1995 Review and Extension Conference
of the Parties to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
26 April 1995
SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 5th MEETING
Held at United Nations Headquarters, New York,
on Wednesday, 19 April 1995, at 3 p.m.
President: Mr. ZLENKO (Ukraine)
later: Mr. DHANAPALA (Sri Lanka)
GENERAL DEBATE (continued)
This record is subject to correction.
Corrections should be submitted in one of the working languages. They should be set forth in a memorandum and also incorporated in a copy of the record. They should be sent within one week of the date of this document to the Chief, Official Records Editing Section, Office of Conference and Support Services, room DC2-794, 2 United Nations Plaza.
Any corrections to the records of this meeting and of other meetings of the Conference will be consolidated in a single corrigendum, to be issued shortly after the end of the Conference.
In the absence of Mr. Dhanapala (Sri Lanka), Mr. Zlenko (Ukraine),
Vice-President, took the Chair.
The meeting was called to order at 3.25 p.m.
GENERAL DEBATE (continued)
1. Mr. ZACHARAKIS (Greece) said that he fully supported the statement made by the representative of France on behalf of the European Union. For his part, he would confine himself to emphasizing the importance which his country attached to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and addressing some issues which were of particular interest to Greece.
2. The non-proliferation Treaty was the most important agreement in the history of nuclear disarmament. It had not only prevented the spread of nuclear weapons and promoted technical cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, but had also provided a frame of reference for nuclear disarmament efforts.
3. The steps taken since the previous Review Conference to strengthen nuclear export controls and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards had contributed to global confidence and security, as evidenced by the significant increase in the number of parties to the Treaty, which now numbered almost 180, including the five nuclear Powers. In order to fulfil the expectations thus raised, it was essential to extend the Treaty indefinitely. Any other solution would create uncertainty about the future of the Treaty, deprive it of its credibility and very quickly have a destabilizing effect.
4. In the absence of the non-proliferation Treaty, a number of achievements, including the IAEA safeguards, could fall apart. In that connection, Greece fully subscribed to the position adopted by the European Union at the Corfu summit meeting that the Treaty should be extended indefinitely. European unanimity was all the more remarkable in that the Union was comprised of both nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States. It should also be noted that the countries of Central and Eastern Europe supported the European Union's initiative. Reviewing the arguments of those who were opposed to the indefinite extension of the Treaty, he said that, whatever the modalities agreed upon, such a solution would deprive non-nuclear-weapon States of the possibility of exerting pressure on the nuclear Powers to honour their commitments under article VI of the non-proliferation Treaty. Indeed, it had been under the pressure exerted within the Review Conferences convened periodically in accordance with article VIII, paragraph 3, that a reduction in nuclear arsenals had recently been undertaken. The opportunity to exert such pressure would be lost if the Treaty were to expire. Moreover, the nuclear Powers would then be freed of the obligation to disarm which they had undertaken in accordance with article VI. That would have even worse consequences.
5. To extend the non-proliferation Treaty for a limited period would be tantamount to programming its expiration, unless an amendment was envisaged. That would be an extremely complex procedure which, in accordance with article VIII, paragraph 2, would have to be supported by the majority of parties to the Treaty (including all the nuclear-weapon States) or by all the parties to the Treaty which were members of the Board of Governors of IAEA. That cumbersome procedure would be very time-consuming.
6. It should also be pointed out that, in such a situation, it would be difficult for IAEA to plan and finance its safeguards activities, which must be based on long-term projections.
7. Greece was also opposed to the solution whereby the non-proliferation Treaty would be extended for several additional periods, since that would also create uncertainty about the future of the Treaty.
8. Whatever the Treaty's shortcomings, its unconditional and indefinite extension was the only way to ensure that the commitments undertaken with regard to non-proliferation would remain valid. That solution would also ensure the continuation of a forum for debate on issues related to non-proliferation, cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the reduction of nuclear weapons and disarmament. The significant increase in the number of parties to the Treaty also argued in favour of a universal Treaty extended for an indefinite period.
9. With the end of the cold war and the conclusion of treaties calling for drastic reductions in the nuclear arsenals of the United States and the Russian Federation, it was at last possible to envisage the attainment of the objectives set out in the non-proliferation Treaty of stemming both vertical and horizontal proliferation. In that connection, Greece supported the various efforts being made at the international level in the field of disarmament: the negotiation of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty, which should soon be achieved; the strengthening of the non-proliferation region and of the safeguards activities of IAEA; the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones, particularly in the Middle East; and the establishment by the Conference on Disarmament of an ad hoc committee to negotiate a universal and effectively verifiable treaty on the prohibition of the production of fissile material for weapon purposes. It also welcomed the adoption by consensus of Security Council resolution 984 (1995) on security assurances and the historic declarations made on that subject by the five nuclear Powers.
10. Whatever its shortcomings, a permanent non-proliferation Treaty would guarantee all parties thereto access to nuclear materials and technology. Greece had contributed towards that goal by providing substantial assistance to various countries and by making voluntary contributions to the Technical Assistance and Cooperation Fund of IAEA.
11. In conclusion, he said that his country, which had been one of the first to sign the Treaty, believed that it should remain a vital framework for the efforts being made in the field of security, arms reduction and disarmament and that its unconditional and indefinite extension would promote economic and social development throughout the world.
12. Mr. WYZNER (Poland), referring to the political transformations which had taken place in his country and in Europe since the previous Review Conference, welcomed the fact that they had been accompanied by a renewal of the commitments undertaken in the cause of non-proliferation. In particular, he welcomed the fact that Ukraine, Belarus and Lithuania had acceded to the non-proliferation Treaty and that, like Poland and the 52 States members of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, they were in favour of the unconditional and indefinite extension of the Treaty. In that connection, Poland shared the views expressed by the representative of France, speaking on behalf of the European Union and the associated States of Central and Eastern Europe.
13. On other continents, the non-proliferation regime was also being strengthened. In Latin America, initiatives had been taken by Argentina, Brazil and Chile, and the Treaty of Tlatelolco had recently been signed by Cuba. In Africa, with South Africa's accession to the non-proliferation Treaty, there was now a prospect of the continent becoming denuclearized. Those successes and the fact that the Treaty had now become an almost universal instrument should not obscure the fact that a number of important States still remained outside it. Poland would be prepared to join with others in exploring ways of encouraging them to accede to the Treaty.
