Former Yugoslavia - UNPROFOR

UNITED NATIONS PROTECTION FORCE

BACKGROUND

Serious fighting in Croatia began in June 1991 when that Republic and its northern neighbour, Slovenia, declared themselves independent from Yugoslavia,2/ and Serbs living in Croatia, supported by the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA), opposed this move. Efforts by the European Community to stop the hostilities in mid-1991 and to resolve the crisis in the framework of the Conference on Yugoslavia had proved unsuccessful.

The United Nations became actively involved in the situation in Yugoslavia on 25 September 1991 when the Security Council, meeting at the ministerial level, unanimously adopted its resolution 713 (1991) expressing deep concern at the fighting in that country and calling on all States to implement immediately a "general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Yugoslavia". The Council commended and fully supported the efforts already undertaken by the European Community and its member States, with the support of the States participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), to restore peace and dialogue in Yugoslavia. By its resolution, the Council invited the Secretary-General to offer his assistance in consultation with the Government of Yugoslavia and all those promoting the peace efforts.

On 8 October 1991, then Secretary-General Javier P‚rez de Cu‚llar appointed Mr. Cyrus Vance, former United States Secretary of State, as his Personal Envoy for Yugoslavia. Thereafter, the Secretary-General and his Personal Envoy maintained constant contact with all the parties to the conflict, with the Presidency of the European Community, with the Chairman of the CSCE-participating States, with Lord Carrington, then Chairman of the European Community's Conference on Yugoslavia, and with other interested parties in their efforts to find a solution to the crisis. It soon became clear that the most valuable contribution the United Nations could make at that stage was a peace-keeping operation to create the necessary conditions for the pursuit of political negotiations for a peaceful settlement.

As part of the collective effort to stop the fighting and to find a peaceful solution to the conflict, the Secretary-General's Personal Envoy undertook several missions to Yugoslavia and discussed with all parties concerned, among other things, the feasibility of deploying a United Nations peace-keeping operation. On 23 November, the Personal Envoy convened in Geneva a meeting which was attended by the Presidents of Serbia and of Croatia and the Secretary of State for National Defence of Yugoslavia, as well as Lord Carrington. During the meeting, the Yugoslav parties reached agreement on an immediate cease-fire and on a number of other issues. Each of the Yugoslav parties expressed the wish to see the speedy establishment of a United Nations peace-keeping operation. However, while progress was made on the other issues, the cease-fire broke down almost immediately.

On 27 November, the Security Council, by its resolution 721 (1991), approved the efforts of the Secretary-General and his Personal Envoy, and endorsed the statement made by the Personal Envoy to the parties that the deployment of a United Nations peace-keeping operation in Yugoslavia could not be envisaged without full compliance by all parties with the Geneva agreement. During subsequent weeks of intensive negotiations with the parties concerned, the implementation of the Geneva agreement was pursued and the general principles were defined for a United Nations peace-keeping operation. On 15 December, the Security Council, by its resolution 724 (1991), approved the Secretary-General's report which contained a plan for a possible peace-keeping operation. A small group of military officers, civilian police and United Nations Secretariat staff travelled to Yugoslavia to prepare for the implementation of this plan.

Thereafter, the Secretary-General and his Personal Envoy focused their efforts on consolidating the cease-fire and on securing unconditional acceptance of the United Nations plan by all parties to the conflict, including assurances of their readiness to cooperate fully in its implementation. Keeping the Security Council informed of these efforts and the developments in the country, the Secretary-General reported on several occasions that, despite widespread support in Yugoslavia for a United Nations peace-keeping operation, the necessary conditions for its establishment still did not exist.

On 2 January 1992, as part of his attempts to remove the remaining obstacles, the Personal Envoy convened in Sarajevo a meeting between military representatives of the Republic of Croatia and representatives of the JNA, at which the Implementing Accord on the unconditional cease-fire was signed. With the Security Council's concurrence, the newly elected Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, then sent to Yugoslavia a group of 50 military liaison officers, with the task of using their good offices to promote maintenance of the cease-fire by facilitating communication between the two sides and by helping them to resolve difficulties that might arise. In the meantime, the Personal Envoy, the United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Peace-keeping Operations and their team continued their efforts to secure the cooperation of all Yugoslav parties in implementing the United Nations plan for a peace-keeping operation.

On 15 February 1992, notwithstanding the fact that certain political groups in Yugoslavia were still expressing objections to the United Nations plan, the Secretary-General recommended to the Security Council the establishment of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR). In making this recommendation, he stressed that, in his view, the danger that a United Nations peace-keeping operation would fail for lack of cooperation from the parties was less grievous than the danger that delay in its dispatch would lead to a breakdown of the cease-fire and to a new conflagration.

On 21 February, the Security Council, by its resolution 743 (1992), approved the report and established UNPROFOR for an initial period of 12 months. The Council confirmed that the Force should be an interim arrangement to create the conditions of peace and security required for the negotiation of an overall settlement of the Yugoslav crisis within the framework of the European Community's Conference on Yugoslavia. It requested the Secretary-General to deploy immediately those elements of UNPROFOR which could assist in developing an implementation plan for the earliest possible full deployment of the Force.

On 7 April, after receiving a report from the Secretary-General on 2 April that all the Force Commander's interlocutors had emphasized the need for the earliest possible deployment of UNPROFOR, the Security Council, by its resolution 749 (1992), authorized the full deployment of the Force.

UNPROFOR:FEBRUARY 1992 - FEBRUARY 1993
The operational mandate of UNPROFOR extends to five Republics of the former Yugoslavia - Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia,3/ Montenegro and Serbia - and it has a liaison presence in the sixth, Slovenia.

CROATIA

UNITED NATIONS PROTECTED AREAS
UNPROFOR is deployed in certain areas in Croatia, designated as United Nations Protected Areas (UNPAs), in which the United Nations Security Council judged that special interim arrangements were required to ensure that a lasting cease-fire was maintained. The UNPAs are areas in which Serbs constitute the majority or a substantial minority of the population and where inter-communal tensions have led to armed conflict. There are three UNPAs: Eastern Slavonia, Western Slavonia and Krajina. For United Nations purposes, they have been divided into four sectors: East, North, South and West.

The original United Nations plan in Croatia rests on two central elements: (a) the withdrawal of the JNA from all of Croatia and the demilitarization of the UNPAs; and (b) the continuing functioning, on an interim basis, of the existing local authorities and police, under United Nations supervision, pending the achievement of an overall political solution to the crisis.

UNPROFOR's mandate is to ensure that the UNPAs are demilitarized, through the withdrawal or disbandment of all armed forces in them, and that all persons residing in them are protected from fear of armed attack. To this end, UNPROFOR is authorized to control access to the UNPAs, to ensure that the UNPAs remain demilitarized, and to monitor the functioning of the local police there to help ensure non-discrimination and the protection of human rights. Outside the UNPAs, UNPROFOR military observers are to verify the withdrawal of all the JNA and irregular forces from Croatia, other than those disbanded and demobilized there. In support of the work of the humanitarian agencies of the United Nations, UNPROFOR is also to facilitate the return, in conditions of safety and security, of civilian displaced persons to their homes in the UNPAs.

UNPROFOR initially established its headquarters in Sarajevo, the capital of Bosnia and Herzegovina; it is now headquartered in Zagreb, the capital of Croatia.

ENLARGEMENTS OF MANDATE
Since the establishment of UNPROFOR, there have been several enlargements of its mandate in Croatia. On 30 June 1992, the Security Council, by its resolution 762 (1992), authorized UNPROFOR to undertake monitoring functions in the "pink zones" - certain areas of Croatia controlled by the JNA and populated by then largely by Serbs, but which were outside the agreed UNPA boundaries. It also recommended the establishment of a Joint Commission chaired by UNPROFOR and consisting of representatives of the Government of Croatia and of the local authorities in the region, with the participation of the European Community Monitoring Mission (ECMM), to oversee and monitor the restoration of authority by the Croatian Government in the "pink zones".

On 7 August 1992, the Security Council, by its resolution 769 (1992), authorized the enlargement of UNPROFOR's strength and mandate to enable the Force to control the entry of civilians into the UNPAs and to perform immigration and customs functions at the UNPA borders at international frontiers.

The third enlargement of UNPROFOR's mandate in Croatia came about on 6 October 1992, when the Security Council adopted its resolution 779 (1992), authorizing UNPROFOR to assume responsibility for monitoring of the demilitarization of the Prevlaka Peninsula near Dubrovnik. By the same resolution, the Council approved the Secretary-General's action to ensure the control by UNPROFOR of the vitally important Peruca dam, situated in one of the "pink zones" in Croatia.

RENEWED HOSTILITIES
On 22 January 1993, the Croatian Army launched an offensive in a number of locations in the southern part of UNPROFOR's Sector South and the adjacent "pink zones". The Croatian Government stated that it took this action out of impatience with the slow progress of negotiations in respect of various economic facilities in and adjacent to the UNPAs and "pink zones". On 27 January, the Croatian Army attacked and captured the Peruca dam. The Serbs responded to the Croatian offensive by breaking into a number of storage areas, which were under joint control under a double-lock system in the UNPAs, and by removing their weapons, including heavy weapons.

UNPROFOR warned both the Croatian Government and the Serb authorities not to attempt further incursions into the UNPAs. The Force also sought to limit the damage caused by the fighting, and made repeated representations to the parties concerned with a view to preventing escalation and bringing about a cease-fire.

On 25 January, the Security Council adopted its resolution 802 (1993), in which it demanded an immediate cessation of hostile activities by Croatian armed forces within or adjacent to the UNPAs and their withdrawal from these areas, an end to attacks against UNPROFOR personnel, return of all heavy weapons seized from UNPROFOR-controlled storage areas, and strict compliance by all parties with the terms of cease-fire arrangements. It called upon all parties to cooperate fully with the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia4/ and to refrain from any actions which might undermine efforts aimed at reaching a political settlement.

As to the implementation of this resolution, the Croatian Government on 26 January informed the Force Commander of UNPROFOR that, upon compliance by the Serb side with the various provisions of the resolution, they would remove their military, but not their police, from the areas they had taken. For its part, the Serb side stated that Croatia must return to its pre-22 January positions before the implementation of the remainder of the resolution could be considered.

Eventually, after several rounds of talks held under the auspices of the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, the Government of Croatia and the Serb local authorities signed an agreement regarding the implementation of resolution 802 (1993).

BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
Although the mandate of UNPROFOR originally related only to Croatia, it was envisaged that after the demilitarization of the UNPAs, 100 UNPROFOR military observers would be redeployed from Croatia to certain parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, in light of the deteriorating situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Secretary-General decided to accelerate this deployment by sending 40 military observers to the Mostar region of that Republic on 30 April 1992. In May, despite all diplomatic efforts by the European Community, the Secretary-General's representatives and UNPROFOR to negotiate a lasting cease-fire, the conflict - between the Bosnian Muslims and the Bosnian Croats on the one side and the Bosnian Serbs on the other - intensified. On 14 May, when risks to their lives reached an unacceptable level, the observers were withdrawn from the area and redeployed in the UNPAs in Croatia. About two thirds of UNPROFOR headquarters personnel also withdrew from Sarajevo on 16 and 17 May, leaving behind some 100 military personnel and civilian staff who lent their good offices to promote local cease-fires and humanitarian activities.

In a series of resolutions and statements, the Security Council appealed to all parties to bring about a cease-fire and a negotiated political solution, and demanded, inter alia, that all forms of interference from outside Bosnia and Herzegovina, including by JNA, as well as by the Croatian Army, cease immediately and that all local irregular forces be disbanded and disarmed.

On 30 May, acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, the Security Council, in its resolution 757 (1992), imposed wide-ranging sanctions on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (which by then consisted of Serbia and Montenegro), in order to help achieve a peaceful solution to the conflict. It also demanded that all parties create the conditions necessary for unimpeded delivery of humanitarian supplies to Sarajevo and other destinations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, including the establishment of a security zone encompassing Sarajevo and its airport. The Council requested the Secretary-General to continue using his good offices to achieve this objective.

