, it will make important changes in how the UN system at large deals with security, at Headquarters and in the field. Beyond the UN, we are working to integrate UN peace operations with the capacities of regional organizations. T he UN has provided technical advice, equipment sustainability, and training to regional organizations in Africa , including the AU and ECOWAS, for example in planning for the ECOWAS Mission in Côte d'Ivoire , and recent planning and support for the AU efforts in Darfur . We have shared our experience with the AU in a number of areas, such as the establishment of an African Standby Force, and modalities for operation of the AU Military Staff Committee. We are also engaged with the EU on a number of fronts, including how UN operations might link with the EU ‘Battle Group' capacity that is being developed. It is important that this dialogue and exchange is developed and strengthened, so that the various mechanisms available to the international community can be brought together, with flexibility and efficiency, depending on the context. Conclusion Ladies and gentleman, These are the crossroads at which we find ourselves today: significant capabilities have been developed, but increased demands at headquarters and in the field are straining the system, and still more innovation is needed if the instrument of UN peacekeeping is to meet, for the people in the countries where we are deployed, the full promise of our mandates. We must deploy with the credible capabilities, and the quantity of human resources that are required, and we must do it rapidly. We must link, through our operations, the expertise of the full range of the UN system and beyond, channeled through integrated strategies and operations to keep, consolidate and build peace in post-conflict societies. As DPKO deploys and manages 17 operations spread around the world - with an extreme range of risk and complexity - the UN is today asked to operate on a scale that only this Organisation can. But if we are, together, to navigate the risks and realize the opportunities for success in each operation, we will need continue in our quest to ensure the necessary quantity and quality of resources, to deploy them rapidly enough and manage them efficiently, and to use the wide array of the UN system's capabilities to full effect. Thank you. |