14. From that perspective, he reviewed the merits of the Treaty and emphasized that they included not only the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, but also nuclear disarmament.
15. In that connection, he welcomed the important advances made in nuclear disarmament and noted that article VI was being implemented. Following the accession of Ukraine to the non-proliferation Treaty, the START I Treaty had entered into force, paving the way for the early ratification and implementation of the START II Treaty. That would open up prospects for further reductions in the strategic nuclear arsenals of the United States and the Russian Federation and, perhaps, of other nuclear Powers, too. The multilateral negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty were also going well and testified to the resolve of the five nuclear Powers to stand by the commitments they had made under article VI of the non-proliferation Treaty. It was to be hoped that, before the 1995 session was over, the Conference on Disarmament would have been able to elaborate a draft treaty that was acceptable to all parties to the negotiations. The draft must be not only comprehensive but specific, and it must prohibit all nuclear tests, everywhere and for all time, and leave no loopholes whatsoever. It was imperative that it should be adopted for an indefinite duration.
16. The elaboration of a treaty on the prohibition of the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapon purposes and other explosive devices was also going well. There were therefore many reasons to welcome the progress achieved in the implementation of article VI and to emphasize that the indefinite extension of the non-proliferation Treaty would lead to further advances in disarmament.
17. That solution would also open up broad prospects for trade cooperation and assistance in all areas of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, in particular the nuclear power industry. Suppliers must be confident that nuclear trade and cooperation would continue to take place within the framework of the safeguards provisions of the non-proliferation Treaty. When those prerequisites were met, the recipient States parties, in other words the nuclear have-nots, should be assured of their right of access to peaceful nuclear technology in accordance with article IV of the Treaty. Poland, which was also at the receiving end of technical cooperation and assistance in the civilian nuclear field and, to the extent of its possibilities, rendered assistance to others, was vitally interested in enhancing such cooperation. It greatly appreciated the role played by IAEA in that connection, and hoped that it would be strengthened.
18. Turning to the question of the safeguard provisions contained in article III of the non-proliferation Treaty he said that in view of recent instances of non-compliance with the Treaty, the need to assure sustained credibility and effectiveness of the IAEA safeguards had become evident. Accordingly, Poland was in favour of prompt implementation of the measures considered by IAEA in the context of the "programme 93 + 2" and it was ready to participate in the necessary work.
19. While speaking about IAEA safeguards he wished to commend the Agency on the considerable work it had accomplished since the last review conference: numerous inspections (including Iraq and in South Africa), verification of the quadripartite agreement on the implementation of safeguards in Argentina and Brazil, negotiation of safeguards agreements with the newly independent States of the former Soviet Union and provision of assistance with a view to giving effect to those agreements.
20. The Agency also deserved to be congratulated for its perseverance in endeavouring to ensure full implementation of the safeguards agreement with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. He noted with satisfaction that IAEA was reporting cases of non-compliance to the Security Council as required by the IAEA statute and that the Council was taking vigorous action in the known cases of non-compliance with a Treaty.
21. It had been decided at the 1990 Review Conference that, in order to be able to receive nuclear supplies, non-nuclear-weapon States would have to agree to full-scope safeguards. That decision had been followed by a consensus decision of the States of the Nuclear Suppliers' Group. As a result, in order to be able to receive nuclear supplies, a non-nuclear-weapon State must either be a party to the Treaty or have concluded full-scope safeguards agreements with IAEA.
22. Unlike many other States, Poland believed that export control measures whether agreed upon within the Zangger Committee or the Nuclear Suppliers' Group, including those concerning dual-use nuclear items, were motivated by principles of non-discrimination and that they served international trade and cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
23. Turning to the issue of security assurances which it was legitimate to give to non-nuclear-weapon States, he welcomed the adoption on 11 April 1995 of Security Council resolution 984 (1995) and the statements made on the subject by each of the nuclear Powers.
24. He was convinced that the Treaty would be extended indefinitely and unconditionally, and expressed the hope that the review mechanism it provided for would be fully used in future to provide for continuous scrutiny and enhancement of the Treaty's implementation.
25. Mr. CONSTANTINESCU (Romania) said that, as a country associated to the European Union, Romania fully endorsed the positions outlined by the presidency of the Union. All nations, both those which had nuclear weapons and those that did not, would stand to benefit from a permanent non-proliferation Treaty. It would be a sign of confidence in the international non-proliferation regime centred around the Treaty. The latter was the foundation for most other arms control agreements and it allowed mankind to enjoy the many benefits of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
26. The main objective of the Treaty, namely, to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, to foster cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to work for an end of the nuclear arms race and encourage arms control and disarmament, were being met. The Treaty was the only multilateral arms control agreement that required its parties to negotiate nuclear disarmament measures. The fact that in all regions of the world, rival States were renouncing acquiring nuclear weapons presented very obvious security benefits. South Africa's adherence to the Treaty had enhanced the security of all African States. The same was true in Europe, where all States, including the newly independent States of the former Soviet Union, were now parties to the Treaty.
27. Implementation of IAEA safeguards was further evidence of the way in which the Treaty strengthened international security. Safeguards did not, in themselves, encourage non-proliferation, but because of the confidence which effective verification provided, they helped reduce the concerns that potential adversaries might have regarding their own security. It was, therefore, necessary to enhance the system of safeguards, starting with the strengthening of the international inspection procedures carried out by IAEA. The safeguards agreements with IAEA were important security assurances for all countries. It was therefore essential for the Conference to reaffirm that such agreements, which were mandated by the Treaty, were vital prerequisites for the supply of any nuclear material or technology to non-nuclear-weapon States for peaceful purposes. Multilateral coordinating groups, such as the Zangger Committee, the Nuclear Suppliers' Group or the Missile Technology Control regime, supplemented the efforts of international organizations, which had difficulty tracking the many commercial business deals that sometimes opened the way to dangerous diversions of dual-use nuclear equipment. Participation in those groups should be strengthened and their effectiveness enhanced.
28. With regard to the future of the nuclear disarmament process, the Conference should take into account and reaffirm the importance of four main tracks: Firstly, there was a need to continue and accelerate the process of nuclear disarmament of the nuclear-weapon States. Secondly, a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty should be concluded; that might be possible in the near future. Thirdly, the multilateral negotiations on a future convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear explosive devices recently launched at the Conference on disarmament must be pursued. Finally, further enhancement of the nuclear weapons non-proliferation regime would be best served by the elaboration of international arrangements to strengthen the security of non-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Security Council resolution 984 (1995) and the individual statements on the subject made by the five nuclear-weapon States constituted an important step towards a suitable solution.