SECURITY AT SARAJEVO AIRPORT
In keeping with the Council's request, UNPROFOR pursued negotiations with the parties to the conflict aimed at stopping the fighting around the airport and reopening it for humanitarian purposes. On 6 June 1992, the Secretary-General reported to the Council that UNPROFOR had negotiated, on 5 June, an agreement for the handing over to the Force of the Sarajevo airport. On 8 June, the Security Council, by its resolution 758 (1992), approved the enlargement of UNPROFOR's mandate and strength and authorized the Secretary-General to deploy military observers and related personnel and equipment to Sarajevo to supervise the withdrawal of anti-aircraft weapons and the concentration of heavy weapons at agreed locations in the city.

Following intensive work by UNPROFOR to establish modalities of implementation of the 5 June agreement, and a visit to Sarajevo by President Fran‡ois Mitterrand of France on 28 June, the Secretary-General reported to the Security Council, on 29 June, that Bosnian Serb forces had been withdrawing from the Sarajevo airport, and both sides - the Serb and the Bosnia Presidential forces - had begun to concentrate their heavy weapons in locations to be supervised by UNPROFOR. On the same day, the Council, by resolution 761 (1992), authorized deployment of additional elements of UNPROFOR to ensure the security and functioning of the airport. By 3 July, despite continued fighting in the area, United Nations observers and troops were deployed at the airport and at other locations in Sarajevo, and the airport was reopened for the humanitarian airlift.

PROTECTION OF HUMANITARIAN CONVOYS
On 13 August 1992, the Security Council, disturbed by the situation prevailing in Sarajevo, which severely complicated UNPROFOR's efforts to ensure the security and functioning of Sarajevo airport and the delivery of humanitarian assistance, adopted resolution 770 (1992). The Council, acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, called on States to "take nationally or through regional agencies or arrangements all measures necessary" to facilitate, in coordination with the United Nations, the delivery of humanitarian assistance to Sarajevo and wherever needed in other parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

In further discussions, however, it was decided that that task should be entrusted to UNPROFOR. On 10 September, following consultations with a number of Governments, the Secretary-General submitted a further report to the Security Council recommending the expansion of UNPROFOR's mandate and strength in Bosnia and Herzegovina. He proposed that UNPROFOR's task, under its enlarged mandate, would be to support efforts by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to deliver humanitarian relief throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina, and in particular to provide protection, at UNHCR's request, where and when UNHCR considered such protection necessary. In addition, UNPROFOR could be used to protect convoys of released civilian detainees if the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) so requested and if the Force Commander agreed that the request was practicable. UNPROFOR would be deployed in four or five new zones. In each zone there would be an infantry battalion group, whose headquarters would also include civilian staff to undertake political and information functions and liaison with UNHCR. UNPROFOR troops would follow normal peace-keeping rules of engagement, which authorize them to use force in self-defence, including situations in which armed persons attempt by force to prevent them from carrying out their mandate.

In resolution 776 (1992), which was adopted on 14 September 1992 and which made no reference to Chapter VII of the Charter, the Security Council approved the Secretary-General's report and authorized the enlargement of UNPROFOR's mandate and strength in Bosnia and Herzegovina for these purposes. A separate Bosnia and Herzegovina Command was established within UNPROFOR to implement resolution 776 (1992), in addition to Sector Sarajevo.

"NO-FLY ZONE"
In a further development, the Security Council, on 9 October 1992, adopted its resolution 781 (1992) banning all military flights in the airspace of Bosnia and Herzegovina, except for those of UNPROFOR and other flights in support of United Nations operations, including humanitarian assistance. The Council requested UNPROFOR to monitor compliance with the ban, and that it place observers, where necessary, at airfields in the former Yugoslavia. The Council also requested that the Force employ "an appropriate mechanism for approval and inspection" to ensure that the purpose of other flights to and from Bosnia and Herzegovina was consistent with its resolutions. It also called on States to provide technical assistance to UNPROFOR in its monitoring efforts. On 10 November, the Security Council adopted its resolution 786 (1992) authorizing the expansion of UNPROFOR's strength by 75 military observers to enable it to monitor airfields in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro).

BORDER CONTROL
On 16 November 1992, the Security Council adopted its resolution 787 (1992), in which, among other things, it considered that, in order to facilitate the implementation of the relevant Council resolutions, observers should be deployed on the borders of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and requested the Secretary-General to present his recommendations on this matter. The resolutions in question were: resolution 713 (1991), which, inter alia, established a general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Yugoslavia; resolution 752 (1992), which, inter alia, demanded that all forms of interference from outside Bosnia and Herzegovina, including by units of the JNA as well as elements of the Croatian Army, cease immediately; resolution 757 (1992), which imposed comprehensive mandatory economic sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro); and resolution 787 (1992), which, inter alia, demanded that all forms of interference from outside Bosnia and Herzegovina, including infiltration into the country of irregular units and personnel, cease immediately. V On 21 December, the Secretary-General submitted to the Council his recommendations. In the report, he indicated that in order to ensure compliance with the relevant Security Council resolutions, it would be necessary to give UNPROFOR a mandate which would include the right not only to search but also to turn back or confiscate military personnel, weapons, or sanctioned goods whose passage into or out of Bosnia and Herzegovina would be contrary to the decisions of the Council. He pointed out that a symbolic presence at selected crossing points would "not only fail to fulfil the Council's requirements, but would also undermine the already strained credibility of UNPROFOR". He proposed, therefore, an enlargement of UNPROFOR with some 10,000 additional troops to provide for a 24-hour observation and search operation at 123 crossing points on Bosnia and Herzegovina's border with neighbouring countries.

FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA
On 11 November 1992, the President of Macedonia conveyed to the Secretary-General a request for the deployment of United Nations observers in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in view of his concern about the possible impact on it of fighting elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia. Such deployment was also recommended by Mr. Vance and Lord Owen, Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia. With the Security Council's approval, the Secretary-General sent to Macedonia from 28 November to 3 December a group of military, police and civilian personnel to assess the situation and prepare a report concerning a possible deployment of UNPROFOR in that Republic.

On 9 December, the Secretary-General submitted to the Council a report in which he recommended an expansion of the mandate and strength of UNPROFOR to establish a United Nations presence on Macedonia's borders with Albania and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). He indicated that the Force's mandate would be essentially preventive, to monitor and report any developments in the border areas which could undermine confidence and stability in Macedonia and threaten its territory. The Secretary-General recommended that the enlargement of UNPROFOR comprise an estimated battalion of up to 700 all ranks, 35 military observers, 26 civilian police monitors, 10 civil affairs staff, 45 administrative staff and local interpreters. This contingent would operate under UNPROFOR's "Macedonia Command" with headquarters in Skopje, the capital of Macedonia. The Security Council, by its resolution 795 (1992) of 11 December, approved the Secretary-General's report and authorized the establishment of UNPROFOR's presence in Macedonia.

Subsequently, on 18 June 1993, the Security Council welcomed the United States offer to provide about 300 troops to reinforce UNPROFOR's presence in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. In adopting resolution 842 (1993), the Council authorized the deployment of the additional personnel.

REVIEW OF UNPROFOR ACTIVITIES
As already noted, UNPROFOR was established on 21 February 1992 by Security Council resolution 743 (1992) for an initial period of 12 months. On 10 February 1993, before the mandate of the Force expired, the Secretary-General submitted to the Council a report in which he summarized the activities of UNPROFOR and presented his recommendations on its future.

CROATIA
In analysing the situation in Croatia, the Secretary-General described UNPROFOR's experience there as a mixed one. Its principal success had been in ensuring the complete withdrawal of the JNA from the territory of Croatia, including the Prevlaka Peninsula. Until the fourth week of January 1993, UNPROFOR's presence had also helped to prevent a recurrence of hostilities in the UNPAs and "pink zones". However, non-cooperation by the local Serb authorities had prevented UNPROFOR from achieving the demilitarization of the UNPAs and the disarming of the Serb Territorial Defence and irregular forces in these areas and in the "pink zones". As a result, UNPROFOR had not been able to establish the conditions of peace and security that would have permitted the voluntary return of refugees and displaced persons to their homes in these areas. Nor had it been able to establish the border controls called for in resolution 769 (1992).

The civilian aspects of UNPROFOR's activities, notably the efforts of United Nations civilian police to prevent discrimination and abuse of the human rights of residents in the UNPAs, had not proved fully successful despite UNPROFOR's best efforts. An atmosphere of terror and intimidation existed in many parts of the four sectors through much of the first ten months of the mandate period. However, since November 1992, the situation had shown improvement in all but a few areas. The maintenance of law and order was gradually enhanced through the reorganization and redeployment of the local police.

However, while the non-cooperation of the local Serb authorities had seriously impeded implementation of the United Nations peace-keeping plan, the Croatian offensive on and after 22 January 1993, referred to above, had significantly altered the situation on the ground. The President of Croatia, Mr. Franjo Tudjman, declared that the willingness of his Government to agree to an extension of UNPROFOR's mandate was dependent on progress in a number of areas. He also urged the Council to grant UNPROFOR an enforcement mandate. For its part, the Serb leadership in the UNPAs had rearmed and remobilized its forces in response to the Croatian offensive and had received substantial reinforcements of Serb fighters from elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia. Serb militias had broken into storage depots holding heavy weapons placed there under the peace-keeping plan. The Serb side had also refused to enter into negotiations with the Croat side, or to return the heavy weapons taken from storage, unless the Croatian armed forces withdrew to the positions they occupied before the offensive. Such a withdrawal, in turn, was categorically rejected by the Croatian authorities.

In addition, the Secretary-General continued, the circumstances in which the peace-keeping plan was drafted and agreed in late 1991 and early 1992 had themselves changed. The plan was envisaged as an interim arrangement pending an overall political solution to the Yugoslav crisis. The Government of Croatia claimed there was no longer any "overall political solution" to negotiate. The only issue was the return of the UNPAs and the "pink zones" to Croatian control. The Serb leadership in the UNPAs, however, refused to consider these territories to be a part of Croatia and rejected talks on this basis, recalling that the plan was explicitly not intended to prejudge a political solution to the Yugoslav crisis. Further, the Serbs argued that two parties to the original plan, the President of Serbia and the Federal Yugoslav military authorities in Belgrade, no longer had recognized legal status in the areas where UNPROFOR was deployed. Therefore, the mandate and deployment of UNPROFOR now needed to be discussed anew with the Serbs representing the so-called "Republic of Serb Krajina".

In these circumstances, the Secretary-General saw three options with regard to UNPROFOR's mandate in Croatia: (1) to renew the mandate entrusted to UNPROFOR by resolution 743 (1992), with no change; (2) to modify that mandate; and (3) to give UNPROFOR no mandate in Croatia and confine its operations to Bosnia and Herzegovina and to Macedonia.

Referring to option one, the Secretary-General stated that the Government of Croatia made it clear that it could agree to a renewal of UNPROFOR's existing mandate only if certain conditions were met, including the complete disarmament of all paramilitary forces and militia in the UNPAs and the "pink zones" with a destruction of their heavy weapons, voluntary and unconditional return of all refugees and displaced persons to their homes in the UNPAs, maintenance of tight controls by the Force in those border areas where the boundaries of the UNPAs coincide with internationally recognized frontiers of Croatia; and restoration of Croatian authority in the "pink zones". The Government's position, in effect, required UNPROFOR either to negotiate results which - as a peace-keeping force relying on the cooperation of the parties - it had no power to compel the other side to accept, or to risk unilateral military action by the Government. In addition, the Croatian offensive had had a devastating effect on cooperation between UNPROFOR and the local Serb authorities, who felt "betrayed" by what they saw as UNPROFOR's failure to protect them, and had put in doubt the feasibility of a return to the original plan.

On the second option, the Secretary-General warned against any modification resulting in enforcement action, saying that such action would involve the danger of placing UNPROFOR in direct conflict with the Serbs. Enforcement would also require additional military forces and equipment which could not be deployed immediately upon the passage of an enforcement resolution by the Security Council. The mere passage of an enforcement resolution risked threatening the safety and security of United Nations peace-keeping personnel deployed in the UNPAs and some, perhaps most, troop-contributing countries might in these circumstances review their participation in UNPROFOR. Enforcement, the Secretary-General stated, "would be a fundamental contradiction of the nature and purpose of UNPROFOR's deployment in Croatia, as a peace-keeping force entrusted with the implementation of a plan agreed by all parties." As to an alternative modification of the mandate which would convert UNPROFOR into a buffer force deployed along the existing front lines in order to prevent a recurrence of hostilities, the Secretary-General did not believe that such an approach would receive the consent of the Government of Croatia.

