1995 Review and Extension Conference
of the Parties to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
18 April 1995
New York, 17 April - 12 May 1995
OTHER ACTIVITIES RELEVANT TO ARTICLE III
Background paper by the United Nations Secretariat
I. INTRODUCTION .............................................. 1 - 2
II. BACKGROUND ................................................ 3 - 28
1. General ............................................. 3 - 8
2. NPT Exporters' Committee (Zangger Committee) ........ 9 - 14
3. "London Group"............. ....................... 15 - 20
4. Review Conferences,the "Zangger Committee"
and the "London Group" ............................ 21 - 28
III. MAIN DEVELOPMENTS SINCE THE FOURTH NUCLEAR
PROLIFERATION TREATY REVIEW CONFERENCE .................. 29 - 42
I. Communications received from members regarding the export
of nuclear material and of certain categories of equipment
and other materal ........................................
II. Communications received from certain member States regarding
guidelines for the export of nuclear material, equipment and
technology: nuclear transfers ...........................
III. Communications received from certain member states regarding
guidelines for the expoet of nuclear material, equipment and
technology: nuclear-related dual-use transfers ..........
1. At its second session, held from 17 to 21 January 1994, the Preparatory Committee for the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) invited the Secretary-General of the United Nations to prepare for the Committee at its third session, to be held from 12 to 16 September 1994, a number of background papers regarding the implementation of various articles of the Treaty (General Assembly resolution 2373 (XXII), annex). Pursuant to that request, the United Nations Secretariat submitted those background papers to the Preparatory Committee at its third session. In reviewing the papers, the States parties expressed general appreciation for the work done and requested the Secretariat to update and revise, as appropriate, the background papers, taking into account various specific observations and suggestions made on that occasion. In that connection, the Secretariat was specifically requested to cover also the issue of export control regimes, which had not been dealt with in the pertinent background papers as initially submitted.
2. In the course of the fourth session of the Preparatory Committee, the Secretariat informed the States parties of its intention, in the context of updating and revising the background papers, to provide them also with factual information on export-control regimes as Part II of the background paper dealing with Article III of the Treaty. At its meeting on 27 January 1995, the Committee took note of that information. The present paper is submitted accordingly.
3. The regulation of nuclear exports became an issue of international concern with the beginning of the nuclear era itself. Over the years, various ideas have been expressed and specific proposals advanced with the objective of promoting international cooperation in the broad field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy for the benefit of all States, while at the same time preventing nuclear proliferation. Over that period, policies on nuclear exports were elaborated in various national and international contexts. In the 1960s, consideration of the issue received additional impetus from growing expectations of the benefits of nuclear energy and was also given greater urgency by the apprehensions about the potential proliferation of nuclear-weapon technology. These two aspects -- peaceful benefits and the threat of nuclear proliferation -- prompted the international community, irrespective of the political and ideological differences that existed in international relations at the time, to try to develop a common approach.
4. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of nuclear weapons of 1968 represented the first successful global multilateral effort to lay down basic rules regarding nuclear exports, facilitating their peaceful application while precluding their diversion to nuclear explosive uses. Article IV, paragraph 1, of the Treaty made clear that it did not affect the inalienable right of its parties to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I and II. Article IV, paragraph 1, reads as follows:
"1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I and II of this Treaty." Paragraph 2 further committed the parties to facilitate, and granted them the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for such purposes. The Treaty also commits parties in a position to do so to cooperate in further development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty and with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world. Article IV, paragraph 2, reads as follows:
"2. All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also cooperate in contributing alone or together with other States or international organizations to the further development of the application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapons States Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world."
5. In this connection, Article I of the Treaty requires nuclear-weapon States not "in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon States to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices". In addition, paragraph 1 of article III spells out the safeguards requirements that non-nuclear-weapon States parties must meet to benefit from the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Each such State wishing to benefit from the peaceful uses undertakes to accept the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) "for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfillment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty" Article III, paragraph 1, reads as follows:
"1. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency's safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfillment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons of other nuclear explosive devices. Procedures for the safeguards required by this article shall be followed with respect to source or special fissionable material whether it is being produced, processed or used in any principal nuclear facility or is outside any such facility. The safeguards required by this article shall be applied on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere." (see NPT/CONF.1995/7/Part I).