29. Romania urged all countries which had not yet done so to accede to the Treaty; all Parties should do their utmost to ensure that it was extended unconditionally and indefinitely. To do otherwise would be to undermine the very foundation of the thus-far successful world-wide efforts to halt the spread of nuclear weapons while making the benefits of peaceful uses of nuclear energy available to mankind. It would endanger the climate of trust prevailing among parties to the Treaty and would weaken their security and their hopes for enhanced nuclear cooperation. Participants in the Conference had a historic opportunity to create a more secure world. It must not be allowed to slip away.
30. Mr. DHANAPALA (Sri Lanka) took the Chair.
31. Mr. AGAM (Malaysia) said that his delegation could not help but note the gap that existed between the commitments undertaken by the nuclear-weapon States under the Treaty and their actions. The non-nuclear-weapon States, for their part, had fulfilled their commitments, in the hope that the nuclear-weapon States would do likewise. Unfortunately, the latter's nuclear programmes had expanded almost without restraint over the past few decades. The Treaty was neither fair nor just but, in fact, discriminatory: it accorded privileged status to the nuclear-weapon States and prohibited the non-nuclear-weapon States from developing or acquiring such weapons.
32. Malaysia acknowledged the important breakthroughs that had been made in the various disarmament negotiations among all or some of the nuclear-weapon States, which had led to major nuclear disarmament agreements. It was encouraged by the ongoing efforts to reduce nuclear weapons, but regretted that those breakthroughs were limited in scope and disappointing. The conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty was an essential prerequisite to halting the nuclear arms race, for it would contribute effectively to ending the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons. Pending the conclusion of such a treaty, the nuclear-weapon States which had instituted a moratorium on testing should maintain it and resist the temptation of resuming testing. Malaysia urged the nuclear-weapon State which did not as yet observe the moratorium to join in the voluntary restraint so as to create an atmosphere conducive to successful negotiations of that instrument.
33. Cessation of the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes was an equally important nuclear non-proliferation measure. His delegation was encouraged by the readiness of the nuclear-weapon States to do so. It hoped that they would spearhead the efforts to draw up a convention banning the production and stockpiling of fissile materials for nuclear weapons.
34. In a global security system premised on nuclear deterrence, it was only natural that the non-nuclear-weapon States should harbour feelings of insecurity. The latest effort by the nuclear-weapon States to remedy the situation, which had taken the form of Security Council resolution 984 (1995), together with individual statements on negative security assurances, were too little and too late. It was an obvious attempt by those States to provide a "sweetener" conducive to an indefinite extension of the Treaty rather than a real move to allay the fears of the non-nuclear-weapon States. The nuclear-weapon States parties should set a time-frame for the elimination of all nuclear weapons, provide greater security assurances to the non-nuclear-weapon States, and recognize and respect the binding nature of nuclear-weapon-free zones. The States outside the Treaty should become State parties as soon as possible to ensure its universality. However, the Treaty should not be perceived as a system that perpetuated the status quo.
35. One of the more positive developments under the Treaty was the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, as established by the Treaties of Tlatelolco and Rarotonga. Thanks to the efforts of ASEAN, south-east Asia also should soon have a nuclear-weapon-free zone. It was to be hoped that the treaty being drafted for that purpose would encourage similar trends in other parts of Asia, particularly in the Middle East, and in Africa and Europe.
36. A further positive aspect of the Treaty was the contribution it had made in the area of applications of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. Unfortunately, the recently reinstated export control requirements were an impediment to the international exchange of nuclear materials and equipment for peaceful purposes under the Treaty.
37. Malaysia supported the strengthening of the IAEA safeguards regime; however, the legal implications of those measures would need to be studied in greater detail. It should be noted also that the resources for the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes through the IAEA Technical Cooperation Fund were in a downward trend. That decline, together with the practice of not giving preferential treatment to States parties over non-parties, meant that only a part of article IV was being implemented. Positive discrimination in favour of States parties would encourage non-parties to accede. Malaysia also expected the monitoring and verification of nuclear materials and activities to be equally applicable to nuclear-weapon States. It therefore welcomed the offer by some nuclear-weapon States to open their peaceful nuclear facilities to IAEA inspection.
38. Despite certain misgivings in connection with the operational aspects of the Treaty, Malaysia was strongly supportive of its extension. It feared, however, that such an extension might permanently divide the world into nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States. It would also tend to confer legality on the possession and use or threat of use of nuclear weapons of mass destruction. Lastly, it would remove for ever the opportunity to utilize the Treaty as a legitimate means of once and for all eliminating nuclear weapons from the face of the earth.
39. For the reasons given, Malaysia found it difficult to support an indefinite extension of the Treaty. Nuclear weapons were immoral and should be declared illegal. Extension of the Treaty should be limited to a fixed period or periods pegged to a schedule of disarmament measures which the nuclear-weapon States must take, leading ultimately to a nuclear-free world. That was not an ideal but rather a specific initiative which could take shape if all the provisions of the Treaty were implemented. Extending the Treaty indefinitely and unconditionally would be a bar to changing the status quo and would mean rejecting once and for all the doctrine of nuclear deterrence.
40. Mr. TAYLHARDAT (Venezuela) said that, from the very beginning of the nuclear era, the need to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons had been overriding. Although the risk of a nuclear holocaust had practically disappeared, the danger of nuclear-weapons proliferation was always present and had even increased. The possibility that some countries might try to acquire nuclear weapons currently added to the danger that unscrupulous elements might traffic in nuclear products without concern for the destabilizing effects on international security. It was therefore of the most critical importance to strengthen further the international non-proliferation system. Accordingly, Venezuela supported without reservation the Treaty and the global non-proliferation system, of which the Treaty of Tlatelolco, establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Latin America and the Caribbean, was an essential piece.