Speaking of option three, the Secretary-General believed that the withdrawal of UNPROFOR from the UNPAs would almost certainly result in the resumption of large-scale hostilities in the areas of its deployment, nullifying the political effort and the material resources invested in ending the conflict that had raged for nearly a year before the deployment of UNPROFOR.

In the Secretary-General's judgement, the difficulties which UNPROFOR and the Security Council faced with regard to the Force's mandate in Croatia could be attributed to two principal factors: the inability to implement the peace-keeping plan; and the lack of an agreed settlement to the conflict between the Republic of Croatia and the Serb populations living in the UNPAs and the "pink zones". Unless these two factors were addressed, the Secretary-General concluded, a sound basis would not exist for renewing UNPROFOR's mandate in Croatia. Urgent efforts needed to be made to resolve the problems arising from the Croatian offensive, to establish a basis for completing the implementation of the United Nations peace-keeping plan and to agree on a framework for negotiating, within the principles of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, a settlement of the underlying dispute. The Secretary-General added that he had asked the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference to address these questions urgently with a view to establishing as soon as possible a basis on which a substantive recommendation could be made for an extension of UNPROFOR's mandate.

In the meantime, the Secretary-General recommended that the Security Council decide to extend UNPROFOR's existing mandate for an interim period up to 31 March 1993, in order to give the Co-Chairmen the necessary time.

BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
Speaking of UNPROFOR activities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where it had a more limited mandate, the Secretary-General noted in his February 1993 report that the Force had succeeded in keeping Sarajevo airport open, despite interruptions as a result of hostile military action against humanitarian aircraft. In the period from 3 July 1992 to 31 January 1993, the humanitarian airlift organized by UNHCR under UNPROFOR protection brought in 2,476 aircraft carrying 27,460 tons of food, medicines and other relief goods.

The operation to protect humanitarian convoys throughout the Republic had been persistently thwarted by obstruction, mines, hostile fire and the refusal of the parties on the ground, particularly, but not exclusively, the Bosnian Serb party, to cooperate with UNPROFOR. None the less, from the deployment of additional UNPROFOR battalions for this purpose in November 1992 until January 1993, a total of some 34,600 tons of relief supplies had been delivered to an estimated 800,000 beneficiaries in 110 locations throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Although the ban on military flights in the airspace of Bosnia and Herzegovina had been violated by all three parties on nearly 400 occasions since its imposition, it had achieved its principal purpose of preventing the use of air power in military combat in the Republic. UNPROFOR observers, using AWACS information made available by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), had found no evidence to suggest that any party had flown combat air missions, or conducted hostilities from the air, since the interdiction regime was established by the Council.

UNPROFOR's efforts in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Secretary-General pointed out, had been characterized by a regrettable tendency on the part of the host Government to blame it for a variety of shortcomings, whether real or imagined. Criticism of UNPROFOR's performance in the Republic had largely been directed at its failure to fulfil tasks that the Force had not been mandated, authorized, equipped, staffed or financed to fulfil. There had been a number of attacks on the Force by the Government and by elements answerable to it, both in public statements and declarations and, more seriously, through violence, resulting in several UNPROFOR fatalities.

As to UNPROFOR's mandate in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Secretary-General stated that it might need to be altered significantly when the outcome was known of the ongoing talks led by the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia.

FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA
Referring to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the Secretary-General considered it premature to draw conclusions about the practicability of the mandate and the effectiveness of the UNPROFOR Macedonia Command in this first preventive deployment operation in the history of United Nations peace-keeping.

INTERIM EXTENSION OF MANDATE
On 19 February 1993, having considered the Secretary-General's report, the Security Council adopted resolution 807 (1993), by which it extended UNPROFOR's mandate for an interim period until 31 March 1993. The Council demanded, inter alia, that the parties and others concerned comply fully with the United Nations peace-keeping plan in Croatia and their other commitments, and refrain from positioning their forces near the UNPAs and in the "pink zones". It invited the Secretary-General to take all appropriate measures to strengthen the security of the Force, in particular by providing it with the necessary defensive means.

The Council urged the parties and others concerned to cooperate fully with the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia in the discussions under their auspices in order to ensure full implementation of the United Nations peace-keeping mandate in Croatia. It also demanded the full and strict observance of all relevant Security Council resolutions relating to the mandate and operations of UNPROFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

UNPROFOR:MARCH 1993 - FEBRUARY 1994
CROATIA
MANDATE RENEWED
In accordance with Security Council resolution 807 (1993) mentioned earlier, the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia held several rounds of talks in New York and Geneva with representatives of the Government of Croatia and the Serb populations living in the UNPAs and the "pink zones". In his 25 March 1993 report to the Council, the Secretary-General stated that while some progress had been made in these talks, fundamental differences remained between the two sides. Having said that more time would be needed to bring the negotiations to a meaningful conclusion, he recommended the extension of UNPROFOR's mandate for a further interim period of three months. He urged the parties to cooperate in implementing UNPROFOR's existing mandate, and to resolve any remaining differences in a spirit of compromise and cooperation.

On 30 March, the Security Council, by adopting its resolution 815 (1993), extended the mandate of UNPROFOR for an additional interim period until 30 June 1993. It also decided to reconsider within one month, or at any time at the request of the Secretary-General, UNPROFOR's mandate in light of developments of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia and the situation on the ground. The Council requested the Secretary-General to report to it on how the United Nations peace plan for Croatia could be effectively implemented.

On 25 June, the Secretary-General submitted his further report on the situation in Croatia, in which he drew attention to the failure of the parties to permit implementation of the United Nations plan and to cooperate in establishing a political process leading to an early settlement. He noted, nevertheless, that the presence of UNPROFOR was indispensable for controlling the conflict, fostering a climate in which negotiations between the parties could be promoted, preventing the resumption or escalation of conflict, providing a breathing-space for the continued efforts of the peacemakers and for supporting the provision of essential humanitarian assistance. He also informed the Council that the termination of UNPROFOR's mandate at that point, in the judgement of his Special Representative, would risk the resumption of a major conflict in the region and cause severe adverse consequences for humanitarian relief operations. The Secretary-General recommended that the Security Council extend the mandate of the Force by a further three months, to 30 September 1993.

In its resolution 847 (1993) of 30 June 1993, the Security Council decided to extend UNPROFOR's mandate for an additional interim period terminating on 30 September 1993, and requested the Secretary-General to report after one month on progress towards implementation of the United Nations peace-keeping plan for Croatia and all relevant Security Council resolutions.

On 16 August, the Secretary-General reported to the Council on this matter. He recommended that no action be taken at that stage and said that he would submit a further recommendation to the Council in the latter half of September 1993.

IMPLEMENTATION OF RESOLUTION 802
Following the renewed outbreak of hostilities in Croatia, precipitated by the Croatian incursion into the UNPAs and "pink zones" on 22 January 1993, intensive efforts were made within the framework of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia and by UNPROFOR to bring about a cease-fire and a restoration of the prior status in accordance with Security Council resolution 802 (1993) of 25 January 1993.

On 8 April 1993, the Secretary-General reported to the Security Council that representatives of the Government of Croatia and the Serb local authorities had signed, on 6 April, an agreement regarding the implementation of this resolution.

The agreement was to enter into force when the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia received from both parties assurances regarding the stationing of police in the areas from which the Croatian Government's armed forces were withdrawn, and their agreement that UNPROFOR should exclusively fulfil all police functions in those areas during an interim period. The Croats orally gave that assurance at the time of signature; the Serb assurance required the approval of their Assembly. That approval was not forthcoming and the agreement therefore did not enter into force.

The parties also agreed to begin talks, under the auspices of the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee, within 15 days of implementation of the agreement in order to resolve outstanding obstacles to the full implementation of the United Nations plan for Croatia.

The UNPROFOR Force Commander assessed the additional resources required to implement the agreement and recommended that UNPROFOR be augmented by two mechanized infantry battalions of some 900 all ranks each, one engineer company of up to 150 troops all ranks, and 50 additional military observers. The Secretary-General recommended that, once the agreement entered into force, the Security Council approve the recommended changes to UNPROFOR's strength and mandate.

However, on 6 July 1993, new tensions arose following the decision of the Croatian Government to take unilateral actions aimed at rebuilding and reopening the Maslenica bridge on 18 July. Though, in pursuance of the Erdut/Zagreb agreement concluded on 15/16 July 1993, which required the withdrawal of Croatian armed forces and police from the area of the Maslenica bridge by 31 July 1993, UNPROFOR had moved 2,000 troops into the areas adjacent to those from which the Croatian forces were to withdraw, these troops could not be deployed because the Croatian military authorities would not allow UNPROFOR full access to the areas concerned.

On 2 August 1993, following Croatia's failure to withdraw from the area and Serb shelling thereof, one of the pontoons of the Maslenica bridge sank. However, the Co-Chairmen concluded that there was still enough common ground to continue negotiations. Accepting the invitation of the Co-Chairmen, the parties began negotiations in Geneva on 12 August 1993, on a cease-fire which would include the elements of the original Erdut/Zagreb agreement. Despite intensive discussions in Geneva, Zagreb and Knin between the representatives both of the Co-Chairmen and of the parties, an overall cease-fire agreement could not be achieved.

On 9 September, after several days of grave incidents in the UNPAs and "pink zones", and rising tensions, shelling intensified on both sides of the confrontation line, and the Croatian Army once again carried out a military incursion in the area of Medak, where three Serb villages were seized. The hostilities worsened on 10 and 11 September. Following the intervention of the Secretary-General's Special Representative and the UNPROFOR Force Commander, and a call from the Security Council, the parties finally agreed to a cease-fire on 15 September. UNPROFOR moved some 500 to 600 troops into the area to replace the Croatian armed forces which eventually withdrew to positions occupied before the incursion began. When UNPROFOR gained access to the area it found that most houses had been deliberately destroyed during the withdrawal. Eighteen corpses were recovered, most of them riddled with multiple bullet wounds or incinerated.

BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
"NO-FLY ZONE" ENFORCEMENT
On 16 March 1993, the Secretary-General reported that three aircraft dropped bombs on two villages east of Srebrenica on 13 March, before leaving in the direction of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). It was the first time since the Security Council instituted the "no-fly zone" in Bosnia and Herzegovina that aircraft were used in combat activity in that country. UNPROFOR was not able to determine to whom the aircraft belonged.

On 17 March, the Security Council, in a statement by its President, strongly condemned all violations of its relevant resolutions and underlined the fact that since the beginning of the monitoring operations in early November 1992, the United Nations had reported 465 violations of the "no-fly zone". The Council demanded from the Bosnian Serbs an immediate explanation of the violations and particularly of the aerial bombardment of the two villages, and requested the Secretary-General to ensure that an investigation was made of the reported possible use of the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to launch air strikes against Bosnia and Herzegovina. On 27 April, the Secretary-General reported to the Council that on 24 March the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) had been requested to provide any information relevant to the incidents. The only response received was a note verbale conveying a statement by the Government of that country, in which it stated that "airplanes and helicopters of the Air Forces of the Army of Yugoslavia have not violated the airspace of Bosnia and Herzegovina since the no-fly zone came into effect".

On 31 March, the Security Council adopted its resolution 816 (1993), by which it extended the ban on military flights to cover flights by all fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft in the airspace of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council authorized Member States, seven days after the adoption of the resolution, acting nationally or through regional arrangements, to take, under the authority of the Security Council and subject to close coordination with the Secretary-General and - UNPROFOR, "all necessary measures" in the airspace of Bosnia and Herzegovina to ensure compliance with the ban on flights, and proportionate to the specific circumstances and the nature of flights. It also requested the Member States concerned, the Secretary-General and UNPROFOR to coordinate closely on those measures and on the starting date of the implementation, which was to be no later than 14 days from the date of the resolution, and to report on the starting date to the Council.