6. Paragraph 2 of article III, however, stipulates specific obligations of all States parties -- both nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States -- "not to provide: (a) source or special fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by this article". Article III, paragraph 2, reads as follows:
"2. Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide (a) source or special fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use of production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source of special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by this article."
7. The Treaty did not, however, provide a definition of what was meant by the terms "source or special fissionable material" or "equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material". Clarifications of these terms was pursued by an informal group of nuclear suppliers shortly after the Treaty entered into force in 1970. The interpretations and specifications that resulted from that effort were first published in 1974 and are commonly referred to as the "Zangger Guidelines" (after the first chairman of the Group, Mr. Claude Zangger). Subsequently another group, open also to non-Party suppliers, published additional guidelines in 1978.
8. Some of the export guidelines subsequently led to differences in position between various developing recipient States and suppliers. One criticism expressed by developing recipient States was related to the manner in which suppliers handled the matter. Developing States argued that those matters should not be considered in informal groups outside the framework of the mechanism of the Treaty itself nor, more importantly, without their involvement in working out the export guidelines. On their part, the supplier countries, who on the whole were also major recipients, have maintained that the main purpose of their policies was to give all States confidence that nuclear cooperation would take place in a manner consistent with the Treaty's principles by (a) facilitating such a cooperation, and (b) enhancing global and regional stability by assuring, through adequate safeguards, that supplies would be used only for peaceful purposes.
B. NPT Exporters' Committee (Zangger Committee)
9. Following the entry into force of the Treaty, in 1970, a group of States began holding informal and, at the time, confidential meetings in Vienna to discuss how to implement their obligations under Article III (2). The group met under the formal name of the "NPT Exporters' Committee", but became better known as the "Zangger Committee". The group decided that its status should be informal and that its decisions would not be legally binding upon its members but would serve as a basis for harmonized national policies. As suppliers or potential suppliers of nuclear material and equipment, the States members of the Committee set as their objective to reach a common understanding regarding the definition of items listed under article III, paragraph 2 (a) and (b), and the conditions and procedures that would govern the export of such items. One guiding principle of the Committee was that the regulations to be applied should not disturb fair international commercial competition and that each item on its list should meet the criterion of the Treaty, namely, be "especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of nuclear material".
10. After a series of meetings held between March 1971 and August 1974, the Committee reached consensus on basic understandings that were described in two separate memoranda. The export of items included in these memoranda triggers a request by the supplier that the conditions of supply set out in those memoranda should apply. Those conditions are designed to ensure that items on the "trigger list" cannot be exported or re-exported to a non-nuclear-weapon State not party to the NPT unless they are covered by a non-explosive use assurance, IAEA safeguards and re-export provisions, that is, such recipients of an exported item are not to re-export it without requiring the same conditions. The trigger list was accompanied by an annex, which provided more detailed clarifications and definitions of the items contained in memorandum B.
11. Those documents were made public on 14 August 1974. The understandings were formally accepted by individual members of the Committee by an exchange of notes among themselves, which committed them to give effect to the understandings through respective domestic export-control legislation. In parallel with that procedure, most members wrote identical letters to the Director General of IAEA informing him of their decision to act in conformity with the conditions set out in the understandings. The content of the letters was communicated to all States members of the Agency on 3 September 1974 and issued as IAEA document INFCIRC/209 (see annex I).
12. Memorandum A dealt with the export of commodities described in article III, paragraph 2 (a), of the NPT (source or special fissionable material). It states that the definition of that term will be that contained in article XX of the IAEA Statute. Memorandum B covered export of commodities referred to in Article III, paragraph 2 (b) (equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material). As published in 1974, it defines plants, equipment and material in the following categories: reactors and equipment therefor; non-nuclear materials for reactors; plants for the reprocessing of irradiated fuel elements and equipment especially designed or prepared therefor; plants for the fabrication of fuel elements; and equipment, other than analytical instruments, especially designed or prepared for the separation of isotopes of uranium.