41. The Non-Proliferation Treaty was probably one of the most paradoxical international instruments. After the Charter, it was the multilateral instrument which had garnered the support of the largest number of States. It had slowed the spread of nuclear weapons and promoted cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. However, the Treaty was also the source of deep resentment, because of both the inequalities it perpetuated and the lack of balance with which it was applied. The non-nuclear-weapon States had faithfully fulfilled their obligations. The nuclear Powers, on the other hand, had not fully honoured their commitments to end all nuclear testing, to pursue good-faith disarmament negotiations to halt the nuclear arms race, to stop production of nuclear weapons, to reduce existing arsenals, to dismantle nuclear warheads and their delivery systems and, lastly, to conclude a treaty on general and complete disarmament.
42. It was true that substantial progress had been made in recent years in the context of bilateral agreements between the United States and the Russian Federation: the arms race had virtually ceased and large quantities of nuclear warheads and missiles had been destroyed. Collateral measures had also been taken to slow vertical proliferation. However, it should be noted that those achievements did not result directly from the obligations embodied in the Treaty but were a fortunate effect of the end of the cold war and the trust which had developed between the two nuclear super-Powers. It should not be forgotten, either, that the world currently contained more nuclear weapons than it had in 1970.
43. Venezuela did not underestimate the importance of Security Council resolution 984 (1995) on negative and positive security assurances or the accompanying unilateral statements of the nuclear Powers. But, in order not to look like a last-ditch effort, those steps should have been taken earlier. Venezuela shared the Secretary-General's opinion that Council resolution 984 (1995) should go hand in hand with specific measures and be transformed into a legally binding instrument.
44. That was the climate of controversy in which the international community must take action of critical importance in determining the framework for the conduct of future international relations and the future shape of world security. All countries were aware of the dangers of the spread of nuclear weapons and wanted the Treaty to continue to shield them from the monstrous instrument of destruction which nuclear weapons represented. That was why the greatest care must be taken with the elements on which the decision to extend the Treaty would be based.
45. According to his delegation, those elements were: first, the decision must strengthen the Treaty and facilitate the attainment of its objectives; secondly, it must be the result of a consensus, since if adopted by a small majority or without the support of major and representative countries of the third world, the Treaty, like the non-proliferation system as a whole, would be unavoidably weakened; thirdly, it must be faithful to the spirit and letter of article X, paragraph 2, which stipulated as a prerequisite for extension the fulfilment of the obligations assumed by all the States parties; fourthly, it must maintain the verification machinery consisting of review conferences every five years; fifthly, it must ensure the maintenance of transfers of technology for peaceful purposes provided for in article IV; and, lastly, it must preserve the link between the renewal of the Treaty and the fulfilment of the obligations assumed by the nuclear Powers. The States parties must be able to call the Treaty into question; otherwise, its discriminatory character would be further accentuated.
46. Venezuela intended to submit to the Conference a formal proposal embodying the aforementioned conditions. The proposal would have the effect of extending the Treaty on the same terms and conditions as those on which it had been based originally: it could be extended for further periods of 25 years, it would be the subject of review conferences every five years, and every 25 years a conference of States parties would be convened to decide on its extension. Accordingly, the States parties could, if satisfied with the results obtained in the area of nuclear disarmament, decide to extend the Treaty for an indefinite period. On the other hand, they could opt for one of the formulas provided for in article X, paragraph 2.
47. Venezuela's proposal would not entail any amendment of the Treaty, since it did not alter the current text at all, and it in no way excluded the possibility of convening another extension conference. The decision to extend the Treaty should be accompanied by a firm and solemn commitment on the part of the nuclear Powers to intensify their efforts to fulfil all the obligations they had assumed and to work effectively towards complete disarmament. Such a commitment would help to reduce the discriminatory nature of the Treaty and would have to be embodied in the documents recording the results of the review of the implementation of the Treaty. That valuable instrument could therefore continue to provide a means of pressuring the nuclear Powers to honour fully their commitments and thereby to contribute to the complete elimination of nuclear arsenals.
48. Mr. PARK (Republic of Korea) said it was extremely satisfying to note that the number of States parties to the non-proliferation Treaty continued to increase; he once again urged those countries which had not yet signed the Treaty to do so at the earliest possible date. His country had acceded to the treaty in 1975, had signed a full-scope safeguards agreement with IAEA in the same year and was fully committed to non-proliferation, as could be seen from the 1992 Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, in which it had pledged not only to forego the development, possession and deployment of nuclear weapons, but also to give up reprocessing and enrichment facilities. His country, which was situated in close proximity to two nuclear-weapon States, a State having a very advanced civilian nuclear programme and North Korea, which had yet to ensure nuclear transparency, was in a uniquely precarious location, especially in the light of the recent serious threat of nuclear proliferation on the Korean peninsula. That had not prevented his country from faithfully implementing the provisions of the Treaty and remaining fully committed to preserving its integrity.
49. It was necessary to bolster confidence in the Treaty, which was the only viable and practical means of curbing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and to rectify the Treaty's shortcomings, especially those relating to fairness and equity in its implementation. It would be unrealistic to ignore the protests concerning the different treatment accorded to States according to whether or not they possessed nuclear weapons. Only when the legitimate concerns raised by those disparities had been addressed would it be possible to attain fully the objectives of the Treaty with regard to nuclear disarmament, enhance the security of all States parties and foster cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy.
50. The objectives of the Treaty were interlinked and mutually complementary, and all must be treated with equal weight if the integrity of the Treaty was to be preserved. That had rarely been the case, for although an overwhelming number of non-nuclear-weapon States had cooperated fully in preventing nuclear proliferation, there had been exponential increases in the nuclear arsenals of the nuclear-weapon States since the Treaty had come into effect and it was only recently that progress towards nuclear disarmament had begun with the conclusion of the intermediate nuclear forces Treaty and the START I and START II treaties. His delegation hoped that those treaties would encourage other States to follow suit and would be implemented promptly and effectively. It urged the nuclear-weapon States to exert further efforts to make major reductions in their nuclear arsenals.
51. It welcomed the adoption of Security Council resolution 984 (1995) and fully supported the ongoing negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a comprehensive test-ban treaty. It also welcomed the moratorium on nuclear testing maintained by the United States, Russia, France and the United Kingdom and hoped that China would join the moratorium soon.
52. It likewise hoped that the negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons would begin soon in Geneva.
53. The best way of addressing the concerns expressed about the transfer of know-how and technology for peaceful uses of nuclear energy would be to make distinctions among States according to their behaviour. For example, preferential treatment should be given to States which had a solid history of honouring the provisions of the non-proliferation Treaty, while strict sanctions should be imposed on those States which had not respected their obligations under that treaty.
