The Convention on Prohibition or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed To Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (CCW) is the only source of international treaty law that directly applies to the use of land mines. Protocol II of this Convention concerns the use of mines, booby-traps and other devices. As treaty law, the Convention only applies to States which have ratified its provisions. Since its adoption in 1980, only 49 countries have ratified the treaty, while a further 16 have signed, but not yet ratified the Convention.
The main provisions of the land mine Protocol include the directive that mines may only be used against military objectives; that remotely delivered mines may not be used unless their location is accurately recorded or they are fitted with an effective neutralising mechanism; that records must be kept of the location of pre-planned minefields; and that at the end of hostilities, the parties are to try to agree either among themselves or with other States or organizations to clear minefields.
The CCW has had little or no effect on the use of anti-personnel (AP) mines in recent conflicts. Along with the low level of ratification, there are serious weaknesses in its material provisions. It only applies to international conflicts, an obvious anachronism given contemporary patterns of warfare and mine usage, and contains no provisions for verifying compliance. Perceiving these weaknesses and others highlighted by NGOs, France in 1993 launched an initiative to ask for a Review Conference of the CCW.
The 48th session of the General Assembly agreed to establish a "Group of Governmental Experts" to prepare revisions to the Convention and to make the necessary arrangements for the Review Conference, to be held in Vienna form 25 September to 13 October 1995.
At the Review Conference, States Parties were to consider amendments to the Convention submitted by the Group of Governmental Experts and adopt them, as presented or in revised form, as new legally binding international norms. The Review Conference considered the following new provisions:
While there seems to be agreement that the revised land mine protocol will apply to internal conflicts and that booby-traps will be prohibited, all other issues remain to be solved. After negotiations stalled in Vienna, particularly over the technical issues of detectability and self-destructing mechanisms, the Conference adjourned and two additional sessions were scheduled for January and April/May 1996.
STATUS OF NEGOTIATIONS
A stringent provision that stipulates that mines have to be detectable was regarded as one possible outcome of this review process. While there seems to be agreement on such a requirement in general, it is likely that the implementation of the provision will be delayed by the introduction of a transitional period (suggestions were ranging from 2 to 20 years).
From the very outset of the review process, most parties favored a technical solution to the land mine problem. Arguing that humanitarian approach was meant to balance military considerations and humanitarian concerns, delegations regarded self-destructing (sd) and self-deactivating (sda) mechanisms as the key to the problem. States Parties believed that civilian populations were sufficiently protected if mines were used that self-destruct or self-deactivate with a specific reliability and within a given time-period. But yet again, parties were not able to agree on meaningful provisions. Proposals for reliability of such mechanisms ranged from 90 to 99.9%. Moreover, the requirement for sd/sda is compulsory only for remotely delivered mines, while hand emplaced mines may remain "dumb" when properly marked, fenced and guarded (with the additional loophole that waives this requirement in cases of "direct enemy military action"). And again, a transitional period of up to 17 years is proposed for the introduction of these requirements.
The proposed transfer prohibitions for land mines are limited in scope, prohibiting only the transfer of non-detectable and remotely delivered mines that are not fitted with sd/sda mechanisms. Otherwise, parties are only required to "exercise restraint in the transfer of mines".
Likewise, there is strong opposition by some countries to introduce stringent compliance and verification provisions, claiming that such a regime would mean unnecessary interference with internal matters. The President's text, therefore, only stipulates a mere "reporting mechanism" on adherence with the provisions of the Protocol.
HUMANITARIAN PERSPECTIVE
All humanitarian agencies and an increasing number of governments agree that a total ban on land mines is the only effective measure to end the legacy of these deadly weapons. Any alleged military utility of these cheap, simple and easy-to-build weapons is dwarfed by the disastrous consequences for civilian populations and the economy of affected nations. With millions of land mines waiting in the soil of many countries around the world, civilians will continue to be killed or maimed and reconstruction cannot begin. And there is every indication that the number of land mines is still rapidly increasing.
A "technical solution" to the land mine problem does not adequately take into account these humanitarian concerns and only goes part of the way toward solving the problem. Moreover, it diverts the attention from the true objective of the Review Conference: to provide maximum protection for civilian populations. The approach to advance mines technically and make them "smart", implies that these mines are less dangerous. However, a person stepping on a mine does not care if it was detectable, self-destructing or self-deactivating. The United Nations believes that only a total ban can effectively end their deadly legacy.