13. At the time the trigger list was first agreed upon, the supplier States considered that limiting the application of safeguards to entire facilities in the nuclear-fuel cycle would be sufficient to hinder any diversion from legitimate uses of nuclear technology. With further rapid technological advances in the field, the members of the Committee felt, however, that it was necessary to make adjustments accordingly. Consequently, in subsequent years, both the memoranda and their annex were regularly reviewed by the Committee and clarified in order to take into account technological developments and to add greater precision and clarity to items on the list to be controlled. Those reviews and consequential clarifications were conducted on the basis of consensus, using the same procedure followed in the adoption of the original understandings. In the period up to the 1990 NPT Review Conference, the following clarifications had been made, all of which were published as modifications of the original document (INFCIRC/209).
(a) In December 1978, memorandum B was amended to include new headings, "plants for the production of heavy water, deuterium and deuterium compounds and equipment especially designed or prepared therefor", and to alter the section already in it on zirconium tubes (INFCIRC/209/Mod.1). The inclusion of the first item was prompted by the London Group (see para. 18) on the grounds that since the export of heavy water was already covered by the trigger list, it was only logical that plants for the production of this material should be subject to safeguards as well;
(b) In February 1984, additions concerning gas centrifuge enrichment equipment were made to the annex to the trigger list in order to clarify the items covered by the list heading in memorandum B on "Equipment, other than analytical instruments, especially designed or prepared for the separation of isotopes" (INFCIRC/209/Mod.2), a technological development that had taken place in the course of the preceding decade;
(c) In August 1985, additions concerning fuel-reprocessing plants were made to the annex in order to clarify the item covered by the trigger list heading in memorandum B, "Plants for the reprocessing of irradiated fuel elements, and equipment especially designed or prepared therefor" (INFCIRC/209/Mod.3);
(d) In February 1990, additions concerning gaseous diffusion enrichment equipment were made in order to clarify the items covered by the trigger list heading in memorandum B, on "Equipment, other than analytical instruments, especially designed or prepared for the separation of isotopes" (INFCIRC/209/Mod.4).
14. Unlike non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT, which under article II, have already renounced nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and under Article III, paragraph 1, have accepted safeguards on all their peaceful nuclear activities, and under Article III, paragraph 2, have accepted the obligation not to export the items specified therein without requiring safeguards on them, States not-parties to the NPT were not under such an obligation. Tthe Committee therefore included, among the understandings governing their exports to non-nuclear weapon States not party to the Treaty, the following basic conditions of supply:
(a) Source or special fissionable material, either directly transferred or produced, processed or used in the facility for which the transferred item is intended, shall not be diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;
(b) Source or special fissionable material, as well as equipment and non-nuclear material, shall be exported only to a non-nuclear-weapon State not party to the Treaty if subject to safeguards under an agreement with the IAEA;
(c) Source or special fissionable material, as well as equipment and non-nuclear material, shall not be re-exported to a non-nuclear-weapon State not party to the Treaty unless the recipient State accepts safeguards on the re-exported item.
3. The London Group
15. Following India's detonation of a nuclear device in 1974, several major supplier States decided to undertake a new review of the guidelines regulating nuclear exports. Their objective was to ensure that the controls of major suppliers, even if not parties to the NPT, were harmonized and to improve non-proliferation controls, particularly with respect to transfers to States not parties to the Treaty. The Group, because of the venue of its meetings, became initially known as the "London Group".
16. By 1978, following a series of meetings, the Group had reached agreement on a set of guidelines regarding export of items related to peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In the process, the Group was further expanded.
17. These original "London Guidelines" were published by the IAEA in February 1978 (INFCIRC/254) upon request of the Group. The Guidelines, by and large, incorporated the work of the Zangger Committee, but in some respects went beyond it in several areas. Thus, as regards the - non-explosive use assurance, safeguards, transfer approval rights (see para. 14) -- the London Guidelines identified two more criteria to be met by a recipient State: (a) to apply physical protection measures on nuclear material on the basis of the recommendations in IAEA document INFCIRC/225 and, (b) to accept that any facility that was built on the basis of the know-how of certain supplied technology (the know-how clause) would be put under safeguards.
18. The items subject to the conditions of supply set out in the guidelines were those previously identified by the work of the Zangger Committee, but with the addition of one new item to the Trigger List ("plants for the production of heavy water, deuterium, and deuterium compounds and equipment especially designed therefor") and a clarification of the items covered by the trigger List heading "Equipment, other than analytical instruments, especially designed or prepared for the separation of isotopes" (separation plant equipment), (see para. 13, above).