54. The IAEA safeguards measures were integral components of the Treaty, whose effectiveness would be enhanced by a strengthening of the IAEA inspection system. His delegation supported the 93 + 2 programme put forward by IAEA, which would strengthen the inspection regime and enhance the transparency of national nuclear policies. His country attached great importance to the role of the State system of accounting and control of nuclear materials and in April 1994 had even established a technology centre for nuclear control to enhance nuclear transparency. It was convinced that the establishment of similar national inspection systems by other countries could contribute effectively to the work of IAEA and looked to the latter for support in such efforts.
55. With regard to the crisis created recently by North Korea's refusal to comply with its obligations under the Treaty, he said that North Korea's nuclear activities threatened peace and security not only in the Korean peninsula but also in north-east Asia and could have serious implications for the implementation of the IAEA safeguards agreement. His delegation believed that the Agreed Framework concluded on 21 October 1994 in Geneva between the United States and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea could solve that problem and invited North Korea to implement faithfully all the provisions of that instrument, to ensure the total transparency of its nuclear programme under the safeguards agreement it had concluded with IAEA, and to comply fully with the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.
56. Lastly, his country believed that the Treaty, which was the only global and nuclear non-proliferation treaty and was a basic norm-setting instrument in the field of nuclear non-proliferation, and which had also served as the model for all the major international arms control agreements, was essential to the enhancement of international peace and security and should therefore be extended indefinitely.
57. Mr. SHENK (Slovakia) said he was convinced that the Conference would further the use of nuclear energy exclusively for peaceful purposes. His delegation fully associated itself with the statement made by the representative of France on behalf of the European Union and the associated countries of Central and Eastern Europe; his country was ready to cooperate actively in the elimination of the most destructive type of weapons of mass destruction.
58. Although Slovakia firmly rejected the use of nuclear weapons, it had a large civilian nuclear programme, of which nuclear power generation was one of the main components; nuclear power plants accounted for about half of the country's total generation of electricity.
59. His country considered that IAEA, with which it enjoyed productive cooperation, made a pivotal contribution to the promotion of international cooperation in the peaceful uses of atomic energy and played an irreplaceable role in the implementation of the non-proliferation Treaty, using its safeguards system to prevent fissile materials from being converted for military purposes. That system was a generally recognized international mechanism whose importance was growing with the increasing number of nuclear installations and had recently proved its usefulness. It could be greatly strengthened by applying it to fissile materials. Furthermore, the progress made in the reduction of nuclear military potential since the most recent Review and Extension Conference promised well for the future.
60. Slovakia adhered strictly to the obligations arising from the application of safeguards to nuclear materials and installations situated in its territory. It supported all measures designed to strengthen the safeguards system and increase its effectiveness. In particular, it endorsed the implementation of advanced methods going beyond currently applied practices (environmental monitoring, expanded right of access to information, "no-notice" inspections, etc.).
61. His country viewed the Treaty as an exceptionally important global mechanism that could play a dominant role in the prevention of nuclear proliferation, reduce the risk of nuclear conflict and promote cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. An issue inseparable from the nuclear disarmament problem was that of a ban on the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and the drafting of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. That treaty, which had rightly been the main focus of the discussions at the 1994 Conference on Disarmament and should be again in 1995, should lead to the establishment of an efficient international monitoring system that would make it possible to identify and measure effects related to nuclear explosions. His delegation supported the early drafting, conclusion and entry into force of a treaty ending all nuclear explosions once and for all, without any exception, and considered observance of the nuclear test-ban moratorium to be an important element in the preparation of that text. It welcomed the fact that the Conference on Disarmament had established an ad hoc committee to negotiate a ban on the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices.
62. Slovakia, which did not possess any nuclear weapons and felt threatened by their existence, supported all initiatives in favour of nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament and had greatly appreciated the coordinated declarations of 6 April 1995 in which the nuclear-weapon States had pledged not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States which were parties to the non-proliferation Treaty and to give immediate assistance to any non-nuclear-weapon State that was the victim of a nuclear attack. Those declarations, like resolution 984 (1995) adopted recently by the Security Council, represented an important element of the security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States.
63. His country supported the indefinite and unconditional extension of the non-proliferation Treaty, which it viewed as an important means of guaranteeing international security and strengthening confidence and stability. It welcomed the growing number of accessions to the Treaty, including those of Belarus, Kazakhstan, Ukraine and South Africa, and the destruction of South Africa's military nuclear potential.
64. Mr. WOLZFELD (Luxembourg) said he endorsed the statement made by the representative of France on behalf of the European Union and the six associated central and eastern European countries and was pleased to note that a very large number of countries had acceded to the Treaty and, in particular, that 173 of the 178 States signatories to the Treaty had renounced the possession of atomic weapons. He also noted that since the entry into force of the Treaty, whose importance and decisive influence was undisputed among the States Parties, the number of nuclear-weapon States had remained practically the same, apart from a few "threshold" countries which had the capacity to manufacture atomic weapons. It was hard to imagine what the current state of the world would be without the Treaty.
65. He recognized that the situation was far from perfect, and particularly regretted the fact that some 10 countries had not yet decided to accede to the Treaty, that some of them presented a serious problem for the international community because of their ambiguous position regarding nuclear non-proliferation and that several States Parties to the Treaty had not honoured the commitments they had undertaken and had tried to develop nuclear weapons. On the other hand, he noted that the vast majority of countries scrupulously respected the arrangements entered into under the Treaty.
66. Recalling that that Treaty also contained provisions that should facilitate the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, he said that his country had decided against installing the capacity for producing nuclear energy in its territory but none the less benefited from a number of peaceful applications of such energy. Luxembourg, which had acceded to the Treaty 20 years earlier, had always pursued a strict policy of nuclear non-proliferation and, being anxious to prevent sensitive nuclear materials from being used for terrorist activities or nuclear programmes of a non-peaceful nature, had established a solid infrastructure to combat the illicit traffic in such materials, whose transfer it permitted only if it was sure that they could not be used for military purposes.