On 9 April, the Secretary-General transmitted to the Security Council a letter from the Secretary General of NATO, Dr. Manfred W”rner, informing him that the North Atlantic Council had adopted the "necessary arrangements" to ensure compliance with the ban on military flights and that it was prepared to begin the operation at noon GMT on 12 April 1993. Dr. W”rner also reported that France, the Netherlands, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States had offered to make aircraft available for the operation. In order to commence the enforcement on time, aircraft from France, the Netherlands and the United States were initially deployed in the region and liaison cells were established at UNPROFOR's headquarters in Zagreb and in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Kiseljak). In addition, UNPROFOR would send a liaison team to the command headquarters of the NATO countries concerned.

The operations authorized by resolution 816 (1993) started, as scheduled, on 12 April at 12.00 GMT. Subsequently, the Secretary-General was informed by NATO that all the countries offering to make aircraft available for the operation would participate fully in it.

Since the establishment of the "no-fly zone" in the airspace of Bosnia and Herzegovina through 1 December 1994, the total number of flights assessed as apparent violations of the ban was 3,317. The most serious incident took place on 28 February 1994, when NATO fighters, acting in accordance with the established procedure, shot down four of six jets in the airspace of Bosnia and Herzegovina which had defied the international ban on military flights and ignored two warnings by the NATO fighters.

"SAFE AREAS"
In March 1993, fighting intensified in eastern Bosnia and Herzegovina, with Bosnian Serb paramilitary units attacking several cities in the area, including Srebrenica. The military attacks resulted in a heavy loss of life among the civilian population and severely impeded United Nations humanitarian relief efforts in the area. In mid-March, UNHCR reported that thousands of Muslims were seeking refuge in Srebrenica from surrounding areas which were being attacked and occupied by Serb forces, and that 30 or 40 persons were dying daily from military action, starvation, exposure to cold or lack of medical treatment. In April, despite strong political pressure from the international community and the Security Council, and the efforts by UNPROFOR and UNHCR in the field, the fighting persisted and the humanitarian situation in the area continued to deteriorate.

On 16 April, the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, adopted resolution 819 (1993), in which it demanded that all parties treat Srebrenica and its surroundings as a "safe area" which should be free from any armed attack or any other hostile act. It demanded the immediate withdrawal of Bosnian Serb paramilitary units from areas surrounding Srebrenica and the cessation of armed attacks against that town. The Council requested the Secretary-General to take steps to increase the presence of UNPROFOR in Srebrenica and to arrange for the safe transfer of the ill and wounded, and demanded the unimpeded delivery of humanitarian assistance to all parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in particular to the civilian population of Srebrenica.

By other provisions of the resolution, the Council condemned and rejected the deliberate actions of the Bosnian Serb party to force the evacuation of civilians from Srebrenica and other parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina in its campaign of "ethnic cleansing". It also decided to send a mission of Council members to ascertain, firsthand, the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Following the adoption of the resolution, UNPROFOR's Force Commander, the Commander of the Serb forces and the Commander of the Bosnian Muslim forces signed, on 17 April, an agreement for the demilitarization of Srebrenica. On 21 April, UNPROFOR's Force Commander reported that 170 UNPROFOR troops, civilian police and military observers had been deployed in Srebrenica to collect weapons, ammunition, mines, explosives and combat supplies and that by noon on 21 April they had successfully demilitarized the town.

As requested in resolution 819 (1993), the Security Council's fact-finding mission, composed of representatives of France, Hungary, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Russian Federation and Venezuela, visited the region from 22 to 27 April. Having considered the mission's report and recommendations, the Security Council adopted resolution 824 (1993) of 6 May, in which it declared that, in addition to Srebrenica, Sarajevo and other such threatened areas, in particular the towns of Tuzla, Zepa, Gorazde, Bihac and their surroundings, should be treated as safe areas by all the parties concerned. The Council further declared that in those areas armed attacks must cease, all Bosnian Serb military or paramilitary units must withdraw and all parties must allow UNPROFOR and the international humanitarian agencies free and unimpeded access to all safe areas. It authorized the strengthening of UNPROFOR's mandate by an additional 50 military observers to monitor the humanitarian situation in those areas.

On 4 June, the Security Council, by its resolution 836 (1993), acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, further expanded the mandate of UNPROFOR to enable it to protect the safe areas, including to deter attacks against them, to monitor the cease-fire, to promote the withdrawal of military or paramilitary units other than those of the Bosnian Government and to occupy some key points on the ground. The Council authorized UNPROFOR, acting in self-defence, to take necessary measures, including the use of force, in reply to bombardments against the safe areas or to armed incursion into them or in the event of any deliberate obstruction to the freedom of movement of UNPROFOR or of protected humanitarian convoys. The Council also decided that Member States, acting nationally or through regional arrangements, might take, under its authority, all necessary measures, through the use of air power, in and around the safe areas, to support UNPROFOR.

In response to the Council's invitation to report to it on the requirements for implementing the resolution, the Secretary-General, in his report dated 14 June, indicated that it would be necessary to deploy additional troops on the ground and to provide air support. While the UNPROFOR Force Commander had estimated an additional troop requirement of approximately 34,000 to obtain deterrence through strength, the Secretary-General stated that it was possible to start implementing the resolution under a "light option", with a minimal troop reinforcement of around 7,600. That option represented an initial approach and had limited objectives. It assumed the consent and cooperation of the parties and provided a basic level of deterrence.

As to the air support, the Secretary-General reported that he had initiated contacts with Member States and had invited NATO to coordinate with him the use of air power in support of UNPROFOR. The Secretary-General pointed out that the first decision to initiate the use of air resources in this context would be taken by him in consultation with the members of the Security Council.

In adopting resolution 844 (1993) of 18 June, the Security Council authorized an additional reinforcement of UNPROFOR initially by 7,600 troops and reaffirmed the use of air power, in and around the declared safe areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina, to support the Force.

On 18 August, the Secretary-General informed the Security Council that following the necessary training exercises in coordination with NATO, the United Nations had the operational capability for the use of air power in support of UNPROFOR.

HOSTILITIES IN CENTRAL BOSNIA
The situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina was further aggravated when, in May 1993, intense fighting between the Muslim and Bosnian Croat forces erupted in central Bosnia and Herzegovina. Despite the calls by the Security Council, efforts of the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee and UNPROFOR, hostilities between the two former allies continued. The fighting intermittently blocked the main supply routes for humanitarian assistance into northern Bosnia, and further restricted the freedom of movement of UNPROFOR and UNHCR in the area. In this connection, UNPROFOR and UNHCR initiated a humanitarian "Operation Lifeline" to keep the main routes open to help ensure the survival of up to 2.7 million people in Bosnia and Herzegovina during the winter.

BORDER CONTROL
On 10 June 1993, the Security Council, by its resolution 838 (1993), requested the Secretary-General to submit a further report on options for the deployment of international observers on the borders of Bosnia and Herzegovina, with priority being given to its borders with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), to monitor the implementation of the relevant Security Council resolutions. The Council called for international observers to be drawn from the United Nations and, if appropriate, from Member States.

The Secretary-General reported to the Security Council on 1 July. He presented two options and their respective requirements in terms of human and other resources.

On option one, the Secretary-General said that it would be unrealistic for the Security Council to authorize international observers to establish full control over the borders of Bosnia and Herzegovina as world-wide resources for additional peace-keeping troops were becoming increasingly stretched. Full border control would require a capability to deny passage and to act where borders had already been crossed. It would also mean that UNPROFOR would supersede the national authorities in respect of certain border-control functions.

Border monitoring was another option identified by the Secretary-General. Observers would only observe and report on Bosnia and Herzegovina's borders, and would not be in a position to check the nature of goods coming into and out of the Republic. Even this more limited option would require substantial additional resources, and the necessary personnel and financing might not be available, he said.

The Secretary-General went on to point out that outstanding contributions to United Nations peace-keeping accounts totalled $1.26 billion in mid-June 1993, while unpaid assessments amounted to $2.236 billion. He said it was "highly probable that in the coming months the Organization will not be able to meet its day-to-day obligations".

On 7 July, the President of the Security Council addressed a letter to the Secretary-General informing him that the members of the Council had considered his report and continued to believe that international observers should be deployed on the borders of Bosnia and Herzegovina. They invited the Secretary-General, bearing in mind the observations in his report, to contact Member States in order to establish whether they were ready, individually or through regional organizations or arrangements, to make qualified personnel available to act as observers along the borders of Bosnia and Herzegovina; and to continue to explore all possibilities for implementation of the border monitors concept.

FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA
As to UNPROFOR's activities in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the Secretary-General reported to the Security Council on 13 July 1993. A Nordic battalion was deployed at Kjojila, east of Skopje, the capital of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and a United States contingent of 315 troops arrived in Skopje in early July, deploying to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia side of the border with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) on 20 August 1993. United Nations military observers, civilian police and civil affairs officers had also been deployed. UNPROFOR maintained close cooperation with the CSCE monitor mission and enjoyed an excellent cooperative relationship with the host Government. In his report, the Secretary-General concluded that the Force had so far been successful in its preventive mandate in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

MANDATE FURTHER EXTENDED
On 20 September 1993, the Secretary-General recommended that the Security Council renew the mandate of UNPROFOR for a period of six months (as is usual with most United Nations peace-keeping operations). In a report dealing primarily with Croatia, the Secretary-General said that he had been "sorely tempted" to recommend the withdrawal of the Force altogether because of the criticism of UNPROFOR by both sides and the dangers and abuse to which its personnel were exposed, but that such a step could only result in further conflict.

The Secretary-General pointed out that key parts of the original United Nations peace-keeping plan for Croatia had been difficult, if not impossible, to implement, and had become more so since the resumption of hostilities following the Croatian incursion of 22 January 1993. He stressed that the fundamental solution to the problem had to be sought through political dialogue, that the parties themselves had to seek such a solution and take steps towards reconciliation. In this process, the principal objective of UNPROFOR could only be to keep the peace, thereby permitting negotiations to take place on an overall political settlement. To enhance the security of the Force, he requested the extension of close air support to the territory of Croatia.

While recommending the extension of UNPROFOR's mandate, the Secretary-General suggested that the Council demand that the parties in Croatia conclude an immediate cease-fire and cooperate with UNPROFOR, which must be allowed to fulfil the peace-keeping aspects of its mandate. The Secretary-General intended to report to the Council by 30 November 1993 on the progress made by the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia and by UNPROFOR, and might at that time make further recommendations, on the basis of developments during the two months and on the course of negotiations undertaken between the parties.

The Secretary-General also stated that should UNPROFOR's mandate be extended, he would give "favourable consideration" to a suggestion by the President of Croatia that the Force be divided into three parts - UNPROFOR (Croatia), UNPROFOR (Bosnia and Herzegovina) and UNPROFOR (the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) - while retaining its integrated military, logistical and administrative structure under the command of one Special Representative of the Secretary-General and one theatre Force Commander.

In the meantime, on 24 September, the Security Council was informed by the Croatian Government that if the mandate of UNPROFOR was not amended to promote energetic implementation of the relevant resolutions of the Security Council, Croatia would be forced to request UNPROFOR to leave the country not later than 30 November 1993.

On 4 October 1993, after intensive consultations and two interim extensions of UNPROFOR's mandate - for a 24-hour period on 30 September, and for another four days on 1 October - the Security Council, by its resolution 871 (1993), extended the mandate of the Force for a period of six months, through 31 March 1994. The Council took this action under Chapter VII of the Charter reiterating its determination to ensure the security of UNPROFOR and its freedom of movement.

The Council reaffirmed the crucial importance of the full and prompt implementation of the United Nations peace-keeping plan for Croatia and called upon the signatories of the plan and all others concerned, in particular the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), to cooperate in its full implementation. Declaring that continued non-cooperation in the implementation of the relevant resolutions of the Council would have serious consequences, the Council affirmed that full normalization of the international community's position towards those concerned would take into account their actions in implementing those resolutions, including those relating to the United Nations peace-keeping plan for Croatia.

