| 1948 - 1998 |  | 50 YEARS OF UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS |
Fred Eckhard, Spokesman
for the Secretary-General: Good morning. You all know Bernard
Miyet, the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations. We have
some handouts for you on the table at the door: a listing of all current
peacekeeping operations, a background piece on peacekeeping in general
over the last fifty years. I am also told that the UN home page added
just today the fiftieth anniversary of peacekeeping site. You are welcome
to click and see what is there. Mr. Miyet, I think you have some opening
remarks and then we will go to questions.
Bernard Miyet: I will try to be brief
in order to have more time for the numerous questions you may have.
Why this press conference? First, I think that, some weeks ago, a journalist
thought that he did not see me very often in this building, even though
I have been receiving all the journalists who wanted to interview me
and I had already answered many radio, TV, and press interviews and
I am still ready to do that. Let me reiterate that my door on the 37th
floor is always open to you.
The second point I would like to make is that
today, 29 May, is the 50th anniversary of the first decision of the
Security Council creating the first peacekeeping operation, which has
to supervise the truce in Palestine in 1948. It is an important anniversary
for us. This is the starting point of the United Nations involvement
in peacekeeping operations. During these fifty years, 49 operations
have been deployed, out of which 36 have been deployed during the last
decade. Today, 14,000 troops, military observers, civilian police, and
civilian personnel are serving in 17 different peacekeeping missions.
As you can see, peackeeping is still very much on the United Nations
agenda. After a few years of interrogations, doubts, and questions on
the United Nations’ capacity and role in peacekeeping, a decision was
taken, at the end of March 1998, to create a new peacekeeping operation
in Central African Republic, called MINURCA, the first after three years,
and the first in Africa after five years. MINURCA is the symbol and
the sign that for Africans, and for the international community, the
UN wants to continue to play its role in the peackeeping area.
Regarding the evolution of peacekeeping over
these fifty years, you know that during the Cold War years, the UN was
the safe way to deal with international confrontations. Our troops were
deployed in areas where there was a problem between two states. This
was called “traditional” peacekeeping. With the end of the Cold War,
we experienced at the same time some hours of glory and a lot of disappointments.
Maybe too much was requested from the United Nations, at a time when
the Secretariat did not have all the tools at hand to carry out these
activities.
However, miracles were done at that time with
a very small team working on peacekeeping within the Secretariat. My
two predecessors, Marrack Goulding and Kofi Annan, accomplished exceptional
achievements. When you look at what they had at their disposal at that
time, and compare it with what other organisations, -- like NATO, which
wants to enter in the peacekeeping business --, have today, you can
see the difference. Too much at that time had been put on the United
Nations’ shoulders. It’s also clear that “good news is no news”. Most
often, media talk only about bad news. We refer more to Rwanda, Somalia,
Bosnia than to the successful peacekeeping operations in El Salvador,
Guatemala, Mozambique, and Namibia, where remarkable achievements have
been done by the United Nations. If you would go today in these countries,
and ask people if these operations had been a waste of resources, of
time, or of intelligence, I would like to know what kind of responses
you would have from all sides. We have to assess the situation in these
terms.
During the last period, after difficulties,
or failures in some countries have been encountered, the idea came up
that the only answer to respond to crises was regional peacekeeping.
At that time, NATO and the Alliance around NATO, SFOR and IFOR, went
to Bosnia in a very forceful way. The international community would
think that this was the only solution. A theory was developed here and
there that it was time to restrict the United Nations peacekeeping operations
to small-scale, low-risk, Chapter VI operations, when clear agreements
were already brokered between the parties, peace plans already in place,
and that all the complex situations would be left to coalitions of the
willing, or regional organisations. The perfect example of this new
path was Bosnia. Last year, before taking up this position, I had discussions
with some countries, and my first impression was that they had clear-cut
mindset about Chapter VI, Chapter VII, peacekeeping, peace restoration,
peace enforcement, and clear-cut separations between them. However,
the decision to replace UNPROFOR by IFOR in Bosnia was taken when peace
had already been settled, when an agreement was in place, and when the
parties were ready to participate. At the same time, the United Nation
was requested to send, if I remember, 7,500 troops to Eastern Slavonia
and Croatia to carry out a very complex, difficult operation under Chapter
VII. Two years later, in Eastern Slavonia, the objectives of a peaceful
reintegration of the region in Croatia had been achieved, while, at
the same time, despite a strong NATO presence in the country, the situation
in Bosnia remained difficult. This raises questions. But, it’s time
for questions from you, so I shall come back to that.