67. He also recalled that although all States Parties to the Treaty agreed on the need to maintain the Treaty in force, they had not yet decided whether it should be extended for one or more fixed-term periods or for an indefinite period. His country was in favour of an indefinite extension of the Treaty, which it considered to be the only acceptable solution and the only means of achieving the objectives set in the area of nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. Indeed, the other options could result in the lapse of the Treaty, sooner or later, and confront the international community with a legal vacuum in the matter of nuclear non-proliferation. That risk was particularly unacceptable as the renegotiation of the Treaty in current circumstances, or periodic reviews of the Treaty, accompanied at the end of each term by a vote on its continuation or cessation, the outcome of which would depend on the results achieved in nuclear disarmament, would be dangerous because it could create a climate of uncertainty and distrust and produce effects quite different from those anticipated, delaying nuclear disarmament and promoting the resumption of the arms race.
68. Referring to the efforts made to achieve complete nuclear disarmament, he said that the recent adoption by the Security Council of a resolution on the provision of "negative" and "positive" security assurances to the non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty was an important step forward. It would have been better, however, if the nuclear-weapon States waited for more substantial results in the field of nuclear disarmament, even if some real progress had already been made in that field. He also regretted the fact that those Powers had not reached agreement on the conclusion of a treaty on the complete and final cessation of nuclear tests, accompanied by a verification system.
69. Luxembourg was in favour of strengthening the IAEA safeguards, of prohibiting the production of fissile materials for the manufacture of explosives and of placing all non-military plutonium under the control of IAEA. Those initiatives which, thus far, had mainly been no more than projects and statements of intention, should be carried out and based on the non-proliferation Treaty which, in spite of its imperfections, was the only universal instrument in the field of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, constituted one of the basic legal foundations of the IAEA controls and ensured the strategic and political stability that would permit accelerated nuclear disarmament.
70. Mr. DE SILVA (Sri Lanka) said that the non-proliferation Treaty had never been considered an end in itself but was more in the nature of a road-map for evolving a security order in which nuclear weapons were never meant to be a permanent feature. It was not the task of the Conference simply to choose between an indefinite or limited extension of the Treaty. The Treaty must be able to respond to the continually evolving challenges of peace and security. The length of the extension should not be viewed in terms of mutually exclusive options. While the political atmosphere surrounding the Conference was propitious, much remained to be done in the matter of nuclear disarmament, and it was particularly necessary to eliminate national arsenals, the doctrine of nuclear deterrence and the diffusion of nuclear weapons.
71. The review of articles I and II of the Treaty would indicate that the general norm of nuclear non-proliferation had remained intact. The serious compliance problems which had emerged during the period under review showed that the Treaty needed strengthening as experience was gained through treaty practice. One important lacuna in the treaty verification regime derived from the fact that, under article III, the IAEA safeguards applied only to declared facilities. Yet several of the compliance concerns arose from activities related to undeclared facilities. The review conferences were the only forums accessible to all States Parties in which those questions could be addressed on an equal footing. Consideration might be given to the possibility of creating a verification mechanism based on the treaty regimes of the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological Weapons Convention. A body of that nature would not require any amendment to the Treaty.
72. While a good consensus needed to be reached on the safeguards regime, it was also necessary to make an honest appraisal of the mounting problem of plutonium stocks and the related question of latent proliferation. Less than a third of plutonium stocks and an even smaller quantity of enriched uranium were under international safeguards. The security and environmental threats were considerable, and commercial or political interests should not be allowed to mask the gravity of that problem or the problem of the smuggling of nuclear material.
73. The strengthening of conventional safeguards must be supplemented by an international treaty regime governing fissile material. Such a treaty could enable the "threshold" States also to join an international non-proliferation regime on a non-discriminatory basis. Hence the importance of addressing the issue of stocks existing at a certain point in time. The offer of voluntary and limited application of safeguards by nuclear-weapon States would not be sufficient to generate confidence among States Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty which were situated in a geopolitical environment of unrestrained nuclear activity.
74. The application of articles III and IV of the Treaty, on the peaceful uses of nuclear technology and material, deserved close attention. The complex problems of dual-use technology, the gaps in the safeguard regime and the suspicions against certain States Parties were questions that would continue to present formidable challenges to the Treaty regime. States Parties should look at contemporary methods and technologies of verifying compliance without hindering the satisfaction of the legitimate development needs of the safeguard-abiding States Parties. Article IV, paragraph 2, designed to promote solidarity and cooperation among States Parties remained an underutilized provision. The fuller utilization of that provision could elevate the Treaty regime to a broader framework for security and cooperation.
75. Article VI represented one of the core issues before the Conference. The nuclear-weapon States could not overlook the fact that article VI was a commitment yet to be fulfilled. It could not be interpreted as an encumbrance which would militate against the long-term viability of the Treaty. His delegation was confident that the Conference would take a positive and firm decision concerning the long-term extension of the Treaty. Commitments under article VI would provide the necessary political platform for a stronger decision. That decision should be underpinned by a consensus or by an overwhelming majority, otherwise there would be an avalanche of doubts.
76. Nuclear non-proliferation could not be isolated from nuclear disarmament. As was shown by the Chemical Weapons Convention concluded in 1992, a non-proliferation regime could only endure if it was conceived in an overall disarmament perspective. That was the essence of article VI, and the time had come to at least begin to rethink the existing security policies.
77. An unambiguous commitment to nuclear disarmament should be one of the principal results of the Conference. It was important to conclude a comprehensive test-ban treaty as early as possible. A comprehensive convention on fissile material could encourage the threshold States to gravitate towards global non-proliferation arrangements. Clear and unconditional security assurances in a legally binding form should be given to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty. It was those States which, through their scrupulous compliance with the provisions of the Treaty, had established the near universal norm of nuclear non-proliferation. The least that the nuclear-weapon States could do was to give them legally binding assurances.
78. With respect to the regional aspects of non-proliferation, he was happy to note that the idea of a nuclear-weapon-free zone continued to gain ground in Africa. Unfortunately, that was not the case in the Middle East. In Sri Lanka's own region, South Asia, militarily significant countries had yet to conclude bilateral or multilateral treaties on nuclear non-proliferation. Disturbing concepts were currently being advanced in the region whereby current policies of nuclear ambiguity were giving rise to new heresies, such as the concept of "non-weaponized deterrence". Such new doctrinal developments could neither advance regional security nor promote global stability and understanding. They were matters of particular concern to States Parties in the region which scrupulously complied with their Treaty obligations. His delegation therefore urged the nuclear-weapon States to be more forthcoming in advancing measures, such as the adoption of a treaty regulating fissile material and a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. Such measures would encourage the threshold States to join in non-discriminatory non-proliferation arrangements within the framework of an internationally supervised verification regime.