The Council called for an immediate cease-fire agreement between the Croatian Government and the local Serb authorities in the UNPAs, mediated under the auspices of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia. It urged all parties to cooperate with UNPROFOR in reaching and implementing an agreement on confidence-building measures, including the restoration of electricity, water and communications in all regions of Croatia. Stressing the importance of restoring Croatian authority in the "pink zones", the Council called for the revival of the Joint Commission established under the chairmanship of UNPROFOR.

In addition, the Council took note of the Secretary-General's intention to establish three subordinate commands within UNPROFOR - in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia - while retaining all other existing dispositions for the direction and conduct of the United Nations operation in the territory of the former Yugoslavia.

The Council decided to continue to review urgently the extension of close air support to UNPROFOR in the territory of Croatia as recommended by the Secretary-General. It authorized UNPROFOR, in carrying out its mandate in Croatia, acting in self-defence, to take the necessary measures, including the use of force, to ensure its security and its freedom of movement.

It requested the Secretary-General to report within two months on progress towards the implementation of the United Nations peace-keeping plan for Croatia and of all relevant Council resolutions, taking into account the position of the Croatian Government, as well as on the outcome of the International Conference negotiations. In light of that report, the Council would reconsider UNPROFOR's mandate.

MANDATE IN CROATIA UNCHANGED
As requested by Security Council resolution 871 (1993), the Secretary-General submitted his further report on 1 December 1993. He stated that various initiatives were under way, with the cooperation of the two sides in the Croatian conflict, which could lead to implementation of the United Nations peace-keeping plan for the Republic. Therefore, he would not recommend that the Council reconsider the mandate of UNPROFOR in Croatia at that stage. However, he strongly urged the two sides to intensify their efforts for achieving a cease-fire agreement, for instituting practical measures of economic cooperation and for negotiating a lasting political settlement. He also appealed to them to extend their cooperation to UNPROFOR as it sought to improve conditions in the UNPAs.

The Secretary-General also reported that talks aimed at achieving a comprehensive cease-fire in and around the UNPAs in Croatia and initiating discussions on economic confidence-building steps were continuing within the framework of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia.

In a letter dated 17 December 1993, the President of the Security Council informed the Secretary-General that the members of the Council agreed with the observations contained in his 1 December report regarding the mandate of UNPROFOR in Croatia.

On 17 December 1993, Croat representatives and local Serb authorities in Croatia signed a Christmas Truce Agreement, mediated by UNPROFOR. The two parties undertook to cease all armed hostilities along all existing confrontation lines from midnight on 23 December until midnight on 15 January 1994. They also agreed to implement certain confidence-building measures, and to open negotiations as soon as the truce took effect on a "general and lasting" cease-fire, with the separation of forces on both sides. Subsequently, the truce was extended beyond 15 January and has generally held since then.

CEASE-FIRES IN BOSNIA NOT RESPECTED
In the meantime, the military and humanitarian situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina continued to worsen. On 9 November 1993, the Security Council, in a statement by its President, expressed deep concern at the reported deterioration of the situation in central Bosnia and Herzegovina where increased military activities posed a serious threat to the security of the civilian population. The Council was equally concerned at the overall humanitarian situation in that Republic and demanded again that all parties concerned guarantee unimpeded access for humanitarian assistance.

In a separate statement issued on the same day, the Council condemned all attacks and hostile acts against UNPROFOR by all parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as in Croatia, "which have become more frequent over the last weeks", and demanded that "they cease forthwith".

Although numerous cease-fire agreements were signed by the warring parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina, practically none of them were implemented and the military situation remained grave. Notwithstanding the Joint Declarations on the delivery of humanitarian assistance, signed by the three sides at Geneva on 18 and 29 November 1993, the level of violence, the imposition of bureaucratic procedures hindering the transport of relief goods or the denial of clearance for the passage of UNHCR convoys reduced deliveries of humanitarian assistance to half the amount required. Furthermore, elements of all three sides deliberately fired upon relief convoys and United Nations personnel.

On 7 January 1994, the Security Council, in a Presidential statement, condemned any hostilities in United Nations-designated "safe areas", particularly the relentless bombardment of Sarajevo by Bosnian Serb forces, and demanded an immediate end to attacks against Sarajevo, which had resulted in a large number of civilian casualties, disrupted essential services, and aggravated an already severe humanitarian situation. The Council reaffirmed its commitment to implement all its relevant resolutions, in particular resolution 836 (1993), by which it had authorized UNPROFOR to use force to protect Sarajevo and five towns previously declared "safe areas" in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and expressed its readiness to consider further measures to ensure that all parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina abided by their commitments.

Strongly deploring the deliberate obstruction of humanitarian relief convoys by any party, the Council reiterated its demand for unimpeded access for humanitarian relief assistance, and condemned attacks against personnel of the United Nations and of humanitarian organizations. It also deplored the failure of the parties to honour the cease-fire agreement, condemned the flagrant violations of international humanitarian law and held the perpetrators personally responsible.

SECURITY COUNCIL CONDEMNS CROATIAN INTERFERENCE IN BOSNIA
On 28 January 1994, in a letter to the President of the Security Council, the Prime Minister of Bosnia and Herzegovina reported that military formations of the regular armed forces of Croatia, supplemented by heavy artillery, armoured vehicles and other war - materials, were involved in military actions on his country's territory.

At informal consultations on the same day, the Council asked UNPROFOR to submit an urgent report on the letter. On 1 February, the Secretary-General reported that the Croatian Army (HV) had been directly supporting the Bosnian Croat Army (HVO) with manpower, equipment and weapons for some time. The number of Croatian soldiers had apparently increased following successful offensives of Bosnian Government forces against the HVO. It was assessed that in total there were approximately 3,000 to 5,000 Croatian regular army personnel in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Secretary-General emphasized, however, that this was an estimation, as it was impossible with UNPROFOR's assets to obtain required information for a more accurate account. The Secretary-General also reported on cross-border movement of military equipment.

In a Presidential statement issued on 3 February, the Security Council strongly condemned Croatia for deploying elements of its Army and heavy military equipment in the central and southern parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and demanded that they be withdrawn. The Council stated that it would consider "other serious measures", if Croatia failed to put an immediate end to "all forms of interference" in that Republic. The Council requested the Secretary-General to monitor the situation and report within two weeks on progress towards complete and full withdrawal. The Council again condemned the acquisition of territory by force as well as the "practice of 'ethnic cleansing' by whomsoever committed", and reaffirmed the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The Secretary-General informed the Council, in a letter dated 18 February 1994, that despite its demand for non-interference in Bosnia and Herzegovina, some 5,000 Croatian Army troops were still believed to remain in that country. Also, no action had been taken regarding the proposed establishment of a monitoring mechanism to verify troop withdrawals.

The Secretary-General also stated that, while no HV command posts nor any full HV brigades operating as formed units had been identified, it appeared that HV troops might be removing their insignia while in Bosnia and Herzegovina. UNPROFOR believed that HV insignia on a number of vehicles had also been erased or repainted. The Secretary-General stated that UNPROFOR would continue to monitor developments to the extent possible.

QUESTION OF AIR STRIKES ARISES
In a separate development, the Heads of State and Government participating in the summit meeting of NATO, held in Brussels on 10 and 11 January 1994, issued a Declaration, by which, inter alia, they deplored the continuing conflict in the former Yugoslavia. They expressed their continued belief that the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina must be settled at the negotiating table and not on the battlefield, and supported the efforts of the United Nations and the European Union to secure a negotiated settlement in that Republic. They were determined to "eliminate obstacles to the accomplishment of the UNPROFOR mandate" and called for the full implementation of Security Council resolutions regarding the reinforcement of UNPROFOR. They reaffirmed their readiness under the authority of the Security Council "to carry out air strikes in order to prevent the strangulation of Sarajevo, the safe areas and other threatened areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina". In this context, they urged UNPROFOR "to draw up urgently plans to ensure that the blocked rotation of the UNPROFOR contingent in Srebrenica can take place and to examine how the airport at Tuzla can be opened for humanitarian relief purposes".5/

On 12 January, the Secretary-General instructed his new Special Representative for the former Yugoslavia, Mr. Yasushi Akashi,6/ to undertake an urgent preparatory study of the proposal. In his report to the Secretary-General on 17 January, the Special Representative reaffirmed the urgent necessity of rotating the contingent in Srebrenica. As to Tuzla, it was concluded that the opening of the main airfield there would improve the flow of humanitarian supplies to the Tuzla safe area. In both cases, it was confirmed that the use of air power could make an important contribution if a military operation by UNPROFOR was needed for those purposes.

On 18 January, the Secretary-General sent a letter to the President of the Security Council, conveying those conclusions. He indicated, however, that in both cases the use of air power to attain proposed objectives would require military assets in excess of what was available to UNPROFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Secretary-General also stated that the new proposal to use air power implied that UNPROFOR could launch offensive action against Bosnian Serb elements which obstructed - or threatened to obstruct - its operations. UNPROFOR had previously been allowed to use air support only in defence of United Nations personnel.

The Secretary-General instructed Mr. Akashi, with the assistance of the UNPROFOR Force Commander, to prepare detailed plans for military operations, including the use of air power as required, to ensure the rotation of the contingent in Srebrenica and the opening of the main airfield at Tuzla in close coordination with NATO's Southern Command. The Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, Mr. Marrack Goulding, was sent to Brussels to brief the Secretary General of NATO on the matter.

On 28 January, the Secretary-General submitted a letter to the President of the Council, containing three scenarios envisaged under the plans prepared under Mr. Akashi's direction by the UNPROFOR Force Commander. In the first scenario, troops in Srebrenica and Zepa could be rotated and the Tuzla airport opened through negotiations and with the consent of the parties. In the second, if the parties did not consent, but were judged unlikely to use military force, existing UNPROFOR military assets would be used with the support, if necessary, of NATO air power. In the third scenario, if the parties resorted to military force, UNPROFOR would use available assets, reinforced with additional troops and equipment contributed by United Nations Member States, and supported, if necessary, by NATO air power.

The first two scenarios, the Secretary-General pointed out, represented "a measured step-by-step approach geared to the attitude of the parties", while the third scenario would imply "a different level of military action" and could not be implemented without Security Council authorization and the deployment of additional troops in the area.

The Secretary-General stated that he would not hesitate to initiate the use of close air support if UNPROFOR were attacked while implementing plans to rotate peace-keepers in Srebrenica and Zepa and to open Tuzla airport. At the same time, he distinguished between close air support involving the use of air power for self-defence, which had already been authorized by NATO, and air strikes for pre-emptive or punitive purposes. NATO forces were not authorized to launch the latter types of air strikes without a decision of the North Atlantic Council (NAC).

The Secretary-General said he hoped that the troops could be rotated and the airport opened in accordance with the first scenario, namely, by mutual agreement. However, he noted that UNPROFOR's mandate regarding safe areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina had been adopted under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, and the Force did not have to seek the consent of the parties for operations falling within its mandate.

The Secretary-General warned that "any resort to the second scenario, and a fortiori to the third scenario" would entail considerable risk for UNPROFOR's operations and for the troops involved in its implementation, as well as for the humanitarian assistance operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Nevertheless, he instructed the Special Representative to "pursue actively", in direct contact with the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the leadership of the Bosnian Serbs, the implementation of the two plans. In the specific circumstances of UNPROFOR operations in Srebrenica and Tuzla, the Secretary-General delegated to his Special Representative the authority to approve a request for close air support from the Force Commander.

In concluding his letter to the Council's President, the Secretary-General pointed to the fact that all parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina were trying to take tactical advantage of UNPROFOR's presence and were increasingly questioning its impartiality. He believed that the time had come to reflect on the role of UNPROFOR, and he would undertake a comprehensive review of its functions and responsibilities prior to the Council's consideration of the renewal of the mandate in March 1994.

On 1 March 1994, the Bosnian Serbs, following talks with high-ranking officials of the Russian Federation in Moscow, agreed to open the Tuzla airport for humanitarian purposes. Deployment of UNPROFOR troops around the airport began in early March in preparation for an airlift that was expected to bring relief supplies to hundreds of thousands of people in the area. The first UNPROFOR flight landed in Tuzla on 22 March 1994.

The rotation of troops in Srebrenica, after protracted negotiations with the Bosnian Serb side, was completed on 10 March 1994, with the Dutch troops replacing the Canadian contingent.