19. Finally, the guidelines introduced some entirely new requirements in respect to sensitive facilities, technology and weapons-usable materials. These essentially required suppliers to exercise special care in the export of such items, for example reprocessing and isotope separation facilities.
20. Following the publication of the London Guidelines in February 1978, the Group did not meet until after the 1990 Review Conference. Its members felt that they would not at that stage be able to add much to what had already been accomplished and which could not be done within the framework of the Zangger Committee, whose members continued to meet regularly in order to review its trigger List and to clarify it as necessary.
D. Review Conferences, the Zangger Committee and the London Group
21. The four Review Conferences held up to 1990 dealt in one way or the other with the work of the Zangger Committee and the London Group. The attitude towards the two was markedly different, however. This followed the perception, held largely by the developing countries, that the Zangger trigger List clarified the conditions of supply established by the NPT, while the London Guidelines went beyond the legal framework of Article III, paragraph 2. This became even more the case when the re-established Nuclear Suppliers Group in 1991 introduced a second area of nuclear items to be subject to export controls, the "nuclear-related dual use items", an area which in the opinions of the developing countries was not properly defined.
22. As regards the Zangger Committee, the first three conferences recognized and, in fact, endorsed its work, without explicitly referring to the Zangger Committee. Thus, the Final Declaration of the first Review Conference in 1975, adopted by consensus, contained the following language:
"With regard to the implementation of Article III, paragraph 2, of the Treaty, the Conference notes that a number of States suppliers of material or equipment have adopted certain minimum standard requirements for IAEA safeguards in connection with their exports of certain such items to non-nuclear-weapon States not party to the Treaty (IAEA document INFCIRC/209 and addenda). The Conference attaches particular importance to the condition, established by those states, of an undertaking of non-diversion to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, as included in the said requirements." NPT/CONF.I/35/1, annex I, p.3.
The Declaration went on to urge that "common export requirements relating to safeguards be strengthened, in particular by extending the application of safeguards to all peaceful nuclear activities in importing States not Party to the Treaty". ibid.
23. The second Review Conference, held in 1980, was unable to agree on a final declaration, owing to disagreements pertaining to the implementation of Article VI of the Treaty and whether full-scope safeguards should be a condition of supply. While from the outset recognizing the need to clarify Article III, paragraph 2, of the Treaty, and subsequently accepting the Zangger trigger list not necessarily as a preferable option but still as a generally acceptable mechanism for promoting export for the purpose of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the reaction of non-nuclear-weapon States to the London Guidelines was negative.
24. These countries believed that the London Group had exaggerated the threat of the potential misuse of peaceful uses of nuclear energy and, consequently, introduced the restrictions on exports of nuclear material, which made it more difficult for these countries to acquire the technology needed to help them take full advantage of nuclear power for their economic development. In the opinion of the developing countries the mere publication of the Guidelines was not sufficient. They continued to reiterate the longstanding request that they be actively involved in this work as well. An attempt to do so was made after the Second NPT Review Conference in 1980 through the establishment of an IAEA Board of Governors Committee known as the Committee on Assurances of Supply, which still exists but is no longer active. The proponents of the Guidelines, on the other hand, saw them as largely designed to broaden safeguard coverage in non-parties and to harmonize all suppliers' approaches, both to ensure that non-proliferation objectives would be met as well as to remove non-proliferation from the area of commercial competition.
25. At the time the third Review Conference was held in 1985, this had changed. While many of the misgivings related to export-control regimes remained, they were increasingly related to political principles, such as the equality of all States parties, rather than primarily to their potentially negative effect on the economic development of developing States. There was also a growing fear in the international community of the possible proliferation of nuclear-weapon technology to non-nuclear-weapon States, both party and non-party to the NPT. All of these developments, in various degrees, made it possible for the Review Conference to adopt unanimously a Final Declaration, which in its relevant parts, once again, expressed support for the work of the Zangger Committee, but without naming it explicitly. The Declaration stated: NPT/CONF.III/64/I, annex I, p.5, Para. 13.
"The Conference believes that further improvement of the list of materials and equipment which, in accordance with Article III, paragraph 2, of the Treaty, calls for its application of IAEA safeguards should take account of advances in technology."