79. His delegation would work assiduously to promote a consensus on the long-term extension of the Treaty in its entirety. It believed that such an approach would enhance the confidence of the current States Parties, allay the security concerns of at least some of the States which remained outside the Treaty, and promote universality.
80. Mr. SALLAL (Kuwait) said that the non-proliferation Treaty had had a positive impact on the maintenance of international peace and security and on efforts to achieve nuclear disarmament. He therefore urged all States to accede to it. His country had been among the first to sign the Treaty as well as among the first to sign the partial test-ban Treaty and all the Protocols related to weapons of mass destruction, including bacteriological and chemical weapons.
81. The experience of Kuwait and the countries of the Gulf region in recent years did not support the view that accession to the Treaty was, in itself, a guarantee of international good conduct. Effective compliance with, and voluntary implementation, in good faith of, the spirit and letter of the Treaty were the only true criteria. The Iraqi occupation of Kuwait, the liberation war which had followed and the various resolutions adopted by the United Nations Security Council, especially resolution 687 (1991) and the various stages of its implementation, had revealed the existence of a vast clandestine nuclear-weapons programme. Those activities were in flagrant violation of the safeguards agreement concluded with IAEA and an infringement of the commitments entered into by Iraq under the Treaty, especially those pertaining to articles II and III thereof. Furthermore, the critical information obtained by the international inspection teams had shown that there were significant gaps in the international effort aimed at the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear weapons, and that the Iraqi regime had shamelessly exploited those gaps. For those reasons and out of a concern about the need to strengthen and improve the system of assurances and its implementation by all States, Kuwait unreservedly endorsed the proposals calling for an increase in the efficiency of the system, to which all nuclear facilities, whether declared or undeclared, should be subject. It also supported the proposal that States parties should be required to subject all exchanges of fissile materials and related devices and equipment to the system of assurances, even if such exchanges took place with States which had not acceded to the Treaty.
82. Recalling that the non-proliferation Treaty had contributed to the realization of significant achievements and, in particular, to the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones in certain parts of the world, in accordance with article VII, he said that his country shared the deep concern of the other Arab States over Israel's refusal to accede to the Treaty, an attitude which was an obstacle to the establishment in the Middle East of a region free of weapons of mass destruction. In that connection, the League of Arab States had recently issued a statement in which it had stressed the universality of the Treaty and urged all States to accede to it; reaffirmed the support of the Arab States for the Treaty and its objectives and for the realization of its universality; and emphasized that securing peace and stability in the Middle East required the elimination of all weapons of mass destruction and that Israel's refusal to accede to the Treaty and to subject its nuclear facilities to the system of assurances constituted a threat to regional security and damaged the Treaty's credibility.
83. His delegation welcomed the bilateral Treaties concluded between the United States and the Russian Federation on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms (START I and START II), which should contribute to the reduction of nuclear arsenals. It hoped that the other nuclear-weapon States would take similar steps, in accordance with the provisions of those Treaties.
84. His delegation had followed closely the work of the Conference on Disarmament and welcomed the positive results achieved. In particular, it noted with satisfaction that progress had been made in the negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty, which should lead to the conclusion of a full agreement before the end of 1995 or early in 1996. It also welcomed the establishment of an ad hoc committee to prepare a treaty prohibiting the production of fissile materials for the manufacture of nuclear weapons, since that would make it possible to tackle the issue of the stockpile of fissile materials and thereby facilitate the establishment of an efficient control system which would increase the transparency and effectiveness of the non-proliferation system. It also believed that Security Council resolution 984 (1995) was very constructive and hoped that multilateral negotiations would soon begin with the aim of reinforcing the assurances offered by the nuclear-weapon States to the non-nuclear-weapon States within the framework of a binding international treaty prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States.
85. Kuwait was all the more committed to the strict implementation of the non-proliferation Treaty, since the ordeal which it had endured during the Iraqi occupation had demonstrated the importance of international cooperation to the maintenance of peace and security, as well as the danger of the random stockpiling and export of weapons, particularly weapons of mass destruction.
86. Mr. NOBILO (Croatia) said that the unstable and challenging times that had followed the end of the cold war required the reinforcement of the non-proliferation regime.
87. Croatia had become a party to the Treaty shortly after attaining independence, in June 1992. It had demonstrated its commitment to the objectives of non-proliferation by concluding a comprehensive safeguards agreement with IAEA in June 1994. It had also acceded to the International Convention on Nuclear Safety, which it regarded as an instrument for improving the safety of nuclear power plants. For that reason, it believed that the indefinite extension of the Treaty was the best way to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and to develop research into and the production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, in conformity with article IV. It was also strongly committed to strengthening the safeguards system, especially with respect to the detection of undeclared activities.
88. While it was committed to the indefinite and unconditional extension of the non-proliferation Treaty, however, Croatia was fully aware of its inherent inequalities and of the shortcomings in its implementation. It was therefore most important to ensure strict compliance with all the provisions of the Treaty if a more secure international environment was to be created at the threshold of the twenty-first century.
89. The Review and Extension Conference offered a unique opportunity for the nuclear-weapon States to reconfirm, in the strongest possible terms, their obligation under article VI to "pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control".
90. Although some progress had been made, particularly in the Conference on Disarmament, Croatia believed that further progress was essential. It hoped that the ad hoc committee responsible for negotiating a treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices would be established soon and that the negotiations would begin. The same applied to the multilateral negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty. The conclusion of legally binding instruments on those topics would help to make the disarmament process irreversible. Croatia therefore urged the nuclear Powers to submit to IAEA safeguards any nuclear installations that were transferred from military to civilian use and all excess fissile material in their possession. Croatia commended the Zangger Committee for having strengthened export control, thus making it possible to combat more efficiently illicit trafficking in or smuggling of nuclear material. Non-proliferation was especially important to Croatia in view of the threat to peace and security posed by Serbia's aggression against its neighbours Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Possession of nuclear weapons by one of the sides in that tragic conflict would have disastrous consequences. He therefore once again urged the Belgrade Government to accede to the non-proliferation Treaty, as the other successor States of the former Yugoslavia had already done.