AIR STRIKES AUTHORIZATION SOUGHT
Meanwhile, fighting in and around Sarajevo continued unabated, including lethal mortar attacks against civilian targets. On 5 February 1994, a 120-mm mortar round fired at the central market killed at least 58 civilians and wounded 142 others in the worst single incident of the 22-month war. This followed a similar attack on one of the suburbs of Sarajevo on 4 February 1994 in which 10 civilians were killed and 18 injured.

These acts were strongly condemned by the international community. The Secretary-General immediately instructed his Special Representative and the Force Commander of UNPROFOR to proceed to Sarajevo in order to supervise the investigation of the incidents and to prevent further atrocities.

After initial investigation, UNPROFOR established that the round fired on 4 February had come from a Bosnian Serb position, but it had not been possible to locate the source of the attack against the central market on 5 February.7/ In a letter dated 6 February to the President of the Security Council, the Secretary-General stated that those two incidents made it necessary, in accordance with resolution 836 (1993),8/ to prepare urgently for the use of air strikes to deter further such attacks. The Secretary-General also informed the Council that he had requested the Secretary General of NATO to obtain "a decision by the North Atlantic Council to authorize the Commander-in-Chief of NATO's Southern Command to launch air strikes, at the request of the United Nations, against artillery or mortar positions in and around Sarajevo which are determined by UNPROFOR to be responsible for attacks against civilian targets in that city".

TEN-DAY DEADLINE IS SET
On 9 February, moving to end the strangulation of Sarajevo, the NAC issued a statement calling "for the withdrawal, or regrouping and placing under UNPROFOR control, within ten days, of heavy weapons (including tanks, artillery pieces, mortars, multiple rocket launchers, missiles and anti-aircraft weapons) of the Bosnian Serb forces located in the area within 20 kilometres (about 12.4 miles) of the centre of Sarajevo, and excluding the area within 2 kilometres (about 1.2 miles) of the centre of Pale".9/ It also called upon the Muslim-led Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina, within the same period, "to place the heavy weapons in its possession within the Sarajevo exclusion zone described above under UNPROFOR control, and to refrain from attacks launched from within the current confrontation lines in the city".

The NAC decided that, ten days from 2400 GMT 10 February 1994, heavy weapons of any of the parties found within the Sarajevo exclusion zone, unless controlled by UNPROFOR, would, along with their direct and essential military support facilities, be subject to NATO air strikes. The strikes would be conducted in close coordination with the United Nations Secretary-General. The NAC accepted the 6 February 1994 request of the United Nations Secretary-General and authorized the Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces Southern Europe, to launch air strikes, at the request of the United Nations, against artillery or mortar positions in or around Sarajevo, including any outside the exclusion zone, which were determined by UNPROFOR to be responsible for attacks against civilian targets in that city.

In a parallel development, a few hours prior to the announcement of the NATO decision of 9 February, a cease-fire agreement had been reached between the warring parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina regarding the area in and around Sarajevo. The agreement followed intensive discussions at the political and military levels brokered by the Secretary-General's Special Representative, the Force Commander of UNPROFOR and UNPROFOR's Sector Commander for Sarajevo. The agreement involved the positioning of UNPROFOR troops in sensitive areas, monitoring, and the placing of all heavy weapons under UNPROFOR's control.

PREPARATIONS FOR AIR STRIKES
Immediately following the decision by NATO, the United Nations Secretary-General instructed his Special Representative for the former Yugoslavia to finalize, with the Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces Southern Europe, detailed procedures for the initiation and conduct of air strikes. He delegated to the Special Representative the authority to approve a request from the UNPROFOR Force Commander for close air support for the defence of United Nations personnel anywhere in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The Secretary-General also instructed him and UNPROFOR military authorities to negotiate arrangements under which: (a) there would be an effective cease-fire in and around Sarajevo; (b) the heavy weapons of the Bosnian Serb forces would be withdrawn or regrouped and placed under UNPROFOR control; and (c) the heavy weapons of the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina would be placed under UNPROFOR control.

COUNCIL CONSIDERS SITUATION IN BOSNIA
On 10 February 1994, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation stated that NATO's call for the parties - both the Serbs and the Muslims - to place the heavy weapons deployed in the Sarajevo area under United Nations control or to withdraw them from the area was close to the Russian position. At the same time, however, the Russian Federation could not agree with the position of a number of NATO members which interpreted the NATO decision as "a one-sided ultimatum to the Bosnian Serbs, who are being threatened by air strikes". It requested an urgent meeting of the United Nations Security Council, open to all countries concerned, to consider practical ways to demilitarize Sarajevo and to introduce a United Nations administration there. A Security Council meeting to discuss the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina was also requested by the Government of that country and Pakistan.

The Council met on 14-15 February 1994. Over the course of four meetings, it heard from a total of 58 speakers. Member States generally welcomed the decision by NATO and the steps taken by the Secretary-General to prepare for the use of force, adding that those actions had been fully authorized by existing Council resolutions. They emphasized that force was designed to underpin efforts by the United Nations and the European Union to achieve a negotiated settlement of the conflict, and that air strikes had to be carried out with caution and precision. Although the NATO ultimatum was widely supported, several Member States either opposed it or expressed concern that, as a result of air strikes, UNPROFOR might become a target for retaliatory measures. No Security Council resolution or statement was put forward during the meetings.

HEAVY WEAPONS WITHDRAWN
On 17 February 1994, following a meeting with Russian officials in Bosnia, the Bosnian Serbs agreed to withdraw within two days all their heavy weapons to the distance set by NATO. On 18 February, after discussions in Sarajevo with Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic and Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic, and later in Zagreb with the Commander-in-Chief of NATO Southern Command, the Secretary-General's Special Representative reported that progress was being made towards achieving a durable cease-fire, disarmament and disengagement, with a clear-cut role for UNPROFOR.

There was agreement with the Bosnian Serb leader on having extensive and unhindered UNPROFOR patrolling within the weapons exclusion zone covering the 20-kilometre radius from the centre of Sarajevo. Heavy weapons not withdrawn from the exclusion zone would be grouped and placed in seven different sites, under the control of armed UNPROFOR elements. An agreement had also been reached with regard to communications, with the full assurance that hot-lines would be established between UNPROFOR and the Bosnian Serb and Muslim sides.

On 20 February 1994, the Security Council met in informal consultations at the request of the Russian Federation, with the NATO deadline for withdrawal of heavy weapons scheduled for midnight that night. The Council was briefed by the Under-Secretary-General for Peace-keeping Operations, Mr. Kofi Annan, who reported that according to the Secretary-General's Special Representative for the former Yugoslavia, the UNPROFOR Force Commander and NATO, Serbian compliance with the ultimatum had been effective. Certain weapons on both the Serb and Muslim sides, which had not been removed from the exclusion zone, would be monitored in place by UNPROFOR. As a result, the Council decided, in coordination with NATO,not to recommend that air strikes be carried out at that time.

The Under-Secretary-General also urged Member States to contribute additional troops with equipment to facilitate the monitoring of the weapons withdrawal and the cease-fire in and around Sarajevo. United Nations troops had been temporarily redeployed for that purpose from other parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina and from Croatia, but they were still needed in those areas.

AGREEMENT ON CEASE-FIRE
In another positive development, military representatives of the Bosnian Government and the Bosnian Croat sides signed, on 23 February 1994, a cease-fire agreement. Under this agreement, reached at a meeting hosted by UNPROFOR in Zagreb, Croatia, the two parties agreed to the immediate and total cessation of hostilities with effect from noon on Friday, 25 February 1994, a halt to all forms of propaganda against one another, and a fixing of lines of contact and positions as of the time of the cease-fire. UNPROFOR forces were to be positioned at key points; heavy weapons were to be withdrawn or put under UNPROFOR control, and a Joint Commission was to be established, with representatives of both sides and chaired by UNPROFOR.

UNPROFOR:MARCH 1994 - NOVEMBER 1994

INCREASE IN STRENGTH REQUESTED
On 4 March 1994, the Security Council adopted its resolution 900 (1994). The Council called on all parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina to cooperate with UNPROFOR in the consolidation of the cease-fire in and around Sarajevo; to achieve complete freedom of movement for the civilian population and humanitarian goods to, from and within Sarajevo; and to help restore normal life to the city.

The Council requested the Secretary-General to appoint a senior civilian official to draw up an overall assessment and plan of action for the restoration of essential public services in the various opstinas of Sarajevo, other than the city of Pale; and invited him to establish a voluntary trust fund for that purpose.

The Council further requested the Secretary-General to present a report on the feasibility and modalities for the application of protection, defined in resolutions 824 (1993) and 836 (1993), to Maglaj, Mostar and Vitez, taking into account all developments both on the ground and in the negotiations between the parties.

The Secretary-General submitted his report on 11 March 1994. He estimated that the implementation of resolution 900 (1994) would require an increase of the authorized strength of UNPROFOR by a total of 8,250 additional troops, 150 military observers and 275 civilian police monitors. Of these additional troops, 2,200 would be required for the operation in and around Sarajevo and 6,050 for operations in central Bosnia, including Mostar and Vitez. A further 1,500 troops would be needed if the Council were to extend the safe area concept to Maglaj.

The Secretary-General noted that recent developments in Bosnia and Herzegovina had created a new situation, which "should provide numerous opportunities for UNPROFOR to make substantial progress" in the implementation of its mandate. UNPROFOR's ability to achieve those objectives, however, was severely limited by the lack of military resources. If Member States did not provide the necessary personnel, its mandate would have to be modified. "It would be a tragedy for the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina if the present opportunity were lost for lack of resources," he concluded.

As to the restoration of the essential services in Sarajevo, the Secretary-General reported that on 1 March 1994, UNPROFOR had established an Interim Coordination Board to act as a temporary focal point for the various organizations operating in that city. The Board would prepare a comprehensive status report, which would provide the basis for the plan requested by Security Council resolution 900 (1994). The Secretary-General also stated that he would shortly announce the appointment of a senior civilian official, with the title of Special Coordinator, who would coordinate the initial efforts under the overall authority of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General.

On 21 March 1994, the Secretary-General established a voluntary trust fund for the restoration of essential public services in and around Sarajevo. On 30 March 1994, the Secretary-General appointed Mr. William L. Eagleton, a United States national, as the Special Coordinator for Sarajevo.

EXTENSION OF MANDATE RECOMMENDED
In a separate report submitted to the Security Council on 16 March 1994, the Secretary-General recommended the renewal of the Force's mandate for a further 12 months beyond 31 March 1994. The report contained the outcome of a thorough review of the role and functioning of the Force. The Secretary-General stated that the continuing conflict in UNPROFOR's area of operations since its mandate was last renewed had led to considerable, but unjustified, criticism of the effectiveness of the Force. Those, together with mounting threats to the safety and security of United Nations personnel, and the continuing failure of Member States to honour their financial obligations to UNPROFOR in full and on time, had led him to consider seriously whether the continuation of the Force constituted a worthwhile use of the limited peace-keeping resources of the United Nations.

The diversity and scope of the problems in the former Yugoslavia, the Secretary-General continued, required the deployment of more military forces than troop-contributing nations appeared to be prepared, at that time, to make available. The encouraging developments around Sarajevo at the end of February 1994, however, provided reason for hope that an overall political settlement might at last be within reach. Since UNPROFOR's deployment embodied the will of the international community to help the parties to arrive at such a settlement, "I believe I must recommend its prolongation", said the Secretary-General. He added that, in turn, it was the responsibility of the parties to seize the opportunity provided by UNPROFOR's continuation to demonstrate by their conduct - on the ground and at the negotiating table - that they were seriously committed to pursuing the path of peace. "If they are, the United Nations stands ready, as always, to help them", he said.

REOPENING OF TUZLA AIRPORT
In yet another report submitted to the Security Council on 24 March 1994, the Secretary-General outlined his plans for the reopening of Tuzla airport, under UNPROFOR's exclusive authority, for the delivery of humanitarian supplies and related purposes. It was estimated that approximately 800,000 people lived in the Tuzla region, 240,000 of them being refugees and displaced persons and another 200,000 being considered cases in need of assistance. Because of the fighting in central Bosnia, the region had been effectively cut off from normal commercial traffic for almost one year, which had made almost the entire population dependent on humanitarian assistance for its survival.