Very quickly, I believe that there is still
a role for the United Nations peacekeeping operations. In fact, peacekeeping
is an essential link between two other important United Nations activities:
peacemaking and peacebuilding. If parties are assured that the Security
Council will give all the means to the United Nations to implement peace
agreements, then mediators will have more influence, and more capacity
to deal with the parties. If you are in a country since the beginning,
bringing back peace, restoring peace, you will have more influence in
the peace building process, because you would have been there during
the difficult times. This is an element to be taken into account.
Just a last point: if the United Nations is
about to play a lower key role in peacekeeping, African countries might
feel that they are left alone with their problems, and that developed
countries --especially the European ones -- might deal only with their
own problems, with their own troops, without supporting any other peacekeeping
activities in Africa. This is why MINURCA in Central African Republic
is a very positive sign. It demonstrates that not only the United Nations,
but also the international community as a whole and the Western countries
in particular, are still ready to participate in peacekeeping operations.
We may come back afterward about the challenges
that United Nations peacekeeping might have to face in the future, in
terms of mandates, managerial issues, or ethical and moral standards.
Thank you.
Question: Mr. Miyet, welcome on behalf
of all the correspondents. We hear very little on UNMOGIP. I would like
to know if the current difficulties between India and Pakistan affect
this mission. Can you tell us something about what is happening there?
Answer: I followed this problem during
the last days and weeks in order to check if there was any specific
repercussion on the work of our mission over there. We did not experience,
from the reports we received from the field, any significant hostility
in this region. We did not experience any abnormal movements of troops
or flare-ups of hostilities over the recent period. However, let me
say something that is rarely said: this region is one of the bloodiest
regions we are involved in. Since the beginning of this year, about
1,400 casualties have been reported in the area. It means that the tensions
there remain high, and have remained high since the mission’s inception.
We continue, as far as we are concerned, to maintain our level of patrolling.
UNMOGIP is a small mission. However, we try to do our utmost through
our presence, through our patrols, to demonstrate that the international
community, the United Nations, is still present and carries on its activities.
Question: You mentioned Bosnia, and I
see, if I am not wrong, that Bosnia is still somehow the most expensive
peacekeeping operation of those under way. When you say that you are
moving towards Chapter VI operation, could you put some more light and
explain to us what do you mean by that?
Answer: I said that the United Nations
peacekeeping operation in Bosnia was replaced by SFOR, while at the
same time we went to Eastern Slavonia under a Chapter VII mandate. This
is what I said. For the time being, more than 2,000 United Nations civilian
police are present in Bosnia, training, supporting the restructuration,
monitoring the police forces of all entities, trying to implement, as
forcefully as possible, the notion of professionalism of the police.
For example, our civilian police is unarmed, but we enforce a check-point
policy in order to avoid any kind of control at the borders that would
prevent movements between the populations. We are working hard now to
impose standards for the local police. We remove any police commissioners
and civpol who behave in the wrong manner. We are now trying to enforce
the multiethnisation of police in villages where it is difficult. We
did it in Brscko, we try to do it in Drvar. We are also trying to enforce
a common license plate policy. It’s a Chapter VI operation for us in
Bosnia, but the NATO operation -- SFOR -- is under Chapter VII. When
there is a need for us to impose a solution, we ask SFOR to support
our activities.
Question: Should the United Nations police
forces in Bosnia work with NATO in order to capture war criminals?
Answer: The mandate of UNMIBH is very
clear: monitoring and assistance to the local police. We have no other
mandate. At the same time, the Secretary-General said that war criminals
should be brought to The Hague, and we welcome all kind of efforts to
achieve this goal. But, our police, which is unarmed, has neither the
mandate nor the capacity to do so.
Question: Are there any measures underway
to ensure a better safety for peacekeeping operations, especially after
Srebrenica and Zepa, and also after the recent hostage-taking events?
Anything that has been done?
Answer: Lessons have been taken into
account, especially in Eastern Slavonia. When we moved there, there
was a peace agreement in place. We moved in 7,500 troops with tanks
and helicopters in order to have, right at the beginning, like SFOR
or IFOR, the deterrent capacity to prevent these events. Regarding the
hostage-taking incidents, we still face this kind of situation in other
missions. We had a hostage-taking situation in Georgia a few months
ago. Most of the time, hostage-taking incidents are not politically
related, but mere acts of banditry. This is an issue on which we are
currently reflecting. I made a report last week to the Security Council,
in order to know if we could find new ways to protect our people. In
Haiti, for example, when the military left, we decided to create a new
formula. We established a rapid reaction police force in case of any
event or difficulty, which led to United Nations Civpol being trapped.