The Declaration went even further as regards full-scope safeguards by recommending that nuclear suppliers take effective steps towards achieving such a commitment by their customers. All these views and recommendations expressed by the Review Conference were subsequently reflected in the work of the Zangger Committee (see paras. 35-36).
26. The developments which facilitated the adoption of the Final Declaration by consensus at the 1985 Review Conference came into even sharper focus at the Fourth NPT Review Conference in 1990. Many countries, including the United States of America and most European States, had placed, or experienced, temporary moratoriums on the construction of new nuclear power plants in response to the spiralling costs involved in building them and the lingering question of their safety prompted by the Chernobyl reactor accident in 1986. The concerns related to suspicions that some "threshold States", both party and non-party to the Treaty, might be involved in acquiring nuclear weapons technology, and that some might already have done so, not only by clandestine activities but also by taking advantage of certain loopholes in the export regimes, have provided a strong impetus to convergence of views on some aspects of the export controls and safeguard mechanisms. They have, however, also led subsequently to divergence of views between supplier and developing countries in the approach to the whole issue, in particular regarding further elaboration of the conditions of supply for nuclear items following revitalization of the London Group as the Nuclear Suppliers Group in 1991 and the introduction of the "nuclear-related dual-use regime" (see para. 31).
27. Although the Review Conference was unable in 1990, as in 1980, to agree on a final declaration, owing once again to disagreements regarding Article VI of the Treaty, its deliberations provided a significant foundation for better understanding of the concerns of the parties. In accordance with established practice, the issues pertaining to article III were dealt with in Main Committee II. The report of the Committee on its work contained several important references to those issues which were clearly the result of a carefully balanced compromise. Thus, the report stated that the "non-proliferation and safeguards principles in the Treaty are essential for peaceful nuclear commerce and cooperation". Further, the document referred to the Zangger Committee by name for the first time and provided a brief description of its aims and practices, recommending that its trigger list be reviewed periodically, and urged all States to adopt the Zangger Committee's requirements for any nuclear cooperation with a non-nuclear-weapon State not-party to the NPT. However, in response to developing countries' concerns, the document also emphasized that the export requirements should not hamper the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The relevant part of the report containing various recommendations with regard to the work of the Zangger Committee read as follows: NPT/CONF.IV/DC/I/Add.3 (a), p.5, para. 27.
"The Conference notes that a number of states parties engaged in the supply of nuclear material and equipment have met regularly as an informal group which has become known as the Zangger Committee in order to co-ordinate their implementation of article III, paragraph 2. To this end, these states have adopted certain requirements, including a list of items triggering IAEA safeguards, for their export to non-nuclear-weapon states not party to the treaty, as set forth in the IAEA document INFCIRC/209 as revised. The Conference urges all states to adopt these requirements in connection with any nuclear co-operation with non-nuclear-weapon states not party to the Treaty. The Conference recommends that the list of items triggering IAEA safeguards and procedures for implementation be reviewed from time to time to take into account advances in technology and changes in procurement practices. The Conference recommends the States parties to consider further ways to improve the measures to prevent diversion of nuclear technology for nuclear weapons, other nuclear explosive purposes or nuclear weapon capabilities. While recognizing the efforts of the Zangger Committee in the non-proliferation regime, the Conference also notes that items included in the 'trigger list' are essential in the development of nuclear energy programmes for peaceful uses. In this regard, the Conference requests that the Zangger Committee should continue to take appropriate measures to ensure that the export requirements laid down by it do not hamper the acquisition of such items by States parties for the development of nuclear energy for peaceful uses."
28. In other sections the report of Main Committee II made two further recommendations: in the first recommendation, it urged all non-nuclear-weapon States "to make an internationally, legally binding commitment not to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and to accept IAEA safeguards on their peaceful nuclear activities, both current and future, to verify that commitment". At the same time, as a complementary measure, the report urged all the nuclear supplier States "to require as a necessary condition for the transfer of relevant nuclear supplies to non-nuclear-weapon States under new supply arrangements, such a commitment and acceptance of such safeguards"; and in a second recommendation, it "recognized that there are items of equipment and materials, including tritium not identified in NPT Article III, paragraph 2, that are relevant to the proliferation of nuclear weapons and therefore to the NPT as a whole". Ibid., p.3, para. 18. The report went on to say:
"Without prejudice to existing principles guiding international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, especially article IV of the NPT, the Conference in this regard calls for early consultations among States to ensure that their supply and export controls are appropriately coordinated".