Tuzla airport would be opened for UNPROFOR and humanitarian use only, and restricted to UNPROFOR and humanitarian airlift coordinated by UNHCR. The Secretary-General stated that, in addition to the Nordic battalion already deployed at the airfield, operating the airport would require a number of support staff to carry out various communications, administrative, transportation, engineer and logistics support tasks. Apart from those functions, UNPROFOR identified a need for some 120 specialist personnel, 20 military observers and 20 United Nations civilian police monitors.

CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT IN CROATIA
On 29 March 1994, in Zagreb, representatives of the Government of Croatia and the local Serb authorities in UNPAs concluded a cease-fire agreement aiming to achieve a lasting cessation of hostilities. The agreement was concluded in the presence of the representatives of the Russian Federation and of the United States, and witnessed by the representatives of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia and the Force Commander of UNPROFOR.

In his 30 March 1994 letter to the President of the Security Council, the Secretary-General reported that the implementation of this cease-fire agreement would involve, inter alia, the interpositioning of UNPROFOR forces in a zone of separation of varying width, the establishment of additional control points, observation posts and patrols, as well as the monitoring of the withdrawal of heavy weapons out of range of the contact line. In order to enable UNPROFOR to perform the functions called for in the agreement, the Secretary-General recommended that the Council increase the authorized strength of the Force by four mechanized infantry companies (one mechanized infantry battalion of 1,000 all ranks) and four engineer companies (600 all ranks). In addition, a helicopter squadron of at least six helicopters with 200 all ranks would be needed for effective monitoring of the cease-fire agreement.

UNPROFOR MANDATE EXTENDED
On 31 March 1994, the Security Council, by its resolution 908 (1994), extended the mandate of UNPROFOR for an additional six-month period terminating on 30 September 1994 and decided, as an initial step, to increase the Force's strength by an additional 3,500 troops. It also decided to take action by 30 April 1994 at the latest on further troop requirements recommended by the Secretary-General in his reports of 11 March and of 16 March 1994 and his letter of 30 March 1994.

The Council approved UNPROFOR's plans for the reopening of Tuzla airport for humanitarian purposes and authorized additional resources recommended by the Secretary-General for that purpose. It called on Member States to contribute personnel, equipment and training in support of those activities.

By other terms of the resolution, the Council decided that Member States might take all necessary measures to extend close air support to the territory of Croatia in defence of UNPROFOR personnel in the performance of its mandate, under the authority of the Council and subject to close coordination with the Secretary-General and UNPROFOR. It further authorized the Force to carry out tasks relating to the cease-fire entered into by the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Bosnian Croat party.

The Council urged the Republic of Croatia and the local Serb authorities in the UNPAs to comply with the cease-fire agreement signed on 29 March 1994, and welcomed the efforts undertaken by UNPROFOR towards implementing this agreement.

The Council also welcomed the appointment of the Special Coordinator for Sarajevo and the establishment of a voluntary trust fund for the restoration of essential public services in and around that city.

By the same resolution, the Council demanded that the Bosnian Serb party cease all military operations against the town of Maglaj and requested the Secretary-General to keep the situation there under review and to report to the Council as appropriate.

On 27 April 1994, the Security Council, by its resolution 914 (1994), authorized, as recommended by the Secretary-General, an increase in the strength of UNPROFOR of up to 6,550 additional troops, 150 military observers and 275 civilian police monitors, in addition to the reinforcement already approved in resolution 908 (1994).

SITUATION IN GORAZDE
OFFENSIVE AGAINST SAFE AREA
At the end of March 1994, the Bosnian Serb forces launched an infantry and artillery offensive against the United Nations safe area of Gorazde. The indiscriminate shelling of the city and of the outlying villages led to considerable casualties among the civilian population.

On 6 April 1994, the Security Council, in a statement by its President, strongly condemned the shelling and infantry and artillery attacks against the safe area of Gorazde, and demanded the immediate cessation of further attacks against the city. The Council called on all concerned fully to respect safe areas, in accordance with its resolution 824 (1993). It also welcomed measures being taken by UNPROFOR to strengthen its presence in Gorazde.

Despite the Council's demand and UNPROFOR's efforts to arrange for a cease-fire, attacks against Gorazde continued unabated. After United Nations military observers in the city were endangered by Serb shelling, UNPROFOR Command requested NATO to use close air support for self-defence of United Nations personnel. Consequently, on 10 and 11 April 1994, aircraft belonging to NATO bombed Bosnian Serb positions.

Notwithstanding Bosnian Serbs' repeated commitments to a cease-fire, however, the heavy shelling of the city did not cease. On 18 April, after the situation in and around Gorazde became extremely dire, the Secretary-General asked NATO to authorize the use of air strikes, at the request of the United Nations, against artillery, mortar positions or tanks attacking civilians in Gorazde, as well as in four other safe areas, namely the towns of Tuzla, Zepa, Bihac and Srebrenica. In a letter to the NATO Secretary-General, he noted that permission for such air strikes had already been given regarding Sarajevo and said that the tragic events in Gorazde demonstrated the need for the NATO Council to take similar decisions on the other safe areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

NATO AUTHORIZES USE OF AIR STRIKES
On 22 April 1994, the NAC authorized the use of air strikes against Bosnian Serb military targets around Gorazde if the Bosnian Serbs did not end their attacks against the safe area immediately, pull their forces back three kilometres from the city centre by 0001 GMT on 24 April 1994, and allow United Nations forces and humanitarian relief convoys freedom of movement there. The NAC agreed that a "military exclusion zone" (within the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina) be established for 20 kilometres around Gorazde, which called for all Bosnian Serb heavy weapons (including tanks, artillery pieces, mortars, multiple rocket launchers, missiles and anti-aircraft weapons) to be withdrawn by 0001 GMT on 27 April 1994. The NAC also agreed on similar arrangements for four other safe areas if they were attacked by heavy weapons from any range or if there was a concentration or movement of heavy weapons within a radius of 20 kilometres of these areas.

NATO reaffirmed its readiness to provide close air support should the Bosnian Serbs attack UNPROFOR or other United Nations personnel in Bosnia and Herzegovina, or forcibly interfere with the implementation of their mandate. It also called on the Bosnian Government not to undertake offensive action from within Gorazde.

SECURITY COUNCIL DEMANDS WITHDRAWAL
On the same day, the Security Council, by its resolution 913 (1994), condemned the shelling and attacks by Bosnian Serb forces against the safe area of Gorazde and demanded the withdrawal of those forces and their weapons to a distance from which they would cease to threaten the safe area. It demanded the immediate conclusion of a cease-fire agreement in Gorazde and throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina, under the auspices of UNPROFOR. The Council also demanded an end to any provocative action in and around the safe areas, the immediate release of all United Nations personnel held by Bosnian Serb forces and unimpeded freedom of movement for UNPROFOR. Underlying the urgent need to intensify efforts towards an overall political settlement, the Council called for the intensification of close consultation between the United States and the Russian Federation and the United Nations and the European Union with the aim of bringing together diplomatic initiatives.

By other terms of the resolution, the Council also invited the Secretary-General to take necessary steps to ensure that UNPROFOR was able to monitor the situation in Gorazde and to ensure respect for any cease-fire and disengagement of military forces, including measures to put heavy weapons under United Nations control.

DEADLINE IS MET
On 23 April, an agreement was reached between UNPROFOR and the Bosnian Serb civilian and military authorities. It called for an immediate and total cease-fire in and around Gorazde from 1000 hours GMT on 23 April and the urgent deployment of an UNPROFOR battalion in an area within a three-kilometre radius from the centre of the city. It was also agreed that heavy weapons would be withdrawn, not later than 2200 hours GMT on 26 April, out of an area within a 20-kilometre radius from the centre of Gorazde.

Although the Bosnian Serbs had not yet fully complied when the 24 April deadline expired, the Force Commander of UNPROFOR decided against the immediate use of air strikes. UNPROFOR felt that significant progress was being made and that the Serbs would soon comply with the ultimatum. It addition, it was important to get United Nations troops and medical units into Gorazde as quickly as possible and the air strikes might have jeopardized that operation.

On 26 April 1994, the United Nations Secretary-General announced that Bosnian Serb forces had complied with the demand that they cease their attacks on Gorazde and pulled their forces and heavy weapons out of the 20-kilometre exclusion zone around the city. He noted that the United Nations had some 500 personnel in Gorazde, and was evacuating the most seriously wounded and bringing in relief supplies.

The Secretary-General stated that the Security Council, with the support of NATO, had taken a clear position that there must be no further threats to any of the safe areas, United Nations humanitarian efforts must continue unimpeded, and all sides must commit to a meaningful cease-fire and negotiate in good faith a political solution.

On 19 May, the Secretary-General reported to the Security Council on the situation in Gorazde. The situation had remained tense although the cease-fire within the 3-km total exclusion zone, as well as the 20-km heavy weapon exclusion zone, had been largely respected.

REFINING OF SAFE-AREA CONCEPT NEEDED
In his 9 May 1994 report to the Security Council, the Secretary-General shared his thoughts with regard to the concept of United Nations safe areas. After analysing the results achieved and lessons learned in establishing the safe areas in Srebrenica, Sarajevo, Tuzla, Zepa, Gorazde and Bihac, he suggested that the successful implementation of that concept required the acceptance of three overriding principles:

(a) That the intention of safe areas is primarily to protect people and not to defend territory and that UNPROFOR'S protection of these areas is not intended to make it a party to the conflict;

(b) That the method of execution of the safe-area task should not, if possible, detract from, but rather enhance, UNPROFOR's original mandates in Bosnia and Herzegovina, namely supporting humanitarian assistance operations and contributing to the overall peace process through the implementation of cease-fires and local disengagements;

(c) That the mandate must take into account UNPROFOR's resource limitations and the conflicting priorities that inevitably arise from unfolding events.

According to the Secretary-General's report, in addition to the arrangements already in place for protection of the safe areas, it was necessary: (a) that the UNPROFOR mission in relation to the safe areas be clearly defined; (b) that the safe areas be delineated, as proposed by UNPROFOR; (c) that they be respected; (d) that complete freedom of movement, on a "notification" (as opposed to "clearance") basis, be ensured for the provision of humanitarian aid to the safe areas, as a prelude to further normalization, including the resumption of commercial traffic.

The Secretary-General believed that safe areas could be made somewhat more effective and manageable. On the other hand, because of difficulties in their implementation as well as their limited effect, it must be recognized that safe areas did not in themselves represent a long-term solution to the fundamental conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which required a political and territorial solution. The Secretary-General therefore viewed the safe-area concept as a temporary mechanism by which some vulnerable populations could be protected pending a comprehensive negotiated political settlement. In this respect, UNPROFOR's protection of the civilian population in safe areas must be implemented so as to provide a positive contribution to the peace process, and not to detract from it.

CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT LAPSES
On 1 June, the Security Council issued a statement by its President in which it reiterated the urgent need for a comprehensive cessation of hostilities throughout the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and called upon parties to resume, without preconditions, serious efforts to reach a political settlement. In that regard, it fully supported efforts by the Secretary-General's Special Representative and the UNPROFOR Force Commander to negotiate such a cessation of hostilities. The Council welcomed the decision to convene in Geneva a meeting with the delegations of the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina and of the Bosnian Serb side.

The meeting was held from 6 to 8 June. On 8 June, after three rounds of discussions held with both sides, the parties signed an agreement according to which they would not engage in any offensive military operations or provocative actions for one month. The agreement came into effect from 1200 hours GMT on 10 June 1994. The agreement also provided for the immediate release, under the auspices of the ICRC, of prisoners-of-war and detainees and the exchange of information on persons whose whereabouts were unknown.

While that agreement was still in effect, Government forces attempted to capture dominating terrain or to secure routes in the areas of Ozren and Travnik. At the same time, Bosnian Serb elements continued to expel Muslim civilians from the Banja Luka and Bijeljina areas and imposed new restrictions on the movement of UNHCR convoys. The agreement, which was renewed for an additional month in July, lapsed on 8 August 1994.