We try to find new ways, mostly for situations where only military observers
or civilian police unarmed are present in a country, in order to protect
them. Sometimes, protection is ensured by regional peacekeeping operations,
which are present or, more frequently, by the countries themselves,
by the parties which have to provide this kind of protection to United
Nations personnel. In case of a larger peacekeeping operation, we would
need the means to protect ourselves, and we will request the Security
Council to grant us these means.
Question: How would you qualify your
trip in Haiti? Is it a success or a failure?
Answer: It depends on what for you go
there. I didn’t go there to provide good offices. I went there, first,
to express the real concern of the Secretary-General, and of the Security
Council about the lack of progress. Second, I went to Haiti to make
clearly our case that there is now a real need for a real dialogue instead
of a succession of monologues. Third, I went there to make clear that,
in a democratic country, the constitution and democratic institutions
should be respected. You cannot stay for months without a Prime Minister.
The elections have to be held at the right time, the time foreseen in
the constitution. This is what I told the parties in Haiti. I added
that the international community will be ready to help in the electoral
process, should this be requested. I also had a meeting with the Friends
of Haiti, after this message had been made clear, even to the press,
in order to find a solution. You must know that, while we are talking,
discussions are held on this basis, with the hope that progress will
be made. I hope although, you never know with Haiti, that next week
the process would move forward.
Question: What kind of dialogue did you
offer?
Answer:I offered a dialogue between the
political parties, the different leaders, the legislative and government
authorities. For the time being, there is no real dialogue. The parties
do not sit together to seek solutions.
Question: What about the Haitian delegation
in South Africa?
Answer: I am not informed of a Haitian
delegation in South Africa. During the discussions held with the Haitians,
and the Friends of Haiti, we clearly stated what the Haitians themselves
should do, in full respect of their sovereignty. At this point, there
is a need for them to overcome their own problems, to have a real dialogue,
and to seek solutions. It has been one year now without any real solution
and with always a good argument for not moving.
Question: Last week, you briefed the
Security Council on the situation in Eastern Slavonia where the exodus
of Serbs still continues, as well as the various intimidations of Serbs
by the Government and even the Croatian police. Last January, you were
there for the end of the UNTAES mandate. There was a ceremony. You said
that UNTAES was a success for peacekeeping operation, and a model for
future peacekeeping operations. But since then, the exodus of Serbs
has continued. Now, Croatia is ethnically the purest in Europe, with
only 3% of non-Croats living there. The United Nations has still a mandate
there, with 180 support policemen. Do you think that, in few weeks,
at the end of the United Nations mandate, Croatia will become 200% pure?
On the issue of the Serbs leaving the country:
it’s still a matter of concern. I have personally discussed the establishment
of a strong OSCE mission in the country last year, which is present
not only in Eastern Slavonia but also in the rest of the country, to
promote the return of the internally displaced persons and refugees.
So far, we had experienced a slow and too weak movement of return. This
is clear. We need to encourage and continue to impress on the Croatian
Government the need to respect its commitments. But there are also problems
linked to the difficult situation in the country. It is true that Serbs
are leaving the region. But, we do not see Croats coming back to this
region either, mainly because of a lack of opportunities in terms of
employment, equipment, etc... Despite housing capacities and possibilities
in the region, the Croats are not returning there. What you said about
the behaviour, about the intimidations, the lack of commitment of the
local authorities is true. But, at the same time, the social and economic
situation in Eastern Slavonia is such that many people, Croats as well
as Serbs, see no future for themselves, for the time being, in the region.
Question: What do you think will come
out of the United Nations’ experience in peacekeeping both in Georgia
and Tajikistan, where the United Nations has a small group of people
who operate with large contingents, in both cases, coming from the Commonwealth
of Independent States? It’s a fact that Russia had been raising on several
occasions the question of a wider UN participation. Are you satisfied
with the way your operations are operating there?
Answer: I spoke earlier about Georgia.
We have security problems both in Georgia and in Tajikistan. In both
cases, we face difficult internal situations, where fighting continues,
and where it’s still difficult sometimes to patrol and to operate. Mission
personnel there are unarmed. We have to operate in a way which appears
totally neutral, totally independent and without any risk for our people.
The point is: do we have to rely on the support of the troops which
are supposed to monitor or should we have an independent capacity for
security? It’s a problem we are currently facing. We proposed the establishment
of a security unit in Georgia. We have tried to rely on a joint security
unit in Tajikistan, composed by both Government forces and UTO forces.
The political process in both countries is long, bumpy and difficult.
Our capacity, as a small mission, to interact with the political process
is important but limited because of the size of our presence.
Press conference
Bernard Miyet, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations
United Nations Headquarters, 29
May 1998