III. MAIN DEVELOPMENTS SINCE THE FOURTH NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION
TREATY REVIEW CONFERENCE
29. Following the 1990 Review Conference, a number of steps were taken by States parties that reflected their desire to take into account new developments in international relations, which had heightened concerns about possible diversion of nuclear technology to non-peaceful purposes. Iraqi's breach of its commitments under the Treaty was particularly alarming and significantly galvanized the resolve of the international community to close the loopholes in the system of export control regimes. All these events had a direct impact on the work of both the Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers Group.
30. At the invitation of the Netherlands, the Nuclear Suppliers Group resumed regular meetings in March 1991. Since then, the Group, which had meanwhile expanded its membership to 30 States, met three more times, at Warsaw in 1992, Lucerne in 1993 and Madrid in 1994. The next meeting is scheduled to take place in Helsinki in April 1995. Currently, the Nuclear Suppliers Group consists of the following members: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovak Republic, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and United States.
31. The meeting at Warsaw agreed on a new set of Guidelines for Transfers of Nuclear-Related Dual-Use Equipment, Material and Related Technology, along with an annex listing such items. This was published in July 1992 as INFCIRC/254/Rev.1/Part 2 (see annex III), while the original Guidelines on Nuclear Transfers were simultaneously reissued as INFCIRC/254/Rev.1/Part 1 but in a new format and incorporating all the clarifications to the Zangger Committee trigger list that had been made up till then (see annex II).
32. The meeting of the Nuclear Suppliers Group at Warsaw also agreed that the Guidelines on Nuclear Transfers should be amended to make full-scope safeguards a condition of supply. This was formally achieved at the Groups Lucerne meeting, and the Guidelines were then reissued in July 1993 in appropriately amended form as INFCIRC/254/Rev.1/Part 1/Mod.1. Subsequently some further changes were made to the Groups nuclear trigger list, two reflecting similar changes to the Zangger Committee's and a further one unique to the Nuclear Suppliers Group list. These changes were published in April 1994 as INFCIRC/254/Rev.1/Part 1/Mod.2.
33. At its meeting in Madrid, the Nuclear Suppliers Group also decided to amend its nuclear Guidelines: to prevent non-Group members from importing items from Group members and then re-exporting them to non-nuclear-weapon States without requiring full-scope safeguards; and to insert a new guideline to the effect that:
"Notwithstanding other provisions of these Guidelines, suppliers should authorize transfer of items identified in the Trigger List only when they are satisfied that the transfers would not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices."
These changes to the Guidelines are incorporated in INFCIRC/254/Rev.1/Part 1/Mod.3, published in November 1994.
34. Currently, part 1 of the Nuclear Suppliers Group Guidelines consist of the following documents: (a) the Guidelines proper, (b) the trigger list" (annex A), (c) the clarifications to the trigger list (annex B), and (d) the criteria for levels of physical protection (annex C).
35. For its part, the Zangger Committee, which has never ceased its work since 1971, continued to hold its meetings at Vienna twice a year. With the exception of Argentina and New Zealand, which is presently a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, but not the Zangger Committee, and the Republic of Korea, which has been invited to observe the work of the Committee, the membership of the two forums - the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee - is the same. The Committee has agreed on two more clarifying amendments, which were made public in the usual manner as modifications to IAEA document INFCIRC/209 (See annex I).
(a) In May 1992, an amendment was introduced further to clarify plants for the production of heavy water, deuterium and deuterium compounds, and associated equipment (INFCIRC/209/Rev.1/Mod.1);
(b) In October 1993 agreement was reached over the interpretation of paragraph 6 of Memorandum A attached to INFCIRC/209/Rev.1, to ensure that safeguards will be applied to export of bulk quantities of source material intended for non-nuclear use;
(c) Finally, in April 1994, further clarifications to the enrichment section were made and a modification of the entry on "Primary Coolant Pumps" to include water pumps was introduced (INFCIRC/209/Rev.1/Mod 2).