91. The international community must deter aggression wherever it occurred, for otherwise the credibility of international instruments would be undermined and the temptation for certain countries to acquire nuclear weapons increased. The international community could not run that risk and must agree on an indefinite extension of the Treaty, complete nuclear transparency and the strengthening of cooperation in the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.
92. Mr. BILOA TANG (Cameroon) said that, 25 years after its entry into force, the non-proliferation Treaty, to which 178 of the 185 States Members of the Organization had acceded, was still of the utmost importance. Everyone hoped to see the world freed of the nuclear threat, but that necessarily entailed respect for all provisions of the Treaty. The balance of terror that had reigned during the cold war had led to an accumulation of nuclear arsenals. Furthermore, for obvious reasons of geopolitical strategy, military cooperation had been established between the nuclear Powers and some non-nuclear-weapon countries. That had led to horizontal proliferation and transfers of technology for military purposes, whereas cooperation for peaceful purposes, provided for in articles IV and V, had not yet produced the expected results, for some countries still had no access to technology.
93. Those shortcomings must be remedied if the Treaty was to become a truly global instrument, capable of promoting technological cooperation.
94. Since relations between States had always been based on force, including military force, permanent renunciation of nuclear weapons should be considered a sacrifice and a risk accepted by the 173 States Parties to the Treaty. That renunciation should therefore be accompanied by guarantees which should not be reduced to simple declarations of intent. Security Council resolution 984 (1995) would have been valuable if it had provided for implementation of the provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter to countries which used nuclear weapons against a country that had renounced such weapons in accordance with the Treaty.
95. Cameroon considered that the security safeguards should be strengthened through an internationally negotiated and binding legal instrument.
96. The progress made in the Conference on Disarmament was welcome. His country welcomed the establishment of committees to negotiate, respectively, an international test-ban treaty and a treaty banning production of fissile materials for military purposes. It would, of course, have been preferable for those two instruments, which must be binding and verifiable, to have been concluded before the current Conference.
97. It was regrettable that the detente resulting from the end of the cold war had not been accompanied by a reduction of the nuclear threat. The nuclear smuggling that was going on around the world was pernicious, for it could undermine the international efforts to eliminate proliferation. The international community should therefore take action and adopt forceful measures against those who failed to comply with international law. It should also strengthen the non-proliferation regime by encouraging the creation of nuclear-weapons-free zones in all regions of the world. In that connection, Cameroon welcomed the progress made towards the conclusion of a treaty on the denuclearization of Africa.
98. It was in the interest of the international community to pursue with determination its efforts to achieve nuclear disarmament by strengthening the non-proliferation regime. Cameroon therefore considered that the continued existence of the non-proliferation Treaty was essential in order to attain the goal of general and complete disarmament, due account being taken of the legitimate concerns of all parties.
99. Mr. KIM (Democratic People's Republic of Korea), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that the South Korean authorities were not qualified to speak about the nuclear question in the Korean peninsula. It was those authorities which had allowed foreign forces to introduce nuclear weapons into the peninsula, exposing the entire nation to the risks of a nuclear holocaust. It was totally incongruous for them to express concern about a nuclear threat from the North while saying nothing about the foreign nuclear weapons aimed at their compatriots in the North or about the nuclear programmes they were conducting in secret. If there was a nuclear threat it came from the south of the Korean peninsula and not the north. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States had demonstrated responsibility in implementing the "Agreed Framework". The problem was that the South Korean authorities were seeking to oppose that agreement by arguing that they should play a central role in its implementation, although they had no right to participate. In fact, they were motivated only by the sinister aim of seeking to make up for the failure of their past efforts to interfere in the talks between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States. It was essential to ensure that the efforts of the South Korean authorities to prevent the full implementation of the Agreed Framework did not succeed. If those authorities achieved their aims, the situation in the Korean peninsula would deteriorate seriously, against his country's will and to the great detriment of the peoples of the region.
100. Mr. LEE (Republic of Korea), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that the accusations made by the representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea were groundless. The Director-General of IAEA had told the Conference that IAEA had had grounds for indicating in its report to the Security Council that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was not respecting its safeguards agreement, that nuclear materials might have been diverted and that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had rejected a special inspection request from IAEA. In the interest of general respect for the guarantees and obligations deriving from the non-proliferation Treaty, it was to be hoped that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea would submit a new statement of nuclear materials and authorize IAEA to inspect its installations as soon as possible. The statement by the Director-General of IAEA was bound to create doubts about the credibility of North Korea's allegations concerning a South Korean nuclear programme. The Republic of Korea had unilaterally renounced any possibility of developing nuclear weapons, as announced in December 1991 in a presidential declaration on a denuclearized Korean peninsula. Since the signing of a safeguards agreement with IAEA in November 1975, all nuclear installations in the Republic of Korea had been subjected to IAEA inspection. There was total transparency in that regard. If the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had doubts about those inspections, immediate verification could be undertaken by agreement between that country and the Republic of Korea. The Republic of Korea once again invited the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to open bilateral talks with it and to begin by applying the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula signed in 1992.
101. Mr. KIM (Democratic People's Republic of Korea) said it had been the consistent policy of his Government to make the Korean peninsula a nuclear-weapons-free zone. The Joint Declaration represented great progress with regard to peace and security in the peninsula. It was, however, currently ineffective because the South Korean authorities were not supposed to involve themselves in questions relating to nuclear weapons. It was pointless at the current stage to refer to talks between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea or to the Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Peninsula. It was necessary, first of all, to resolve the nuclear issue between the United States and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Only when that issue had been settled in the way envisaged in the Agreed Framework could North and South Korea begin to implement the Declaration. His delegation therefore urged the South Korean authorities not to impede the implementation of the Agreed Framework. If there were nuclear weapons in South Korea, there had never been such weapons in the North, not even a single atomic bomb. The nuclear threat obviously came from the South. However, the South Korean authorities would never have a role to play in the resolution of the nuclear issue in the Korean peninsula because they had no say in the matter.
102. Mr. LEE (Republic of Korea) said he regretted the further unreasonable statement just made by the representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and felt that no representative present would have faith in the efforts of the North Korean delegation to denigrate the Republic of Korea, in the light of what North Korea had said and done on the international scene. The international community clearly understood that those accusations against the Republic of Korea were erroneous and unfounded.
The meeting rose at 6.30 p.m.