ANOTHER PEACE PLAN REJECTED
Successive blueprints for peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina have been drawn up with the parties and then subsequently repudiated by one side or the other: the Carrington-Cutiliero plan, the Vance-Owen plan, the "HMS Invincible" package, the European Union Action Plan. In January-February 1994, the parties, in talks held under the auspices of the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, Lord Owen and Mr. Thorvald Stoltenberg, reiterated their acceptance of a constitutional framework and modalities for the implementation and monitoring of a cessation of hostilities and on the greater part of a map for the allocation of the territory. However, disagreement remained on, at most, 2 per cent of the territory.

In an effort to overcome the impasse, consultations took place involving the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee, and interested Governments. Following the introduction of a heavy-weapon exclusion zone, the involvement of NATO and the redeployment of a Russian UNPROFOR contingent from Sector East to Sarajevo, it became necessary for the Governments of France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States to become more deeply involved in the peace process.

The United States took the lead in establishing a Bosniac-Croat federation and a confederation between Croatia and the federation. The signing of the Framework Agreements, which took place in Washington on 1 March was followed on 10 May by the signature of the Washington accords for the creation of the Bosniac-Croat Federation. Meanwhile on 25 April, a Contact Group was established involving, at ministerial level, the Foreign Ministers of France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, the United States, the European Union Commissioner for Foreign Affairs and the two Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee.

The Contact Group drew up a map for the allocation of territory between the Bosniac-Croat Federation and the Bosnian Serb entity (the so-called "Republic Srpska") and submitted it to the two sides on 6 July. The map allocated 51 per cent to the Bosniac-Croat Federation and 49 per cent to the Bosnian Serbs. The Contact Group, supported by the Security Council and the Council of Ministers of the European Union, as well as by Governments and organizations world-wide, informed the parties that the proposed map would have to be accepted as presented, unless the parties could agree between themselves on changes.

At the end of July, the Bosniac-Croat Federation accepted the map. The Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) also accepted the map. Leaders of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) urged the Bosnian Serb leadership to accept the map. The Bosnian Serb side, however, rejected it.

BORDER CLOSED
In early August, in an effort to persuade the Bosnian Serb authorities to accept the map, the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) severed economic and political relations with the Bosnian Serb leaders and took measures to cut off telecommunications between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and Bosnian Serb-controlled territory, to deny visits to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) by Bosnian Serb officials and to close the 300-mile border to all traffic except for food, clothing and medical assistance.

In September, after detailed discussions with the Co-Chairmen and the staff of the International Conference, the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) agreed that the Conference would send a mission which would control the effective delivery of humanitarian assistance at designated crossing-points and would have freedom of access elsewhere in the country. The Mission would report to the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee and, through them, to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Presidency of the European Union, on the implementation of the border closure. It would consist of international civilian staff made available to the International Conference.

The initial party of the Mission arrived in Belgrade on 14 September, and on 16 September it sent out its first reconnaissance team to visit a number of border crossings. As of 20 September, the Mission had 52 international staff. On 19 September, the Co-Chairmen informed the Secretary-General that the Mission had reported that the Federal Government and the federal authorities had fully cooperated with the Mission. The Mission's first impressions from the border areas seemed to verify that the Federal Government was taking "every action to seal off the border between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and Bosnia and Herzegovina effectively".

On 23 September, the Security Council, by its resolution 943 (1994), welcomed the decision by the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to close the international border with Bosnia and Herzegovina. It decided to suspend several economic sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) for an initial period of 100 days following the receipt by the Secretary-General of a certification that the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) were effectively implementing their decision to close the border. It would suspend restrictions on air travel for civilian passengers and personal effects; suspend the impoundment of vessels, freight vehicles, rolling stock and aircraft; suspend restrictions on maritime traffic, particularly the ferry service between Bar in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and Bari in Italy carrying only passengers and personal effects; and suspend restrictions on sporting events and cultural exchanges.

The Council also requested that every thirty days the Secretary-General submit to it a report as on certification by the Co-Chairmen that the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) were effectively implementing their decision to close the border with Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Since the adoption of resolution 943 (1994), the Co-Chairmen have submitted two reports, on 3 October and 2 November, certifying that the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) was meeting its commitment to close the border between that country and the areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina under the control of Bosnian Serb forces. As of 2 November 1994, the Mission of the International Conference had 118 international personnel from Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, the European Union, Finland, France, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the Russian Federation, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States.

SANCTIONS STRENGTHENED
On 23 September, the Security Council, by its resolution 942 (1994), welcomed the territorial settlement for Bosnia and Herzegovina proposed by the Contact Group, strongly condemned the Bosnian Serb party for their refusal to accept it, and decided to strengthen the sanctions against the Bosnian Serbs. The sanctions, which apply to "all activities of an economic nature, including commercial, financial and industrial activities and transactions", would be reconsidered if the Bosnian Serbs unconditionally accepted the proposed territorial settlement.

The text of the two-part 22-paragraph resolution referred in particular to all economic activities involving property - funds, financial, tangible and intangible assets, property rights, and publicly and privately traded securities and debt instruments and any other financial and economic resources.

The Council also decided that States should freeze financial assets held in their countries by Bosnian Serbs or entities under their control and take steps to prevent the diversion of benefits to areas controlled by the Bosnian Serbs. States should also prevent any economic activities carried on with any entity directly or indirectly controlled by persons or entities resident or incorporated in areas controlled by Bosnian Serbs, or with those acting on behalf of such persons or entities.

By the terms of the resolution, all commercial riverine traffic was prohibited from entering the ports in areas under Bosnian Serb control.

Excepted from the sanctions were medical supplies, foodstuffs and goods for essential humanitarian needs. In addition, States might authorize economic activities to be carried on within their territories when they were satisfied that such activities did not result in the transfer of assets to areas controlled by the Bosnian Serbs.

The Council decided that States should prevent from entering their territory Bosnian Serbian authorities and persons who violated this and other relevant Council resolutions. The Council also decided to review the sanctions whenever appropriate and in any event, every four months.

FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS IN FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
In mid-September 1994, in view of the expiration of UNPROFOR mandate by the end of the month, the Secretary-General submitted to the Security Council a further report providing an account of the developments in the former Yugoslavia since March 1994.

CROATIA
Analysing the situation in Croatia, the Secretary-General stated that UNPROFOR's activities in that country were focusing on the monitoring of the general cease-fire agreement signed in Zagreb on 29 March 1994 by the Government of Croatia and the local Serb authorities in the UNPAs. The agreement constituted a major achievement that had significantly reduced active hostilities between the conflicting sides in Croatia. By the end of May, UNPROFOR reported almost total compliance, characterized by a general cessation of hostilities, withdrawal of forces beyond fixed lines of separation and the placement of heavy weapons in agreed storage sites. UNPROFOR assumed exclusive control over the zone of separation, covering an area of over 1,300 square kilometres.

In the following months, UNPROFOR focused on strengthening compliance with the cease-fire agreement. These efforts, however, faced several setbacks involving a number of violations by both sides of the cease-fire agreement in the UNPAs.

In addition, the Association of Displaced Persons of Croatia in early July imposed a blockade on all the crossing-points into or within the UNPAs, in order to draw attention to their plight and apply pressure on UNPROFOR to expedite their return to their homes in the Protected Areas. After a series of high-level discussions between UNPROFOR and Croatian authorities and following the Security Council's presidential statement of 11 August 1994, the blockade was eventually lifted on 19 August. Although 17 of the 19 crossing-points were reopened, tensions persisted on this issue.

Despite these setbacks and violations, both sides continued to express support for the cease-fire agreement, and UNPROFOR intensified its efforts to restore full compliance with its provisions.

It was hoped, the Secretary-General said, that after the cease-fire agreement, the parties would begin comprehensive discussions on issues of mutual economic benefit, followed by talks on a final political settlement, under the auspices of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia. However, during the months of April and May, local Serb authorities in Knin issued a number of statements that appeared to close the door on political reconciliation. They announced their intention to pursue full integration with other Serb areas in the former Yugoslavia and stipulated unrealistic preconditions for talks. It proved impossible to open negotiations at that stage.

In August, following renewed mediation efforts by the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, senior officials from the Croatian Government and local Serb authorities were brought together for discussions in Knin. Committing themselves to continuing the negotiating process, they agreed to establish eight expert groups to prepare for future negotiation on specific economic issues.

The Secretary-General also recalled that by its resolution 908 (1994), the Security Council had authorized the extension of close air support to the territory of Croatia. Discussions between NATO and UNPROFOR were continuing on technical aspects of this issue.

BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
Describing the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Secretary-General noted that following the signature on 23 February 1994 of a cease-fire agreement between the Bosnian Government army and the Bosnian Croat forces, as well as the agreement subsequently reached in Washington on 10 May 1994 on the creation of the Bosniac-Croat Federation, UNPROFOR was closely involved in the implementation of all its military aspects, bringing a large degree of stability and peace to central Bosnia and western Herzegovina. UNPROFOR was instrumental in achieving a breakthrough in an agreement on freedom of movement in the Mostar area, which was implemented on 23 May, and resulted in a rapid improvement in the quality of life for residents on the eastern bank of the Neretva River. UNPROFOR also played an important role in monitoring the demilitarization of Mostar, a precondition for the establishment of the European Union administration in that city on 23 July 1994. In central Bosnia, UNPROFOR was also involved in negotiations on freedom of movement both for the population and for commercial traffic. While freedom of movement was not yet complete, some commercial convoys, under the security provided by UNPROFOR's presence, were able to move from the coast to southern, central and northern Bosnia.

Also on the positive side, the Secretary-General referred to the establishment of the cease-fire in Gorazde in April 1994, which was largely respected since then, and of the exclusion zone around that city. Also, in late April, tensions mounted in and around the strategically important Posavina corridor, with frequent artillery, mortar and rocket exchanges affecting the Brcko, Tuzla and Orasje areas. In response, UNPROFOR mediated between the parties and eventually deployed United Nations military observers in and around Brcko. That deployment significantly contributed to reducing tension and making an offensive by either side less likely.

The Secretary-General referred further to the signing on 17 March 1994 of an agreement between the Government and the Bosnian Serb party on freedom of movement in the Sarajevo area, an anti-sniping agreement negotiated by UNPROFOR in Sarajevo on 14 August, a similar anti-sniping agreement concluded in Gorazde on 28 August, as well as the activities of the Special Coordinator for Sarajevo.

At the same time, the Secretary-General stated that despite the progress made in many areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina, hostilities had erupted along many parts of the confrontation line between Government and Bosnian Serb forces after an initial period of calm following the Gorazde crisis.

In western Bosnia, Government forces launched an offensive and defeated the forces of the self-declared "Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia" [with its stronghold at Velika Kladusa and headed by the breakaway Muslim leader, Mr. Fikret Abdic] in the Bihac area, resulting in an exodus of an estimated 35,000 mostly Muslim refugees to the UNPA of Sector North in Croatia. Meanwhile, Government forces also resumed operations in the Ozren and Travnik areas and advanced south from the areas of Breza and Dastansko. All these activities were met by heavy Bosnian Serb shelling and local counter-attacks at many points along the confrontation line. UNPROFOR made several unavailing attempts to persuade both sides to seek a negotiated rather than a military solution.

The Secretary-General also reported that serious violations of human rights persisted. UNPROFOR continued to highlight and condemn strongly the incidence of torture, killings and expulsions of minorities within Bosnia and Herzegovina. UNPROFOR persisted in its attempts to visit and establish a presence in Bosnian Serb-controlled areas, particularly in Banja Luka and Bijeljina, which were the scene of continued "ethnic cleansing".

FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA
The Secretary-General reported that although the military situation in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia remained relatively calm and stable, since April there had been a rise in the frequency of encounters between patrols from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia along their common border. UNPROFOR successfully mediated several tense border encounters, achieving the withdrawal of soldiers on both sides. In those activities, UNPROFOR maintained close coordination with other international bodies, including the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia and the CSCE.

The Secretary-General noted further that the most serious difficulties experienced by the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia were economic. Social stability was endangered by rising unemployment and a declining economy resulting, among other things, from the effects of the economic blockade imposed by Greece on 17 February 1994 and of the United Nations sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), formerly the country's primary trading partners. Internal political tensions between Macedonians and ethnic