36. The Zangger Committee has focussed its attention in recent years on the question of whether or not facilities for the conversion of uranium fall under the definition of article III, paragraph 2. This matter is under review.
37. Thus, over the years, two groups of suppliers -- the Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Suppiers Group -- although generally dealing with the same subject-matter of nuclear export controls, have emphasized different aspects of the issue. The Zangger Committee, which derives its existence from the NPT, is concerned with the interpretation of supplier commitments under article III, paragraph 2, while the Nuclear Suppliers Group, in addition to the development of a trigger list largely identical to that of the Zangger Committee, has in recent years focused also on the proliferation impact of dual-use equipment and technology. The two groups, with almost identical membership, continue to work along these lines.
38. As noted earlier, since the inception of the export-control regimes, developing countries have expressed, to varying degrees, their concerns and, at times, strong objections to what they perceived as even more stringent conditions of supply of nuclear materials, which, they felt, were harmful to their economic development, in general, and discriminatory in nature, in particular. They voiced their concerns on numerous occasions and in different forums. The recurrent theme in the statements was the demand for the respect of the principle of long-term assurance of supply. In this connection , these countries have repeatedly recalled paragraph 5 of the Final Declaration of the 1985 Review Conference, adopted by consensus,which in conjunction with the review of article IV and preambular paragraphs 6 and 7 of the Treaty, stated the position of the States parties as follows:
"The Conference recognizes the need for more predictable long-term supply assurances with effective assurances of non-proliferation. " NPT/CONF.III/64/I.
This principle was also part of the terms of reference of the Committee on Assurances of Supply mentioned in paragraph 24. Apart from the substantive aspects of the issue, developing countries have continued to express misgivings regarding the form and procedure under which the supplier States pursue their work. They consider that great transparency and involvement of recipient States in this work is necessary.
39. Developing countries parties to the Treaty also object to what they consider insufficient differentiation on the part of suppliers between recipient States parties and non-parties to the Teaty. In this context reference is more to the draft of the Final Declaration of the Fourth Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference with respect to the implementationof article IV, which recalls that in all activities designed to promote the peacefil uses of nuclear energy, preferential treatment [should] be given to the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty which have concluded the required safeguards agreement with IAEA, taking the needs of developing countires particularly into account. NPT/CONF.IV/DC/1/Add.3.
40. The most recent occasion on which these views were expressed by a large group of States was the Eleventh Ministerial Conference of the Movement of the Non-Aligned Countries, held in Cairo from 31 May to 3 June 1994. A/49/287-S/1994/894 and Corr.1. In the section on disarmament and international Security of the Final Document of the Conference, the non-aligned developing States made the following reference to the NPT and the question of export-control regimes: Ibid., para. 66.
"The Ministers expressed their objection to the continued functioning of ad-hoc export-control groups on the pretext of non-proliferation of armaments, since they could impede the economic and social development of developing countries. They reiterated the need for multilaterally negotiated, universal, comprehensive and non-discriminatory disarmament agreements to address proliferation problems."
41. On the other hand, supplier States point out that the requirement for export controls is well established and their benefits are widely recognized. For example, in addition to the various recommendations of NPT Review Conferences, in 1992 the members of the United Nations Security Council, meeting at the level of Heads of State and Government issued a statement that, inter alia, said: S/23500. The membership of the Security Council in January 1992 was as follows: Austria, Belgium, Cape Verde, China, Ecuador, France, Hungary, India, Japan, Morocco, Russian Federation, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Venezuela and Zimbabwe.
"On nuclear non-proliferation, they note the importance of the decision of many countries to adhere to the non-proliferation Treaty and emphasize the integral role in the implementation of that Treaty of fully effective IAEA safeguards, as well as the importance of effective export controls."
42. These States point out that the General Assembly, at its forty-ninth session, adopted resolution 49/65by a vote of 161 to none with 6 abstentions, the third preambular paragraph of which recognized "the importance of the work of the Agency in promoting the further application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, as envisaged in its statute and in accordance with the inalienable right of State parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and other relevant internationally legally binding agreements that have concluded relevant safeguards agreements with the Agency to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I and II of the Treaty, other relevant articles and with the object and purposes of the Treaty."